Ottoman Policy and Restrictions on Jewish Settlement in Palestine: 1881-1908—Part I

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Periodisation in history is arbitrary, but for the Jews of Imperial Russia, already an unhappy community, the assassination of Tsar Alexander II in 1881 ushered in a painful new era. The pogroms after his death were followed by the notorious ‘May Laws’ of 1882 which stepped up economic discrimination against the Jews. The stirring among the Jewish community, both physical and intellectual, was heightened. Many more of them started to leave, mainly for America, and not a few began to think seriously about Jewish nationalism, with the result that the ‘Lovers of Zion’ Movement gained momentum. Some of them, whether for reasons of sheer physical safety or nationalism or a combination of both, thought of finding a home in the Ottoman Empire. The Sublime Porte was well-informed of these trends and of their contagious effects on other Jews, especially in Austro-Hungary, from the start. What is more, the Porte decided to oppose Jewish settlement in Palestine in autumn 1881, some months before the increased flow of Jews in that direction got under way. (‘Palestine’, for the purpose of this article, is used to mean the area referred to in contemporary Ottoman parlance and documents as ‘Arzi Filistin’, which at the end of the nineteenth century was not a single administrative unit but was made up of the Mutasarrıflık of Jerusalem to the south and the Sancaks of Nablus and Acre in the north; these Sancaks were part of the Vilayet of Şam (‘Syria’) until 1888, whereafter they were incorporated into the new Vilayet of Beirut).

On examination, the Porte’s awareness of trends among the Jews of Eastern Europe was not as surprising as it may seem at first sight. Given the aggressive intentions throughout the nineteenth century of Russia and Austro-Hungary on the Ottoman Empire, the Porte had good reason to try to keep abreast of events in those rival empires. Thus, inter alia, its diplomatic representatives in St. Petersburg and Vienna reported regularly on Jewish affairs, and there is even a file in the catalogues of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry, listed under Russia, entitled ‘Situation [of] the Jews; Question of their Immigration into Turkey: 1881’.1

Moreover, there had been some direct approaches to the Sublime Porte on this matter. In 1879 Laurence Oliphant, an English writer, traveller and mystic, had submitted a scheme to settle Jews on the east bank of the River Jordan.2 In 1881 a group of English and German businessmen sent a representative to negotiate with the Government for a concession to build a railway from Smyrna to Baghdad, along the length of which they proposed to settle Jews.3 Their representative saw the Foreign Minister who, according to Reuter’s reports, was in favour of Jewish immigration into the Empire.4 The Council of Ministers considered the question and in November 1881 it was announced that:
[Jewish] immigrants will be able to settle as scattered groups throughout Turkey, excluding Palestine. They must submit to all the laws of the Empire and become Ottoman subjects.

With growing numbers of Russian Jews applying to the Ottoman Consul-General at Odessa for visas to enter Palestine, the following notice was posted outside his office a few months later, on April 28, 1882:

The Ottoman Government informs all [Jews] wishing to immigrate into Turkey that they are not permitted to settle in Palestine. They may immigrate into the other provinces of [the Empire] and settle as they wish, provided only that they become Ottoman subjects and accept the obligation to fulfil the laws of the Empire.

The specific exclusion of Palestine had not been expected by the Jews. To them it seemed hard to believe that the Ottoman Government, with its record of hospitality to the Jews since their expulsion from Spain in the fifteenth century, should now forbid Jews to settle in Palestine. When the announcement was made in Odessa, Laurence Oliphant was in Eastern Europe on behalf of the Mansion House Committee, a British organization concerned with the relief of persecuted Jews from Russia and Rumania. The Jews whom he met persuaded him to go to Constantinople in order to find out more about the Porte’s policy and also, if possible, to gain permission for numbers of Jews to settle in Palestine. At the same time, though independently of Oliphant, the Central Office of one of the first ‘Lovers of Zion’ groups was transferred from Odessa to Constantinople in the hope of obtaining a grant of land in Palestine for three hundred settlers. Then, at the beginning of June, Jacob Rosenfeld, the editor of Razsvet (a Jewish paper in St. Petersburg which sympathised with the ‘Lovers of Zion’) came to Constantinople to investigate the situation as well.

In Constantinople, Oliphant found about two hundred Jewish refugees. He also discovered that on entry to the Empire they were required to adopt Ottoman nationality and declare not only that they accepted the laws of the Empire without reserve, but also that they would not settle in Palestine. Oliphant approached the American Minister at the Porte to see if he would be prepared to try and clarify the position. When General Wallace said that he could only do so if a request came from the Jews themselves, Oliphant sent a telegram to Jews he had met in Bucharest—and thus another delegation seeking permission for Jews to settle in Palestine hurried to Constantinople.

