
Introduction

In advance of the 2012 congressional elections, a New Mexico senatorial candidate recently asked, “What is the most striking difference between Middle Eastern Arab political systems and ours in the United States?” The response was: “In the US, there is institutional leadership, in the Middle East, leaders are institutions themselves.” For more than a thousand years, dynastic, tribal, and autocratic regimes have dominated Arab politics, bureaucracies, militaries, and governments. They have existed at the local, national, and regional levels.” There are many examples: the Meccans, Umayyads, Buwayids, Abbasids, Fatamids, Almoravids, Osmanis, Saudis, Rashidis, Hashemites, Sabahs, Tikritis, etc. In the last century, how different would Palestinian Arab politics have been if the Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin-al-Husayni, and the head of the PLO, Yasir Arafat, had not dominated their community and undermined alternative political voices at virtually every turn? \(^1\) Since the political upheaval that began across the Arab world in late 2010, the general public’s vitriol and revulsion have been aimed at domineering autocrats. Since Mohammed Morsi’s summer 2012 election in Egypt, rampant conjecture has revolved around his political direction and his relationships with the Egyptian military, the Moslem Brotherhood, Iran, Hamas, the Egyptian parliament, and foreign powers. The cry for change across the region has called for reducing the dictatorial roles of imperious rulers, elite cronyism, and corruption. So far, the change has focused on who rules, rather than by what rules of governance inhabitants might be assured basic rights.
Anwar Sadat, the President of Egypt from October 15, 1970 to October 6, 1981, remains one example (among many) of an autocrat who controlled and manipulated an Arab political system. Both Sadat’s predecessor and his successor were equally proficient at domineering, one-man rule. Each was an autocrat with peculiar characteristics, but they were autocrats. So also were his contemporaries in Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, and all around the Arabian Peninsula. After Sadat rebuked challenges to his presidential rule within a year of taking office, he asserted authoritarian control over domestic politics and foreign affairs. At one point prior to the October War, he made himself Prime Minister as well as President. He developed a historiography that glorified himself as Egypt’s pharaoh of the moment. In Arab-Israeli negotiations, Sadat willingly became the essential catalyst. By sheer force of will, he drove the negotiation process forward. He was impatient, yet understood how to use other political actors, personal predispositions, and political realities to achieve his single most important national objective: the full return of the Israeli-held Sinai Peninsula, which had been lost by his predecessor, Gamal Abdel Nasser, in the June 1967 war. Restoration of Sinai was a necessary step towards regaining Egyptian national dignity, which was so mightily damaged in the June 1967 war. Nasser made the mistake of frightening Israel sufficiently to provoke a devastating pre-emptive military strike that lost Sinai in six days. When he came into office, Sadat set about the task of righting Nasser’s mistake. Without the loss of Sinai in 1967, there would not have been a territorial reason for Egypt to engage with Israel diplomatically. Thus, Nasser’s decision to go to war, the loss of Sinai, and Sadat’s drive to have it returned collectively culminated in partial Arab state acceptance of Israel. During Sadat’s lifetime, Egypt signed military disengagement agreements with Israel in January 1974 and September 1975. From there until his
trip to Jerusalem in November 1977, he kept the diplomatic process moving forward either openly, secretly, or along parallel tracks. In September 1978 and March 1979 he and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin signed the Camp David Accords and Egyptian-Israeli Treaty, respectively. The 1978 Camp David Accords were a ‘Declaration of Principles,’ or an outline on how to move forward in resolving the Palestinian-Israeli component of the conflict. It was another ‘disengagement agreement,’ only this time relating to Israel’s potential disengagement from the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The 1991 Madrid Middle East Peace Conference could not have taken place if Egypt and Israel had not sustained their treaty relationship; in fact, no further diplomatic process would have been possible had Israel not fully withdrawn from all of Sinai and had the United States not remained centrally engaged in Arab-Israeli diplomacy. The 1993 Oslo Accords signed between Israel and the PLO and subsequent Israeli-Palestinian agreements provided additional substance, though not a conclusion, to that element of the conflict. The convocation of the 2007 Annapolis Middle East Peace Conference was predicated on direct negotiations between the parties— the formula that Egypt and Israel developed from 1973 through 1979; it was applied and reinforced by the 1994 Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty and American led efforts in 2000 to restart Syrian-Israeli negotiations.

No analyst, casual observer, diplomat, historian, or political scientist, friendly or otherwise, doubts the important function the United States played in unfolding and catalyzing modern Arab-Israeli diplomacy. In these difficult and episodic negotiations, the US played many roles: critic, convener, drafter, engineer, friend, guarantor, hand-holder, mediator, and postman. No other national bureaucracy had the number of skilled, knowledgeable, and experienced diplomats to “work the issue.” No other team of diplomats remained as intrepidly dedicated to
pushing for elusive, seemingly impossible interim and final agreements. In the 1970s, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and President Jimmy Carter were vitally important in dedicating the White House to moving Egyptian-Israeli diplomacy forward. Both are appropriately given due praise for their dedication and accomplishments, though at times neither were fully aware of the complexity of inter-Arab political jealousies. At times, both inserted US national interests or their own personal biases into the diplomatic processes. Sometimes the US, as mediator, wanted an outcome or a pace that neither the Egyptians nor Israelis preferred. Immediately after the October 1973 War, both countries could have reached a military and political agreement if left to their own devices, but Kissinger – as will be shown below – intervened to stop the negotiations dead in their tracks. He wanted the military agreement to conclude in the aftermath of the December 1973 Geneva Middle East Peace Conference. He needed the agreement to come after the Conference, so he could demonstrate his control over the negotiations; it was a means of showing Moscow who was in charge. Neither Sadat nor Israel’s Begin particularly liked the Carter administration’s preferences for a comprehensive agreement. Sadat had told the Israelis, according Israel Foreign Minister Dayan, “that the question of the Palestinians, the West Bank, the refugees in general, and Jerusalem were less a priority than occupied Sinai.” 4 Neither Egypt nor Israel wanted any procedure that slowed-down the pursuit of a bilateral arrangement. Of course, Sadat gave public notice that he was always interested in a comprehensive peace, but when push came to shove in the fall of 1978, he did not stop negotiations because either Syrian or Palestinian interests were not being fulfilled. Neither Israel nor Egypt wanted the Soviet Union to play a diplomatic role in renewed negotiations. That point was expressly stated in the secret Israeli-Egyptian talks in Morocco in September 1977. 5 Nor did either country want their
national priorities ensnared by the spider-web of procedures that emerged from the Carter administration’s diplomatic cooking.