General Wallace met this delegation on June 6 and a few days later he spoke to the Ottoman Foreign Minister who confirmed what was known already. It all boiled down to the same thing. Immigrant Jews were welcome in the Empire, but not in Palestine; they could settle in small groups, provided that (a) they relinquished their foreign nationality and became Ottoman subjects, and (b) they did not seek any special privileges, but were content to remain bound by the existing laws.

Various theories were advanced to explain the Government’s policy. Oliphant suggested that it derived from Muslim sentiments over Palestine,
anti-Jewish influences in Constantinople and the strained relations between
the Ottoman Empire and Britain because of the crisis which had developed
over Egypt during the first half of 1882.\textsuperscript{15} But these explanations are
unconvincing. Even if accepted, the first two of them barely suffice to
justify the Porte's rigid opposition from the outset; and the last of them is
clearly wrong, since the Porte had decided in autumn 1881 not to allow
Jewish settlement in Palestine—well before the crisis over Egypt.

In the \textit{Mutassarriflik} of Jerusalem, Jewish newcomers put forward
equally unlikely explanations for the difficulties they encountered on
arrival. They pointed a suspicious finger at local \textit{Sephardim} (Oriental Jews)
who had no particular liking for \textit{Ashkenazim} (European Jews),\textsuperscript{16} and at
certain Jews living on alms in Jerusalem who feared that the immigrants
might also have to be supported from the same funds.\textsuperscript{17} Others claimed
that the \textit{Mutassarif}, Rauf Paşa, was personally ill-disposed towards Jews.\textsuperscript{18}
Admittedly Rauf Paşa does not sound at all sympathetic from contem-
porary (Jewish) records but, whatever his personal feelings, the fact
remains that at all times he was acting on strict instructions from Con-
stantinople.

Moreover, when pressed by foreign governments the Porte gave un-
satisfactory explanations of its policy as well. In 1887 it argued that the
majority of the immigrants were penniless and therefore added to the
penury already prevailing in Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{19} It also contended that the aged
and sick among the immigrants were a danger to health in Jerusalem;\textsuperscript{20}
and that the Jews were a threat to public order because of Christian
fanaticism which, according to the Grand Vezir, Kamil Pasa, rose to such
a pitch during Easter that Jews were compelled to remain indoors lest they
were attacked and even murdered in the streets!\textsuperscript{21}

The real reasons lay elsewhere. They were principally two. First, the
Sublime Porte feared the possibility of nurturing another national problem
in the Empire. Secondly, it did not want to increase the number of foreign
subjects, particularly Europeans, in its domains.

Towards the end of 1882 Isaac Fernandez, the President of the \textit{Alliance
Israélite Universelle} in Constantinople, was told of the first of these reasons.
Ottoman ministers informed him that they were determined 'to resist
firmly the immigration of Jews into Syria and Mesopotamia, as they [did]
not wish to have another nationality established in great numbers in that
part of the Empire'.\textsuperscript{22} A year later, the Minister of Internal Affairs and
others explicitly indicated to Fernandez that they regarded Jewish coloni-
sation of Palestine as a political issue and 'they did not want, after the
Bulgarian, Rumanian and other questions, to have a new question on their
hands.'\textsuperscript{23} By 1888 Kamil Paşa was even more specific when he referred to
'the report that had spread abroad that the Jews throughout the world
intended to strengthen themselves in and around Jerusalem with a view,
at some future time, [to] re-establishing their ancient kingdom there'.\textsuperscript{24}
In the light of their long series of misfortunes with national minorities since
the beginning of the nineteenth century (which had led to considerable
territorial losses in the Balkans) and only shortly after the Congress of
Berlin (1878), the apprehensions of the Ottoman ministers were under-
standable.
Secondly, the Ottoman Government did not warm to the prospect of European immigrants flowing in relatively large numbers into the Empire. By the nineteenth century the European was disliked and distrusted by the Turk. Under the system of 'Capitulations' (whose history was long and complicated) he enjoyed extensive extra-territorial privileges, including the right to trade, travel and hold property freely throughout the Empire. Through the Capitulations, he was also largely exempt from Ottoman taxes and dues, and beyond the reach of Ottoman courts. By the middle of the nineteenth century the Powers were exploiting the Capitulations shamelessly to deepen their influence in the Empire, while the Ottoman Government was trying to abolish them. In these circumstances, Ottoman ministers must have asked themselves why, of all things and of all places, let European numbers and influence increase in Palestine. They had only to recall that while the Crimean War (1854-6) had nominally been fought over the Christian Holy Places in Jerusalem, a broader issue had been the attempt by Russia to distort the Capitulations in order to extend her protection over all Greek Orthodox subjects of the Empire. What would happen now if European Jews were allowed to flood into Palestine?

Furthermore, there were two subsidiary considerations which strengthened the Porte's opposition to Jewish settlement in Palestine. Many of the prospective immigrants belonged to the 'Lovers of Zion' Movement and they had given the Ottoman Government the impression that their movement was larger and more powerful than it actually was. For example, they exaggerated their numbers in the European Jewish press and in the summer of 1882 they sent various delegations to Constantinople, one of which—from Rumania—bore a petition speaking of 'hundreds of thousands' of potential Jewish immigrants. They contacted prominent Ottoman Jews, not to speak of the American Minister at the Porte and the Ottoman Ministers of Internal Affairs and of War. And within a short while, they moved Baron Edmond de Rothschild of Paris to use his influence on their behalf as well. Little wonder that the Government quickly became apprehensive of what was afoot.

The other subsidiary consideration was that most of the Jews in question were Russian subjects, and Russia was the arch-enemy of the Ottoman Empire. During the nineteenth century alone, there had been four Russo-Turkish wars, the last as recently as 1877-8. Moreover, the Ottoman Government held Russia responsible for Balkan nationalism. The 'Lovers of Zion' were Jewish nationalists, and the Porte had no wish to have another Russian-educated, and possibly Russian-inspired, nationalist movement to contend with, especially in the heart of the Arab provinces of the Empire which as yet were still free of the 'canker' of European nationalism.

These reasons, taken together, add up to solid grounds for the Ottoman Government's immediate opposition to Jewish settlement in Palestine. Another national problem and a large influx of Europeans into a sensitive part of the Empire were unwanted in themselves. But a national problem where almost all the members of that nationality were Europeans—and Russian subjects to boot—could not be countenanced in any circumstances. Public hygiene in Jerusalem was beside the point.
Ottoman policy remained constant throughout the 1880’s and the first half of the 1890s, and it probably was not subjected to any fundamental review until Theodor Herzl’s famous pamphlet, Der Judenstaat, was published in February 1896. In this pamphlet, Herzl gave more concrete expression to Jewish national aspirations, arguing (as suggested in the title) that the ‘Jewish problem’ could only be solved by establishing a Jewish state, possibly in Palestine but possibly elsewhere, in which persecuted Jews could live in freedom and dignity. This pamphlet led directly to the formation of the Zionist Movement in 1897 with Herzl at its head.

It is not generally appreciated that Herzl brought himself and his ideas to the Porte’s attention one year before the first Zionist Congress was held. He did so by travelling to Constantinople in June 1896 and making contact not only with several senior officials in person but also with the Sultan through an intermediary. Displaying impressive ignorance of Ottoman sensitivities, Herzl’s ideas were not calculated to appeal to the Porte. At a time when the Government’s grip over its remaining territories in the Balkans was far from secure, and when the Sultan was under attack from Young Turks abroad for the ‘dismemberment’ of the Empire, Herzl asked that Palestine should be granted to the Jews with official blessing in the form of what he called a ‘Charter’. And at a time when the Government had had more than enough of heavy European interference in its internal affairs, including control of its Public Debt since 1881, Herzl hoped that his Jewish State would enjoy Great Power protection. In exchange for Palestine, he nebulously offered ‘to regulate the whole finances of Turkey’ for ‘His Majesty the Sultan’.

‘His Majesty the Sultan’ was that enigmatic figure, Abdültrhabim II, who came to power in 1876. His presence and personality cannot be ignored because, although the Council of Ministers dealt with the question of Jewish settlement in Palestine from 1881, power and politics in the Ottoman Empire were more and more influenced, and later wholly controlled, by Abdültrhabim until the Young Turk Revolution in 1908.

Abdültrhabim probably knew of the increased flow of Jewish immigrants towards Palestine from very early on. In keeping with his character, his attitude seems to have been one of suspicion and ambivalence. In 1881 he was reported to favour the Anglo-German proposal to settle Jews along the proposed railway from Smyrna to Baghdad; and he was said to have received the Rumanian delegation, which came to Constantinople the following summer (although the evidence for this is weak). However, in 1891 he told the Military Supervisory Commission at the Yildiz Palace:

Granting the status of [Ottoman] subjects to these Jews and settling them is most harmful; and since it may in the future raise the issue of a Jewish government, it is imperative not to accept them.