The bottom line remains: Without Sadat’s presence, vision, courage, and chutzpah, there would not have been any Egyptian-Israeli agreement or series of agreements. Israeli leaders, though, were also central to agreements with Egypt. They saw the need to neutralize Egypt’s military power because of its potential to put Israel’s security in deep and regular jeopardy. Nonetheless, the Israelis were inherently hesitant; they never really trusted Sadat, thinking of him as ‘mercurial’ and ‘unpredictable,’ qualities that colleagues and diplomats alike have said that he possessed in “adequate quantities.” To be sure, Sadat did not wake up one morning and say to himself, “I want peace with Israel, and to do that I want to go to the Israeli parliament and give a speech with a photo of Theodor Herzl looking over my shoulder.” He negotiated with Israel and signed agreements and a treaty with Israel because they were a means to an end. Harnessing himself to the US had several desirable outcomes: Washington could support his economy and help supply his military with equipment; US diplomatic engagement meant that Israel’s most important friend was supportive of a negotiating process in which Israel’s security remained paramount; and he could demonstrate to a highly skeptical Israeli public, particularly after decades of Nasser’s publically stated hatred for Israel, that Israel should take a chance on withdrawal from Sinai. Sadat also wanted to move out from under the influence of Moscow. He knew that inching Egypt closer to the US would reduce Soviet influence in Egypt, a move that Washington found strategically advantageous in the midst of the Cold War. Peter Rodman, who was part of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s diplomatic shuttle missions in the 1973-75 period, categorized Egypt’s shift from Moscow to the US as “one of the great victories for the
United States” in the Cold War. In his relationships with Washington, Sadat was a masterful strategist: he anointed Kissinger his “ambassador” to Israel, and, according to Zbigniew Brzezinski (Carter’s national security adviser), later “played Carter like a violin.”

When Jordan’s King Hussein wanted his own disengagement agreement with Israel in 1974, Sadat quietly told Kissinger to remain focused on a Syria-Israeli agreement; the Jordanians were livid. Sadat was beyond clever. In the middle of 1974 and again in 1975, when he was being accused of selling out the Palestinians by negotiating indirectly with Israel through the United States, Sadat endorsed the PLO as the “sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.” That, too, angered the Jordanians, who wanted to negotiate for the future of the West Bank and, of course, Arab Jerusalem. But Sadat knew what the Israeli response would be. If the PLO was the only possible diplomatic address for negotiating the future of the West Bank, then (given its then passionate hatred of the PLO) Israel would never negotiate the return of the West Bank and Jerusalem. That suited Sadat just fine. It kept the focus of Israel’s diplomatic attention on Egypt, away from the frigid complexities of the Palestinian-Israeli relations. Sadat’s consistent method was to defend the Palestinians publically, but privately work to isolate them from negotiations or planned talks. Arafat did not make good on his private promise to Brzezinski and Carter, made through a secret intermediary in March 1977, to recognize the legitimacy of UN Resolution 242. That kept the PLO out of the negotiating mix until the Carter administration introduced the idea of Palestinian representation in a “unified” Arab delegation at a reconvened international peace conference. The resulting summer 1977 undertaking was aimed at bringing Arabs and Israelis together to resolve all issues at one time, a concept that many in the State Department thought to be totally unrealistic. Sadat, too, was not enamored with the
idea; while the Carter administration spun its wheels on this procedure, Sadat engaged in a series of secret talks with the Israelis directly in Morocco and indirectly through Rumania. If the Carter administration was going to get lost in procedural matters, it was not going to keep Sadat from determining Israeli readiness to negotiate for Sinai’s return.

Sadat’s purpose was to gauge whether the Israelis were prepared for direct talks. When the Carter administration moved to bring the Soviet Union into diplomatic negotiations in October, after Israelis and Egyptians had agreed in secret exchanges not to support reintroduced Soviet engagement, Sadat decided that direct talks with the Israelis was one of the only ways to maintain progress on Egypt’s objectives and priorities. At Camp David in September 1978, he told Carter that he would represent the interests of the other Arabs; Carter and Brzezinski naively believed him. While the Israelis and Americans regularly became testy with each other about settlement building, Sadat simply did not care to let the settlements issue stand in the way of Egyptian-Israeli negotiating progress and the ultimate return of Sinai. These were examples of unsuccessful Carter White House injections to direct the negotiating process and seek outcomes that reflected American priorities, rather than those of the negotiating parties.

**Why Did Sadat Go to War?**

Sadat used war as a means to break the diplomatic freeze. War was not his first option. Or, if it was, he cleverly disguised it by trying the diplomatic route while also preparing for war. Sadat knew by April 1973 that diplomacy alone would not ignite a negotiating process. By showing a public and private diplomatic side to the skeptical Israelis, he encouraged them to feel relaxed in their military planning. As early as 1971, Sadat let American diplomats and the media know that
he wanted a diplomatic process to restore Egyptian sovereignty over Sinai. First he thought about only having several hundred Egyptian policemen stationed in Sinai. This he would reciprocate with an interim agreement with Israel—not a treaty, but something less formal. Sadat said he was prepared to “recognize Israel, if there would be full withdrawal from all the occupied territories, with the first step being withdrawal from the canal to the strategic Gidi and Mitla Passes in Sinai.”

Independently of Sadat’s overture, at about the same time in the late winter of 1971, Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan approached Israeli Prime Minister Meir with the idea of unilateral but only partial Israeli military withdrawal from Sinai. Dayan believed that if Israel withdrew sufficiently from the Canal area, then the Egyptians would have reason to rebuild the Suez Canal cities and open the Canal (which had been closed since the June 1967 war), which would have been the best assurance of Egypt’s intention not to launch another war; on the other hand, Dayan said that “Israel had to be in a position if they [the Egyptians] violate our expectations, within hours we will be there to take care of the situation.” Dayan floated the idea to some Israeli newspaper editors and then to the general public, but he was unable to convince Meir and she did not approve it. She said, if “we retreat an inch from the Canal…. [we] will in no time land at the international border.”

On several occasions in 1971 and 1972, Sadat told Donald Bergus, head of the American interests section situated in the Indian embassy, that he was prepared to negotiate with Israel. He said the same thing in 1973 to Michael Sterner, the head of the Egypt Desk at the State Department. In early 1973 he sent his National Security Adviser Hafez, Ismail, to Kissinger to explain carefully in secret talks he and Egypt were prepared to sign an agreement with Israel.
Ismail made it clear to Kissinger in unambiguous terms that Egypt thought that “the end of the state of war will come with the final withdrawal of Israel from Egyptian territory. We shall acknowledge respect for the sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity of Israel and the right to live in peace…with the final withdrawal.”  

Ismail did not say that after withdrawal that Egypt would sign a treaty with Israel, but he was precise about how ending the ‘state of war’ with Israel would be defined. He did intimate that Egypt was not willing to normalize relations with Israel, and would withhold full recognition until Egypt knew that agreements where on the way to conclusion with Syria and Jordan. Ismail said nothing about the need for a Palestinian state. Sadat told a Newsweek interviewer on April 23, 1973, “The time has come for a shock. Diplomacy will continue before, during, and after the battle. All West Europeans are telling us that everybody has fallen asleep over the Middle East crisis. But they will soon wake up to the fact that America has left us no other way out. The resumption of the hostilities is the only way out. Everything is now being mobilized in concert for the resumption of the battle which is inevitable.” That month he met secretly with President Assad in Egypt and told him, “Hafez, I am going to war this year. What do you think? He said: I am with you.”

Sadat was moved to action because the US, or more precisely Kissinger, was not prepared to engage as mediator.

Why not? Was it Kissinger’s unfamiliarity with the Arab world and Arab politics? Was it that his view of readiness for the US to become involved in negotiations was framed by Israel’s Prime Minister Meir, who remained highly skeptical of Sadat or his motives? Was it that the CIA and State Department relied too heavily on the Israeli intelligence assessments that the Egyptians simply could not and would not go to war? Since Kissinger jumped into the negotiations with
such gusto at the war’s conclusion, what kept the Nixon administration from engaging in serious negotiations prior to it? In the days just before Nixon’s summit meeting with Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev in June 1973, Kissinger (after his meetings with Ismail) summed up the limited possibilities and liabilities for engaging in Egyptian-Israeli negotiations. “The most the US can foresee [is] persuading Israel to accept restoration of nominal Egyptian sovereignty in the Sinai with a transitional Israeli security presence at key positions. This might not be full sovereignty but it would establish the principle of legal sovereignty. The question now is whether Sadat can accept a step-by-step approach with assurance of persistent White House involvement. The US needs to avoid the kind of concrete detail that would limit the usefulness of our involvement before we have even begun.” Since Ismail had specifically asked for direct American engagement in negotiations and in a step-by-step manner, why did Kissinger (not yet Secretary of State, but only NSC head) still recommend caution to Nixon in regards to Egyptian-Israeli negotiations? What is certain is that Sadat was ready to negotiate, ready to give the mediating mantle to the Americans to do so, and accurate about US reluctance to take the initiative.

There is consensus from a variety of authoritative sources on why Sadat went to war. However, with the exception of Hafez Ismail and Egyptian General al-Gemasy, his military Chief of Staff at least from the sources used for this paper did not know the degree of detail Ismail had provided Kissinger in regard to how talks could be conducted, namely “step-by-step,” and to Egypt’s readiness to sign an agreement or agreements with Israel at the end of negotiations. “The war was a pro-American move where he deliberately started an international crisis, aimed at lighting a fire under the United States.”14 It was designed to cause Washington
and Kissinger to take notice, become involved, and ultimately arrange for Israel’s departure from Sinai.\textsuperscript{15} Before the 1973 War, Sadat told Zaid Rifa'i, King Hussein's political adviser and later Jordan's Prime Minister, that in order to have the Soviets and Americans pay attention to the Middle East, he had to start a war “\textit{harb taharik mish harb tahrir}”— a war for movement, not a war for liberation. “For me, I [Sadat] shall cross the canal and stop.”\textsuperscript{16} By contrast, Syria's Foreign Minister Abd al-Halim Khaddam said: “For Syria, it was a war of liberation, not a war of movement. The objectives of the war were to liberate Golan and Sinai. The Syrian forces advanced according to that plan. The Egyptian forces, however, just passed the canal and stopped.”\textsuperscript{17} According to Nabil al-Arabi, Sadat entered the war, “not to attain military objectives, but to influence the political process.”\textsuperscript{18} As per a later assessment by American diplomat Joseph Sisco and his deputy, Roy Atherton, Sadat went to war because he could not get negotiations started otherwise. Said Sisco: “The decision to go to war was precisely to get what he wanted, namely, a negotiation” started.\textsuperscript{19}

Either by luck, cleverness, or a combination of both, Sadat used the war's muddled outcome to promote his own national interest: to begin to achieve the restoration of Sinai to Egyptian sovereignty. Sadat told al-Gamasy that “this was not a war for the Palestinians or for the other Arabs; it was for Egypt.”\textsuperscript{20} Sadat was not prepared to make peace with Israel; according to Usamah al-Baz, later his key foreign policy adviser: “His concept of peace with Israel was something like non-belligerency, opening the Suez Canal, and ending the Arab boycott in exchange for all of Sinai with security arrangements, providing they would be undertaken astride the international border [between Egypt and Israel].”\textsuperscript{21} In preparing for the war, Sadat was neither naive about his own military capabilities nor unrealistic about Washington's willingness
to preserve Israeli security. Sadat believed that U.S. intervention, on Israel's side, at some point during a war was likely, to prevent either an Israeli military defeat or major loss of territory. Sadat understood quite well what his limitations were militarily, even with Syria as a full partner in the October War. Sadat realized that through military means, the Egyptian Army could not dislodge Israel from all of Sinai. His war goals were limited to piercing the Israeli Bar-Lev line on the East Bank of the Suez Canal and perhaps, if the option presented itself, driving to the western side of the Gidi and Mitla Passes, some twenty-five to thirty miles into Sinai. 22 In an interview with me, Hafez Ismail (then Sadat’s National Security Adviser) recounted that, “Sadat wanted the heat of the battle to be a force behind the political decisions which had to be taken. He was in a hurry; he would not let things cool down.” 23 Sadat was the engine and motivation for Washington’s reengagement in Arab-Israeli diplomacy. He unfurled a negotiating process from the war to provide for Egypt's domestic needs; and he saw the possibility of a political settlement, not exclusively for Egypt, but for Egypt first. 24