And in 1892 the Ottoman High Commissioner in Egypt told Sir Evelyn Baring, the British Consul-General, that the Sultan was disturbed by an attempt to settle Jews on the east coast of the Gulf of Aqaba. But by the following year Abdültrhabim appears to have considered the possibility of allowing Jews to settle elsewhere, for he told the Haham Basi (the Chief Rabbi of the Empire) that he was willing to offer Russian and other
oppressed Jews refuge in the Empire, particularly in Eastern Anatolia, so that they together with Ottoman Jews might furnish him with a force of 100,000 soldiers, to be attached to the Fourth Army. This proposal was welcomed by the Haham Basi and his Rabbinical Council, but nothing came of it because, according to the Turkish (Jewish) historian, Abraham Galante, the Council of Ministers considered it ill-advised—presumably for the reasons outlined above.

In 1896 Theodor Herzl met Philipp Michael de Newlinski, a Polish aristocrat who had once worked in the Austro-Hungarian Embassy at Constantinople and was employed by Abdülhamid for special diplomatic missions. In June Herzl travelled with de Newlinski to Constantinople. On the train there, de Newlinski introduced Herzl to Tevfik Paşa (the Ottoman Ambassador at Belgrade), Karatodori Paşa and Ziya Paşa (both described as ‘elder statesmen’), who were returning to Constantinople after the coronation of Tsar Nicholas II. Herzl explained his project to Ziya Paşa, who agreed that ‘the benefits in money and press support which you promise us are very great’. But, he warned, ‘no one is even likely to have pourparlers with you if you demand an independent Palestine’.

A day after Herzl and de Newlinski arrived in Constantinople, Abdülhamid told the latter that:

If Mr Herzl is as much your friend as you are mine, then advise him not to take another step in this matter. I cannot sell even a foot of land, for it does not belong to me, but to my people. My people have won this empire by fighting for it with their blood and have fertilized it with their blood. We will again cover it with our blood before we allow it to be wrested away from us. The men of two of my regiments from Syria and Palestine let themselves be killed one by one at Plevna. Not one of them yielded; they all gave their lives on that battlefield. The Turkish Empire belongs not to me, but to the Turkish people. I cannot give away any part of it. Let the Jews save their billions. When my Empire is partitioned, they may get Palestine for nothing. But only our corpse will be divided. I will not agree to vivisection.

Herzl’s reputation as a leading journalist attached to an influential Viennese newspaper (the Neue Freie Presse), his hints of assistance for the Empire’s finances and de Newlinski’s contacts enabled him to meet several prominent figures during the fortnight he spent in Constantinople. Abdülhamid refused to receive him, but as he learnt more about Herzl’s proposals he asked de Newlinski about the possibility of ceding Palestine to the Jews in exchange for some other territory, a suggestion which had been made to Herzl a few days earlier by ‘Izzat Paşa al-‘Abid. Abdülhamid’s Second Secretary and a Arab from Damascus who, among other things, held a brief on the Sultan’s staff for affairs in the Arab provinces. On the day of Herzl’s departure from Constantinople, Abdülhamid presented him through de Newlinski with Commander’s Cross of the Meçidiye Order. De Newlinski also brought a message that the Sultan wished him to influence the European press towards a more favourable view of the Empire and to obtain a loan of £2,000,000. Abdülhamid was willing to explore Herzl’s worth—or so it seemed.
Herzl's assessment of his reception in Constantinople (based on his own impressions and hearsay from de Newlinski and others) was that the Grand Vezir, Halil Rifat Paşa (whom he met twice) was averse to his scheme, whereas some senior officials—'Izzat Paşa al-'Abid, Mehmed Nuri Bey (Chief Secretary at the Foreign Ministry) and Ibrahim Cavid Bey (the Grand Vezir's son and a member of the Council of State)—were favourably inclined, though each was not without his reservations. The Grand Vezir's opposition and the general reserve elsewhere soon made themselves felt. Apart from anything else, Herzl heard six months after his visit to Constantinople that the Porte was 'angry' with him, because the press support he had promised had not been forthcoming.

Within the Jewish world support for Herzl grew, especially in student circles and among 'Lovers of Zion' in Eastern Europe. In February 1897, Dr d'Arbela, the director of the Rothschild hospital in Jerusalem, informed Herzl that 'all Palestine talks about our nationalist plan'. This, of course, did not fail to attract the attention of the Ottoman authorities. In April, a visit to Palestine by a group of distinguished British Jews, including Israel Zangwill and Herbert Bentwich, and news in May of a rally at New York in support of the first Zionist Congress (to be held that summer) alarmed the Mutasarrıf of Jerusalem, Ibrahim Hakki Paşa. As it was originally proposed to hold the first Zionist Congress in Munich, the Mutasarrıf conferred with the German Consul at Jerusalem, who suggested that press reports about this congress were very exaggerated. At the same time he felt that the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine should not be considered utterly remote. Carefully speaking in a private capacity, the Consul regretted that Jews had continued to enter Palestine, because inter alia the immigrants were a potential political danger, as they 'frequently inclined towards the Social-Democrat Party'. Ibrahim Hakki Paşa reported this post-haste to the Porte and the restrictions against the Jews in Palestine (described below) were renewed, one month before the first Zionist Congress.

The Congress was held at Basel and not at Munich as originally planned. The Zionist Movement's programme, worked out at this Congress, began by declaring that:

The object of Zionism is to establish for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law.

Although the German text spoke equivocally of a Heimstatte in preference to the more explicit Judenstaat, this public statement of Zionist aims could not but alarm the Ottoman Government. The wide coverage which the European press accorded the Congress, and the ensuing enthusiasm for the Zionist Movement, especially among Jews in Eastern Europe, can only have added to the Porte's disquiet. Thus that autumn, so that there should be no mistaking the Government's attitude, the Grand Vezir prompted Isaac Fernandez, as a prominent Jew in Constantinople, to make it known that the Porte had not given Herzl any encouragement in his ideas. Evidence of the seriousness with which Abdülhamid regarded the Zionist Movement is reflected in the fact that shortly after the first Congress he replaced the Mutasarrıf of Jerusalem, who was a regular member.
of the provincial service, with one of his Palace secretaries. Over the next years Ottoman representatives not only in Eastern Europe but also at Washington, London, Vienna and Berlin reported on the progress of the Zionist Movement, and even used special funds to obtain their information. Their despatches appear to have been read by the Sultan, and he clearly attached importance to them. Thus in 1900, after an increase in Jewish emigration from Rumania, the President of the Commission of Immigrants at the Porte told Fernandez that:

As a general rule, in Constantinople, in all official departments, in all ministerial offices and in the Grand Vezirate, one does not dare take the smallest measure in favour of the Jews (especially concerning Palestine), the smallest initiative in their regard, without having advised the Imperial Palace beforehand. The Sultan has made the Jewish question a personal question. All Jewish affairs are concentrated in the Palace. None of the views of the ministers and of the Council of State [which are] most favourable to Jewish interests have recrossed the threshold of the Yildiz [Palace] once they have penetrated into it.

Herzl had set an audience with the Sultan as a major objective. In 1898 Abdülhamid acknowledged a telegram sent to him by the second Zionist Congress. However, such encouragement as this gave was dissipated later that year when Palace officials visibly snubbed Herzl who had come to Constantinople in the wake of Kaiser Wilhelm II. Hopes of an early meeting with the Sultan in 1899 were destroyed by the death of de Niewlinski whilst in Constantinople on a mission for Herzl. For the next two years Herzl tried to obtain his audience through various contacts in Constantinople. Eventually Arminius Vambéry, a Hungarian Jewish scholar and an intimate of the Sultan, was able to persuade Abdülhamid to receive Herzl in May 1901.

The audience lasted over two hours. Herzl records in his diary that he 'got everything'. In return for 'some measure particularly friendly to the Jews', Herzl offered to relieve the Empire of the Public Debt, and the degree of foreign control accompanying it since 1881 (when the Powers set up the 'Council of the Public Debt'). Abdülhamid made a show of interest. He promised Herzl to keep their discussions secret, to furnish him with a detailed account of the Empire's financial situation and to make a 'pro-Jewish proclamation' at a moment designated by Herzl. Herzl left Constantinople well satisfied (even though two days after his audience with the Sultan he fell foul of 'Izzat Paşa in the mesh of Palace intrigues). But he had been deceived by Abdülhamid's affability and histrionics. The Sultan, on the other hand, had taken Herzl's measure:

This Herzl looks completely like a prophet, like a leader of his people. He has very clever eyes; he speaks carefully and clearly.