Sadat, of course, could not choreograph the actions of all the players in the conflict once the October War began. Prior to the war, he did arrange with the Saudis to impose an oil embargo on countries that supported Israel. He could not have predicted the actions of either Moscow or Washington, though he hoped when the war ended Moscow’s role in the post-war diplomacy would be marginalized. He could not have predicted that when his troops crossed the canal so quickly, the Israelis would successfully counter-attack and surround 15,000 Egyptian soldiers of his Third Army—leaving their fate dependent upon the goodwill of Israeli leadership, which was opposed by a powerful inclination toward outright retribution against Egypt for the surprise attack on Yom Kippur day. Ultimately, the Third Army was left in the
hands of Secretary of State Kissinger, who knew that the Army’s survival would give Sadat additional reason to depend on US diplomacy. Sadat could not have surmised when he went to war on October 6 that the US and the USSR would find themselves on the brink of conventional military, if not nuclear, confrontation over the matter of the Third Army. He could not have predicted that his capture of Israeli prisoners of war and the absolute priority of their immediate return to Israel, as demanded by Israeli Prime Minister Meir, could allow for the survival of his Third Army. Nor could he have guessed that the UN Security Council Resolution 338 would be passed, sanctioning “direct negotiations between the parties.” He was not yet ready to embrace such a procedure, but UNSCR 338 established an internationally sanctioned atmosphere under which indirect Egyptian-Israeli talks would take place until Sadat went to Jerusalem on November 19, 1977. He could not have predicted that the post-1973 Egyptian-Israeli military talks at Kilometer 101 would evolve so successfully that he would have to countenance their early suspension—so Kissinger would have a partial agreement that he could build on after the conclusion of the December 1973 Geneva Conference. Those military talks resulted in the detail and the maps that Kissinger used in finalizing the January 13, 1974 Egyptian-Israel Disengagement Agreement. Did he surmise that, by promoting Egyptian national interests, he would be opening an angry competition with Syria? Did he realize that this competition would allow Syrian President Assad to use creeping Egyptian-US closeness to deepen Syria’s ties with Moscow? When Assad turned down Kissinger’s invitation to attend the December 1973 Middle East Peace Conference a week before it was to commence in Geneva, Sadat achieved one of his purposes for going to war: to keep Syria from obstructing a negotiating process that promoted Egypt’s interest first.
The Kilometer 101 Talks to the January 1974 Egyptian-Israeli Agreement: how Sadat managed his desired outcome

On October 27, 1973, a German-born Egyptian career foreign service officer, Omar Sirry, who served as Deputy Chief of Operations in the Egyptian Foreign Ministry, was called by Egyptian Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy. This was three weeks after the outbreak of the October 1973 War, ten days after Israel launched a counter-attack against the Egyptian Army in Sinai and eventually surrounded the 15,000 man Egyptian Third Army, and one week after American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger negotiated the contents of what came to be United Nations Security Council Resolution 338 in Moscow with Soviet Chairman Brezhnev. It was only a day after the United States and the Soviet Union stepped back from possible military confrontation over the intervention of Soviet troops into the canal area. Fahmy told Sirry to “get a toothbrush and a pajama and be ready” to talk with Israelis. The primary Egyptian reason for attending such talks was to find immediate relief for the Egyptian Third Army, which was surrounded by Israeli forces. The destruction of the Third Army had the potential to destroy Sadat’s presidency, not to mention jeopardizing Sadat’s newly-expanded opening to the United States. By contrast, Israel's absolute priority was effecting a swift exchange of war prisoners and arranging the return of the remains of soldiers who had been killed during the war. Fahmy told Sirry that he had to be prepared to go to Suez. Fahmy had a large ego; he did not like playing the role of President Sadat’s messenger. Moreover, he was not fully informed about Sadat’s objectives, and was philosophically uncomfortable about having any discussions with the Israelis. Said Sirry: “Indicative of the psychological attitude that was prevailing at the time in Egypt, after so many years of fighting and opposing the Israelis, Fahmy found it very difficult to tell me that I was
going to talk to them." After a pause, Fahmy told Sirry that he was to go to military headquarters, meet General al-Gamasy, and become al-Gamasy's political adviser. Sirry attended the first meeting at Kilometer 101. He was accompanied by two or three other Egyptian Foreign Ministry and military officials in the approximately eighteen negotiating sessions that took place between Egyptian and Israeli representatives after the October War and lasted until the end of November 1973. Sirry said, “No one understood the political significance of what we were doing.”

Al-Gamasy, who led the Egyptian negotiating team at the Kilometer 101 Talks, was a career Egyptian military officer. He was a fierce Egyptian nationalist and professional soldier. He was motivated to restore the dignity and prowess of the Egyptian Army, which was so demoralized by the Arab defeat in the June 1967 War. Moreover, for al-Gamasy and other high ranking Egyptian officials, going to war in 1973 was a measure of personal revenge against Moshe Dayan, whom they thought was the “dark side” of Israel. On the same day, Israeli General Aharon Yariv, recently retired as head of Israeli military intelligence, was summoned by Prime Minister Golda Meir to Tel Aviv. During the October War, Yariv had not held an official military position. Meir told Yariv that he would be negotiating with an Egyptian counterpart at Kilometer 101. Yariv received his instructions from Israel Galili, a very close confidant of Meir and Minister-Without-Portfolio in her Cabinet. Galili made sure that Yariv did not give anything, say anything, propose anything, or affirm anything without prior approval and knowledge of the government. Galili told Yariv that Israel wanted a firm cease-fire, an exchange of prisoners-of-war, and a lifting of the Egyptian naval blockade of Israeli shipping at the Bab al-Mandab Straits.
The pending Egyptian-Israeli talks were unique in their countries’ respective belligerent relationship: Egyptian and Israeli military officials were about to negotiate the separation of their forces without the United States or another party in a mediation role, and with the United Nations relegated to a mere gopher status. Kissinger realized that the Third Army needed to be saved; that was the most pressing political requirement. He readily consented to use U.S. government channels to connect Egyptian and Israeli negotiators. Though Kissinger is credited with shaping that agreement, it was pre-negotiated by Sadat and Meir through their military representatives at Kilometer 101. Sadat outlined the content of the meetings, Meir refined them, and the generals at Kilometer 101 added detail to their framework— before Kissinger had the talks suspended so he could use the parties in the Geneva Peace Conference, and eventually use the content they had already agreed upon as the basis for the January 1974 Agreement.

A little after 1 am on a bitter cold morning of Sunday, October 28, the initial Egyptian-Israeli negotiating session took place at a wooden table under a camouflage canopy stretched between four Israeli tanks. It was 101 kilometers from Cairo. Each general made short introductory remarks, noting that both armies had fought well and honorably and that both sides should now perform admirably in making peace. The content and tone of Yariv's comments alleviated the apprehension among the Egyptians that the Israelis would be arrogant. Sirry described Yariv as “sophisticated and calm. He did not shove anything down our throats. Had he been otherwise, the Egyptian delegation would not have accepted it.” Al-Gamasy considered Yariv “a very fine man who knew his work very well.” Yariv believed al-Gamasy to be “a pedantic man, but a proud officer, Egyptian, and Arab.” Even as the separation of forces discussions took place, elements of the two armies remained engaged. As the talks continued that
first night until approximately four o'clock in the morning, there were intermittent intrusions of
gun fire, rockets, and flares. For weeks after the commencement of the Kilometer 101
negotiations, the cease-fire agreed to on October 23 was periodically broken. Al-Gamasy
acknowledged that most of the violations came from the Egyptian side.\textsuperscript{32}

Replying to Yariv, al-Gamasy refrained from answering most questions, saying a
response had to await instructions from Cairo. Al-Gamasy customarily reported back directly to
President Sadat. Al-Gamasy provided both verbal and written assessments of Israeli views on a
variety of issues under negotiation, and the direction in which he thought they were heading.
Likewise, Yariv repeatedly excused himself to phone his superiors in order to report information
and to receive further instructions.\textsuperscript{33} While the military men were negotiating, their civilian
superiors were essentially making the decisions about the content of the talks, which obviously
contained political implications, including their present and future respective relationships with
Washington. After the end of the first negotiating session, Sirry and Fawzi al-Ibrashi, a legal
specialist in the Egyptian Foreign Ministry, finished their report around six o'clock that morning
and apparently hand-delivered it to President Sadat. Sadat informed Fahmy that he would
immediately go to Washington to meet with Kissinger and told Fahmy exactly what he wanted
from the trip.

In his memoirs, Fahmy claimed that he conceived the ideas that became the operational
outline for the tactics and strategy of Egyptian negotiating policy. But Sirry, who took the notes
in this October 28 meeting, said that Sadat provided the original detailed framework for the
agreement he was seeking with the Israelis. Normally, Sadat’s preference was not to focus on
negotiating details, but in this case he paid unique attention to the diplomatic framework he
needed to save the Third Army. Apparently, not until that meeting did Sadat have a written text of what he wanted to accomplish at the Kilometer 101 Talks, afterwards, or how Kissinger would take control of the unfolding diplomacy.

The framework, which Sadat dictated and Fahmy took to Washington, included the following: “Israel would withdraw to the October 22 lines; all prisoners-of-war would be released; Israel would withdraw to a line inside Sinai east of the [strategic] passes, while Egypt's forces remained in place; U.N. forces would be deployed between the Egyptian and Israeli forces; after Israel started withdrawing to the disengagement line, Egypt would lift the blockade of the Straits of Bab al-Mandeb; once the disengagement was completed, Egypt would start clearing the Suez Canal; within an agreed time, Israel would withdraw to the international frontier; at this point, belligerency would end.”\textsuperscript{34} Also included in the framework was an outline of steps to be taken to convene an international conference, and to restore diplomatic relations between Egypt and the United States. From the outset of Egypt's diplomatic effort, Sadat wanted all substantive issues agreed upon privately before ratification at a public conference.

By the time Kissinger met with Sadat for the first time in Cairo on November 7, 1973, Fahmy had already brought Sadat’s ideas to Washington and had given them to Kissinger. Simultaneously, at the Kilometer 101 Talks, Sadat had al-Gamasy tell Yariv that he would agree to separate military forces in phased periods of time, establish a UN monitored buffer zone between the opposing armies, and allow the repopulation of the cities along the Suez Canal. In their two-and-one-half-hour meeting on November 7, Kissinger persuaded a positively predisposed Sadat not to settle just for a separation of forces agreement reflective of the October 22 cease-fire lines, but for a larger disengagement agreement with considerably more
This November 7 visit was pivotal in solidifying the concept of step-by-step diplomacy because “Sadat and Kissinger devised the “strategy of interim steps...under the mantle of a conference to bless the interim steps.” For his part, Sadat did not need to be convinced of the merit of the step-by-step approach; the notion of liberating Sinai through stages or phases was inherent in the Sadat-Dayan exchange via Washington eighteen months earlier, and Hafez Ismail suggested it to Kissinger in his secret meetings earlier in 1973. Kissinger also discussed with Sadat elements of the six-point plan which he had reviewed with Meir in Washington when she visited there on November 4. In her delegation to Washington was Yariv himself, who had taken three days off from talks with al-Gamasy. What had transpired in the previous ten days? Sadat dictated an outline that emerged from the first Yariv-al-Gamasy meetings, Fahmy took it to Washington, Kissinger then presented the outline to Meir, who had seen it already and discussed it in full with Yariv, and then Kissinger took it back to Sadat on November 7th.