Only in subsequent months, after all the letters and memoranda detailing his proposals for the consolidation of the Public Debt were ignored, did Herzl sense that something was amiss. He was recalled twice to Constantinople (in February and July of 1902), and on both occasions he communicated with Abdülhamid through various Palace officials. These
'discussions' had the outward form of genuine negotiations, although the Sultan could not be induced to modify the established conditions for Jewish settlement in the Ottoman Empire, and Herzl too gave no ground: 'A Charter without Palestine! I refused at once.'

Herzl was not alone in volunteering to ameliorate Ottoman finances and to consolidate the Public Debt; other groups, both private and national, sought to gain concessions from the Sultan. When a French project for the consolidation of the Debt was approved in 1902, Herzl realized sadly that Abdülhamid had engineered his visits to the Palace merely to obtain the best possible terms from the successful French group.

Herzl tried to regain the Palace's attentions over the next two years by elaborating new financial schemes and affecting to hold out to the Ottoman Empire its last opportunity for redemption before he concluded alternative schemes with Great Britain for Jewish colonization in the Sinai Peninsula and East Africa. But all Herzl's coaxing went in vain. When he died in 1904, the Ottoman Government had not accepted any of his suggestions—and the Empire, sick as it was, lived on.

In 1905, the seventh Zionist Congress—the first after Herzl's death—resolved that its efforts must be directed exclusively towards Palestine. Alternative schemes, such as the East Africa project, were no longer to be considered. This decision was reached after heated debate, mainly between Menahem Ussishkin for the 'Ziyyone Ziyyon' (Palestine-oriented Zionists) and Israel Zangwill for the so-called 'Territorialists'. Reports of this debate in The Times, L'Indépendence Belge and in Zionist journals, alarmed the Porte as well as the authorities in Palestine. The Porte immediately ordered the suspension of all land transfers to Jews then in process and the stringent implementation of the existing restrictions. The Mutasarrif of Jerusalem had long conversations about the Congress with David Levontin, the manager of the Anglo-Palestine Company (a Zionist bank in Jaffa). He asked Levontin, who had attended the Congress why, with his knowledge of local conditions, did he allow a resolution to be adopted which focused Zionist aims entirely on Palestine. Moreover, why this talk of autonomy, why so much publicity and why appeal to the Great Powers to induce the Ottoman Government to accede to the Zionists' wishes? And what truth was there to the rumour that Ussishkin would be the 'Prince of Jerusalem'?

Thereafter the Zionist Movement did not make any approaches to Abdülhamid until autumn 1907 when David Wolffsohn, Herzl's successor as President, visited Constantinople. He too conducted indirect negotiations with the Sultan through his First Secretary, Tahsin Paşa, and other officials, but these representations were no more successful than Herzl's had been; and the possibility of any change in Ottoman policy only offered itself—in theory, at least—with the Young Turk Revolution the following year.

Under Abdülhamid (1876–1908), things could hardly have been otherwise. The basic reasons underlyimg Ottoman opposition to Jewish settlement in Palestine had been greatly reinforced by developments both within the Empire and beyond since the early 1880s. Ottoman territories in the Balkans had become a prime focus of European diplo-
macy and Balkan nationalism had increased to dangerous proportions. Crete, after a series of revolts, had gained its independence in 1898. The Armenians had caused serious disturbances which were cruelly put down, and there had been upheavals both in the Hauran (to the north-east of Palestine) and in the Yemen. Moreover, for the European Powers this was an era of new alliances and alignments which, in sum, put less and less of a premium on the continued existence of the Ottoman Empire. Russia's interest in influence, and if possible a presence, south of the Bosphorus was as pronounced as ever, and Austro-Hungary still held Bosnia and Herzegovina in her grasp under the terms of the Treaty of Berlin (1878). It was also an era of great imperialistic expansion on the part of Europe which among other things touched the Ottoman Empire's one-time provinces in North Africa. Egypt, already tenuously attached to the Empire, became a British protectorate in 1882. Tunis, also nominally a tributary to the Empire, became a French protectorate in 1883. The Anglo-French incident at Fashoda in 1898-9, the Franco-German crisis over Morocco in 1905, and Anglo-Russian rivalry in Persia culminating in the 1907 convention between those Powers were probably disquieting, even though all these events took place outside the Empire. In this political climate, both at home and internationally, Abdülhamid was in no position to relinquish freely any part of his Empire, autocrat as he was. That the Zionists were careful to request a limited form of autonomy in Palestine and at all times asserted the Jews' loyalty to the Sultan was of little consequence.

Abdülhamid had still other reasons to oppose the Zionists' proposals for Palestine. He knew full well that he reigned over a discontented Empire, and he was nervous. Among other things he was concerned about the loyalty of his Arab subjects and consciously pursued policies which he hoped would increase his popularity among them. He also posed as a champion of Pan-Islamism in an effort to maintain the support of his own Muslim subjects and also to rally Muslims beyond the Empire's borders. He therefore claimed to be Caliph (spiritual ruler of the Muslims) in addition to being Sultan (temporal ruler of the Empire). With an eye to his Arab subjects and as the would-be Caliph of all Muslims, Abdülhamid could scarcely hand Jerusalem, the third city of Islam, to the Jews.

Finally, Herzl's 'golden-egg'—his proposals to consolidate the Ottoman Public Debt—lacked substance, attractiveness and practicality. First, Herzl and the Zionists simply did not command the immense funds necessary for the task. Secondly, although the Empire had been virtually bankrupt when Abdülhamid came to power, its financial situation had improved over the years under the supervision of the European Powers. Their control was exercised through the 'Council for the Public Debt' and it is inconceivable that they would have surrendered their administration of the Debt (and the scope it offered to interfere in the Empire's internal affairs), let alone tolerate its consolidation by a Jewish group to be recompensed with a foothold in a part of the Empire which was still, at the turn of the century, of undeniable interest to the Powers themselves.

On June 29, 1882, the first tiny group of 'Lovers of Zion', numbering all of 14 souls, sailed from Constantinople for Jaffa. On the very same day,
the Porte cabled the Mutasarrif of Jerusalem, ordering him not to let any Russian, Rumanian or Bulgarian Jews to disembark at Jaffa or Haifa; such Jews were not to set foot in any of the four so-called ‘Holy Cities’ of Palestine (Jerusalem, Hebron, Safed and Tiberias) and were to proceed to some other Ottoman port aboard the ship they came on. 

This prohibition was contrary to one of the Capitulations with Russia which assured her subjects of unrestricted travel throughout the Ottoman Empire (except Arabia). When the Mutasarrif sought clarification from Constantinople, he was ordered to expel all Jews who had settled in the Mutasarriflik within the last four months; only to permit Jewish pilgrims and businessmen to remain for a brief period; and to prevent other Jews (i.e. prospective settlers) from landing. Similar instructions were soon received and enforced in the Vilayet of Sam (embracing the northern part of Palestine). The terms of these and subsequent instructions made it clear that the Porte was primarily concerned to prevent Russian Jews from settling in Palestine. Jews from other countries were arriving in much smaller numbers, and were of correspondingly less concern.

Irregularities were not long in arising. Some Russian Jews applied for visas to Constantinople, where they obtained permits to travel within the Ottoman Empire. Thus they would arrive at Palestine with valid papers, but as prospective settlers they were refused entry. This led to complaints, and at the end of 1882 the Ministry of Police in Constantinople was ordered by the Council of Ministers to stop issuing internal travel permits to Russian Jews until the Government took a decision on the matter. The reason given for this order was that the Jewish immigrants were not fulfilling the first obligation required of them, i.e. to become Ottoman subjects. In spring 1883 it was reported that a complete bar was being imposed on the entry of all Jews at Beirut and Haifa. Against this, it was still possible for Jews from countries other than Russia and Rumania to disembark at Jaffa. And even in the case of Russian and Rumanian Jews, pilgrims and businessmen were allowed to land.

But the Mutasarrif of Jerusalem appears to have recognized that it did not accord with the Porte’s real purpose to admit these Jews who claimed that they came for prayer or business, but in fact came to settle. He therefore turned to Constantinople for advice. A correspondence ensued; the Ministries of Internal and Foreign Affairs conferred; the opinions of the Porte’s legal advisers were sought; and the Council of State considered the question in March, 1884. After a further exchange with Jerusalem, it was decided to close Palestine to all Jewish business men, on the grounds that the Capitulations, which permitted Europeans to trade freely within the Ottoman Empire, applied exclusively to areas ‘appropriate for trade’—the Council of State did not consider that Palestine was such an area. 

Henceforth, only Jewish pilgrims could enter Palestine. Their passports were to be properly visaed by Ottoman Consuls abroad; on arrival they were to hand over a deposit guaranteeing their departure, and they were to leave after thirty days.