Kissinger was apparently surprised that Sadat accepted the six-point plan so quickly. But why not? He and Meir, through their generals, had negotiated it. It was signed on November 11 at kilometer 101. The six-point plan agreed on November 11 and the subsequent Yariv-al-Gamasy understandings at Kilometer 101 were not Kissinger originals; they were hybrids parented by Sadat and Meir. The disengagement agreement drafted by Generals Yariv and al-Gamasy on November 11, 1973, contained the following general six points:

“1. Egypt and Israel agree to observe scrupulously the cease-fire called for by the UN Security Council.
2. Both sides agree that discussion between them will begin immediately to settle the question of the return to the October 22 positions in the framework of agreement on the disengagement and separation of forces under the auspices of the United Nations.
3. The town of Suez will receive daily supplies of food, water, and medicine. All wounded civilians in the town of Suez will be evacuated.
4. There will be no impediment to the movement of non-military supplies to the east bank [of the Suez Canal where the Third Army was surrounded].
5. The Israeli check-points on the Cairo-Suez road will be replaced by UN check-points. At the Suez end of the road, Israeli officers can participate with the UN to supervise the non-military nature of the cargo at the bank of the canal.
6. As soon as the UN check-points are established on the Cairo-Suez road, there will be an exchange of all prisoners-of-war, including wounded.”

In the moments after the signing ceremony was completed at kilometer 101, and while the international media were taking pictures, the dialogue between Yariv and Al-Gamasy went approximately as follows: “My dear General, what do you mean by disengagement agreement? It is listed in the six-point agreement, that phrase.” Al-Gamasy replied, “I said it means to place the troops away from one another.” Yariv replied, “No... It is a Harvard expression and it is Kissinger who will put the explanation for it, and you and I will not be able to do anything about it until Kissinger says what he means by it.” 39 Al-Gamasy acknowledged the accuracy of Yariv's assessment. Both Generals understood that the diplomatic negotiations involving political discussions would be ultimately transferred to Kissinger's control, but neither knew when or how that would happen. Neither General was yet prepared to deliver the negotiating prerogative to him.

After the signing ceremony, Yariv and Al-Gamasy continued to negotiate the details of a disengagement agreement. Subsequent Al-Gamasy-Yariv meetings took place at least every two or three days, each for several hours or more. Progressively, discussions became more and more specific. As meetings became increasingly amiable, Yariv replied with even more specifics.40 Both generals strayed beyond the scope imposed upon them by their political superiors. Through
al-Gamasy, the Egyptians suggested an Israeli withdrawal of thirty-five kilometers deep into Sinai, with UN observers separating the belligerent forces, and a zone for the drawn-down forces of both armies. The Egyptians worked out time schedules for a full Israeli withdrawal accompanied by one for Suez Canal repair. They included discussion about force levels in main and thinned-out buffer zones, the number of buffer zones and their sizes, the number of UN personnel and where they would be stationed, what authority the UN would enjoy in relationship to Israeli forces, when Egyptian civilians would return to the Canal Zone, etc. Al-Gamasy and Yariv went further. Considerable detail about the size of the buffer zones to be established was made public in a television interview given by Meir on November 16 and repeated by Dayan to a U.S. Congressional delegation on November 19. Three days later, Yariv and al-Gamasy agreed that “disengagement and separation of forces should be held for 3-6 months followed by successive Israeli withdrawals until a line agreed upon in peace negotiations is reached.” 41 At the same meeting, Yariv dropped Israel’s insistence that the Egyptian armies on the east bank of the Canal return to the pre-war lines. Al-Gamasy and Yariv agreed that the main Israeli force should be somewhere between 35 and 45 kilometers east of the Canal, disengagement and separation of forces should take place within six months with Egypt wanting the first disengagement completed by January 15, 1974, and the United Nations should man the different buffer zones to be set up between their respective armies. At their November 26 meeting, Yariv and al-Gamasy had concluded several options pertaining to the content and implementation of the disengagement agreement. There were five or six different proposals for the depth of Israeli withdrawal in Sinai. Yariv stated that Israel was ready to withdraw even beyond the strategic passes if Egypt would minimize its number of troops, tanks, and artillery on the western bank of
the canal. Maps were exchanged at virtually every meeting in efforts to reach implementable compromises. After the negotiations and the details discussed at meetings between November 19 and November 26, some key disagreements remained over the number of forces each side would have in the different buffer zones, and the number, range capability, and kinds of weapons each could have in those zones.

On November 28, 1973, quite abruptly, Yariv told al-Gamasy that he could no longer discuss matters pertaining to the separation of forces. The UN representative who sometimes witnessed the talks, General Siilasvuoto, was bewildered and al-Gamasy was upset; both were perplexed. Al-Gamasy asked Yariv, “Why can't you discuss the separation of forces issue? We have spoken about ten principles on which we have agreed.” When Yariv departed from the Kilometer 101 Talks, he, too, was disappointed that he suddenly had to break off his personal and substantive contacts with al-Gamasy. On the same day, Sadat publicly claimed that he was discontinuing the military talks because the discussions were “not to his liking, led nowhere, and were characterized by Israeli schemes and intrigues.” Many Egyptian officials, including Foreign Minister Fahmy and General al-Gamasy, saw the sudden Israeli withdrawal from the talks as a case of Israeli duplicity – making agreements one day and suspending their implementation the next. Al-Gamasy had no idea that Kissinger had asked Meir to stop the negotiations. At the conclusion of the talks, Sadat's advisers, historically predisposed to antagonistic attitudes toward Israel, saw the breakdown as another indication of the lack of Israeli sincerity and trustworthiness. However, when the talks ended on November 29, 1973, virtually all the details for a full disengagement agreement were discussed and made public.
The Kilometer 101 Talks ended because Kissinger wanted them ended. In his memoirs, Kissinger noted that he was “not eager for a breakthrough at Kilometer 101 before the Geneva Conference...[it] tested our patience...We never knew exactly what was happening at Kilometer 101...If disengagement disappeared from the agenda, we would be forced into endless skirmishing over broader issues on which I knew we would not be able to deliver quickly. As I cautioned [Israeli Ambassador to the U.S.] Dinitz on December 3: Suppose Yariv comes out a great hero on disengagement, what do you discuss [at Geneva]?” Dinitz added that “Kissinger did not value direct discussions at [Kilometer] 101 because he believed that they would be making [political] concessions there to each other without actually eliciting the full price which he could have obtained had he been choreographing the negotiations.” Kissinger told Eban, “For God's sake, stop the Yariv-al-Gamasy thing – put it on the Geneva level. Otherwise, we don't have an agenda in Geneva.” Kissinger asked Fahmy later in Washington, “What are you doing? Why did you present this [disengagement plan] to the Israelis [at Kilometer 101]?” Kissinger at one point told Meir, “You don't seem to understand that they are making mistakes [at Kilometer 101]. Let me do it.” According to the newly-appointed U.S. Ambassador to Egypt, Hermann Eilts, political discussions had to be avoided because they “would potentially incapacitate [Kissinger's] direct and incipient intervention;” “he [Kissinger] wanted all the reigns in his own hands, and was uneasy about all this progress being made and the military working group where he wasn't present.” The Israelis and the United States agreed to pull out of Kilometer 101. The cease-fire remained in effect, but all of the details – withdrawal, how far, and who did what to whom – were to be the subject of the Geneva Conference. “We knew,” said Nick Veliotes, the Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv, that “Geneva
would be window dressing for what had already been achieved in the Kilometer 101 negotiations.”


Conclusions

When the Geneva Middle East Peace Conference opened on December 21, 1973, it had been sanctioned by the United Nations. The conference served as an international umbrella for the understanding reached between Yariv and al-Gamasy on November 11, 1973, at the Egyptian-Israeli Kilometer 101 Cease-fire and Troop Disengagement Talks. The conference was a public bow toward a comprehensive solution. According to former Assistant Secretary of State Sisco, there was no doubt in Henry's mind, in my mind, that [the negotiations had to be] step by step; that regardless of all the noises about comprehensive solutions, we knew that the most feasible step would be in the aftermath of Geneva: the talks between Egypt and the United States. We never felt that the conference per se was going to be the locus of the real negotiations. Disengagement was also a political act which could not be really achieved at 101 with that cast of characters. And to put it more precisely, if anybody was going to achieve a disengagement agreement, it was Henry Kissinger himself and his personal role.”

The Geneva Middle East Peace Conference sustained and confirmed Washington's domination of Arab-Israeli negotiations. It successfully checked Soviet engagement in real
negotiations; it edged them to the sidelines. It formalized a gradualist, step-by-step negotiating approach through interim phases by focusing on Egypt and Israel. It gave international sanction to previously agreed-upon Egyptian-Israeli cease-fire negotiations. In the historical context of Arab-Israeli negotiations, the Geneva Conference was an unprecedented public event, dramatically occurring at a pivotal moment and forcefully advancing pragmatic diplomacy.

According to Alouph Hareven, who handled the public relations for the Israeli delegation to the conference, “from the moment we walked into the United Nations building, this was theater, all theater, purely theater, superbly conducted by Kissinger.”

Although Kissinger projected a public focus aimed at a comprehensive peace, he had “absolutely no intention of tackling political issues [after the October 1973 War or at Geneva].” Kissinger fulfilled his promise to “assemble a multilateral conference...to use it as a framework for... essentially bilateral diplomacy.” Hafez Ismail noted that the “1973 Geneva Conference was a tool for a military delegation to sit and work out the details of a disengagement agreement.”

The Geneva Middle East Peace Conference served Sadat’s and Kissinger’s purposes: to maintain the diplomatic initiative created by the October War necessitated the abrupt end of the Kilometer 101 Talks.

In the aftermath of the 1973 War, and between January 1974 and March 1979, the negotiating process was often difficult, publically rancorous, and relatively slow. But in comparison to the extraordinary complex series of fits and starts in Arab-Israeli negotiations that followed 1979 (with the exception of the negotiation and signing the Jordanian-Israeli Treaty in October 1994), Egyptian-Israeli agreements (though difficult to achieve in their time) were relatively less complex. Those later negotiations had to deal with Jerusalem, Palestinian claims to all the land west of the Jordan River, who was to speak for the Palestinians, persistent Arab
and Moslem state rejection of Israel’s right to exist (let alone as a Jewish state), the future of the Golan Heights, water and strategic security issues, and the issues surrounding Israel’s major population centers situated so closely to avowedly hostile neighbors. Perhaps it is unfair to compare the agreements of 1970s to the heavily burdened negotiating agenda that followed.

However, three irrefutable lessons may be learned the diplomacy that emerged from the 1973 War: First, there had to be a motivation or several motives from both sides in the negotiations for an agreement to take place. An externally imposed agreement was not possible; national self-interest was required to sustain negotiations and reach negotiated agreements. Egyptian and Israeli leaders both knew what they wanted from the respective agreements negotiated. Second, despite fits and starts in the negotiations in the 1973-1979 period, exercised the political will to continue negotiations until agreements were reached. Sadat on the one hand, Meir, Rabin, and Begin on the other were willing to withstand negative fall-out from friends and adversaries in order to reach agreements, however imperfect they may have been from a particular national vantage point. And third, agreements were reached because there was an enormous amount of private pre-negotiations between the parties. The 1973 Geneva conference was “pre-cooked.” Prior to Sadat’s historic visit to Jerusalem in November 1977, from private discussions through the Rumanians and Moroccans and notably without knowledge or involvement of the Americans, Sadat and Begin understood that they could reach an understanding over Sinai, even if all the devilish details had not been clarified to mutual satisfaction before his November visit. Narrowing of differences between the sides about Palestinian autonomy is what the US State Department’s Roy Atherton did in nine shuttle missions between Cairo and Jerusalem from January –August 1978; the July 1978 Leeds
(Egyptian, Israeli, and American) Foreign Minister’s conference was consumed with detail about settlements, autonomy, the transitional period, and even Jerusalem. These pre-negotiations were essential for detailed draft agreements to be crafted before Camp David commenced in September 1978. There is no doubt that the negotiations at Camp David were difficult and tiresome, but the pre-negotiations allowed the first discussions on September 5, 1978 to address detail connected to Palestinian autonomy. The treaty negotiations that took place in 1978-1979 were equally tedious. Yet, in the larger picture, without Nasser’s loss of Sinai in 1967 and without Sadat’s drive to start a diplomatic process out of the October War, to have it returned, US diplomats might have been challenged to push for Egyptian-Israeli negotiations. While the October War was the spark that ignited diplomacy, without Sinai in hand from 1967 onwards, Israel would not have had anything tangible to trade for a treaty. The irony is that Nasser, the great pan-Arabist and staunchest opponent of Israel and Zionism, by his actions in May-June 1967 unleashed the consequences that led ultimately to Egyptian recognition and acceptance of Israel, by Nasser’s successor in 1979.

Notes

The interviews listed here, unless specifically noted as undertaken by another author, were
carried out by me during a twelve year research period that produced *Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace*, Routledge, 1999. The Hebrew version of the book, *Medinuit Amitza* [Courageous Policy]. Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense Publishing House, appeared in 2003. The findings from the interviews were systematically reinforced by data secured from the Freedom of Information Act, use of presidential archives, and published memoirs. The interviews conducted for *Heroic Diplomacy* have been digitized and will be made available for public use beginning in 2015.


3 Nasser went to war in 1967 “to prove that he was a political giant and restore the awe and prestige that many of the Third World countries felt for him, but which had been in decline in
recent months....Nasser triggered [the war]. He by his own unfortunate speeches he created a political situation that he was unable to master.” Interview remarks by Lucius Battle, US Ambassador to Egypt, September 1963 to March 1967. When Battle returned from Cairo just prior to the 1967 War, President Lyndon Johnson sought his daily input on understanding Nasser and his motivations. From Battle’s departure in March forwards, the US did not have an accredited Ambassador in Cairo until after the October 1973 War. The designated US Ambassador Richard Nolte knew little about Egypt, running an embassy, and was never accredited. Prior to and during the 1967 War, the US did not have an ambassador in Cairo. After the war, the US was represented by a US interest section located in the Indian Embassy, first headed by the very savvy Donald Bergus. See Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, The Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, July 10, 1991, http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/mfdip:”field(DOCID+mfdip2004bat03); see also Michael Oren, Six Days of War June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East, Oxford, 2002.


5 Interview with Naftali Lavi, July 8, 1993; when Dayan was Foreign Minister, Lavi was his press and media adviser.


7 Interview with Zaid Rifa‘i, January 9, 1993, Amman, Jordan. Rifa‘i was Jordan’s Foreign Minister during and after the 1973 war.
Ken Stein, Notes of a meeting between Jimmy Carter and Usamah al-Baz, March 12, 1990, Cairo. As Middle East Fellow of the Carter Center at the time, I took the trip notes at Carter’s meetings with Middle Eastern policy makers and leaders during our trips to the Middle East in March 1983, March 1987, and March 1990. These notes were deposited at the Carter Center in April 1990, with a set delivered to Carter personally. Carter never disputed that Sadat failed to support him on the matter of an Israeli settlement freeze, regardless of duration. In the 1970s and 1980s, al-Baz emerged as Sadat’s and later Mubarak’s most trust political adviser on matters relating to the Arab world, Israel, and the negotiating process. Al-Baz was part of the Egyptian delegation at the September 1978 Camp David talks.


Interview with Moshe Dayan by Rami Tal, November 22, 1976, Yediot Aharanot, April 27, 1997; interviews with Naftali Lavi, July 8, 1993, Jerusalem, Israel and Yossi Ciechanover, July 5, 1993, Tel Aviv, Israel.

Interview with Gideon Rafael, March 25, 1992, Jerusalem Israel. Rafael was Director General of the Israel Foreign Ministry.


15. Interview with Usamah al-Baz, November 9, 1992, Cairo, Egypt.


17. Interview with Abd al-Halim Khaddam, July 18, 1993, Damascus, Syria. Khaddam was a very close confident of President Hafez al-Assad, at the time Foreign Minister and later Vice-President of Syria.

18. Interview with Nabil al-Arabi, February 26, 1993, Atlanta, Georgia. Al-Arabi was in the Egyptian Foreign Ministry at the time of the 1973 war and would become a key adviser to Sadat and Mubarak and served Egypt in several significant diplomatic posts, including Arab League Secretary General,
19. Remarks by Joseph Sisco and Roy Atherton, United States Institute of Peace meeting, Washington, D.C., April 3, 1991, pp. 87-88. Both Sisco and Atherton served in the US State Department and were part of Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy team that negotiated the three disengagement agreements that followed the 1973 War. Atherton continued his service in the State Department during the Carter administration and was instrumental in narrowing substantive differences between Israel and Egypt prior to the 1978 Camp David negotiations.

20. Interview with Abd al-Ghani al-Gamasy, November 10, 1992, Heliopolis, Egypt. Al-Gamasy was the Egyptian Chief of Staff who planned the October War and later became Egyptian Minister of Defense.

21. Interview with Usamah al-Baz, November 9, 1992, Cairo, Egypt.


23. Interview with Hafez Ismail, January 7, 1993, Cairo, Egypt. Ismail was Sadat’s National Security Adviser and later Cairo’s Ambassador to Moscow.


25. Interview with Omar Sirry, January 5, 1993, Cairo, Egypt.

26. Interview with Omar Sirry, January 5, 1993, Cairo, Egypt.

27. Interview with Ahmed Maher, an Egyptian Foreign Ministry official at the time, July 29, 1993, Washington, D.C.

28. I am particularly grateful to General al-Gamasy and General Yariv for providing the
opportunity to interview both of them at length, and in Yariv’s case, reading his diary notes made at the Kilometer 101 talks directly into my tape recorder. Al-Gamasy was no less candid in his recollection of the talks with Yariv. To my knowledge, and according to both of them, they did not meet again after their Kilometer 101 encounters.

29. Interview with Omar Sirry, January 5, 1993, Cairo, Egypt.
31. Interview with Aharon Yariv, March 26, 1992, Ramat Aviv, Israel.
33. Interview with Omar Sirry, January 5, 1993, Cairo, Egypt.
38. Kissinger's enumeration of the six points was in a very different order and less explicit than one of the several Israeli drafts of the six points, see Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval,


44. Interview with Hermann F. Eilts, April 11, 1991, Boston, Massachusetts.

46. Interview with Simcha Dinitz, March 20, 1992, Jerusalem, Israel.

47. Interview with Abba Eban, March 24, 1992, Herzlia, Israel.

48. Interview with Hafez Ismail, January 7, 1993, Cairo, Egypt.

49. Interview with Mordechai Gazit, March 22, 1992, Jerusalem, Israel.


52. Interview with Aharon Yariv, March 26, 1992, Ramat Aviv, Israel.

53. Interview with Joe Sisco, February 27, 1992, Washington, D.C.

54. Interview with Alouph Hareven, August 2, 1992, Jerusalem, Israel.

55. Interview with Hermann F. Eilts, April 11, 1991, Boston, Massachusetts.


57. Interview with Hafez Ismail, January 7, 1993, Cairo, Egypt.