In all this, the role of the Powers was crucial. If the entry restrictions were to be effective, they had to be accepted by the Powers, on whose nationals they fell. And, broadly speaking, the Powers did not accept them,
since they were bent on preserving their privileges granted under the Capitulations (which, as already mentioned, the Porte was trying to curtail). There were of course certain differences in the positions taken by the various Powers, depending to some extent on the state of their relations with the Ottoman Empire. For example, from the 1880's onwards, Germany was trying to befriend the Ottoman Empire and on occasion seemed inclined to fall in with the entry restrictions. But in general the Powers refused to acquiesce in them, and so in 1888, after adopting a strong stand, they were able to extract a concession from the Porte permitting Jews to settle in Palestine, provided that they arrived singly, and not en masse.

The only major exception among the Powers during the 1880s was Russia which at first did accept the restrictions and was even suspected by some of having gone so far as to invite them. The reasons for Russia's attitude require investigation—perhaps she feared that a larger Jewish community in Palestine could endanger the status quo over the Holy Places in Jerusalem, or perhaps her stand was merely an extension of the Tsarist Government's attitude to its Jews at home.

Whatever the reason, the important point is that Russia changed her position and joined the other Powers in resisting the restrictions in the early 1890s. This became evident in May 1891, when Said Paşa, the Ottoman Foreign Minister, received word from Odessa that greatly increased numbers of Russian Jews were applying for visas to enter the Empire (as a result of rumours of forthcoming anti-Jewish measures in Russia in 1890 and the actual expulsion of Jews from Moscow in spring 1891). Abdülhamid was informed and on June 28 he minuted on a submission apparently asking if Jewish immigrants should be admitted:

[This] memorandum should be returned. It is not permissible to take a course which, by accepting [into the Empire] those who are expelled from every place, may in the future result in the creation of a Jewish government in Jerusalem. Since it is necessary that they should be sent to America, they and their like should not be accepted, and should be put aboard ships immediately and sent to America.

Abdülhamid also ordered the Council of Ministers to re-submit to him a 'serious and decisive resolution' on the matter.

While awaiting a decision, the Foreign Minister issued various instructions to Ottoman representatives in Russia with the object of ensuring that only Jews who were bona fide pilgrims were granted three-month visas for Palestine. Parallel instructions were also sent by the Grand Vezir to Palestine, ordering the authorities there to enforce the existing entry restrictions strictly.

The decision, taken a few weeks later, was drastic enough. The entire Ottoman Empire was closed to Russian Jews. No visas were to be issued to them and port officials throughout the Empire were not to let them disembark; shipping companies therefore ought not to receive them on board. And on October 19, Said Paşa went further and—presumably with Abdülhamid's knowledge—closed the Empire to foreign Jews of all nationalities, on the grounds that they endangered public health. Such
a sweeping step, so clearly violating the Capitulations, was inevitably rejected by the Powers who argued that it went ‘beyond the necessities of the case’. Rebuffed, Said Paşa continued to press Russia for the next two years to prevent shipping companies from giving her Jews passage into the Empire. His efforts were unsuccessful, presumably because Russia had come to share the view that preserving her privileges under the Capitulations was more important than worrying about the Jews’ presence in Palestine—which anyhow could be used to increase her influence in that country.

Throughout the 1880s the Ottoman Government concentrated on trying to stop Jews from settling in Palestine. It failed for various reasons which will be explained in a subsequent article and so, by the 1890s, it was forced to turn its attentions to another problem: how to prevent Jews from buying land in Palestine. The interest which the ‘Lovers of Zion’ had shown in land had caused prices to rise and also led to speculation in real estate. Rauf Paşa, the Mutasarrif of Jerusalem from 1877 to 1889, had done his best to hinder Jews from acquiring land, and to an extent this had kept a rein on prices. But his successor, Reşad Paşa (1889–90), took no such steps. As a result local Jews rushed to buy land, immigration societies sent representatives from abroad for the same purpose and even local Arabs purchased land with the intention of reselling it to Jews. The Hebrew writer, Asher Ginsberg (Ahad Ha-‘Am), visited Palestine in 1891. He was appalled at the number of land-agents, both Arab and Jewish, and also at their greed which had been stimulated by the Jews’ appetite for land.

In November 1892 the Mutasarrif of Jerusalem received orders from Constantinople, prohibiting the sale of miri land (state land requiring official permission for transfer) to all Jews. As most of the land in Palestine was miri, there were loud protests from Ottoman Jews and also from foreigners—both Jewish and Gentile—who had invested in land. As usual the foreigners complained—but with unusual vehemence—to their consuls, who immediately notified their embassies at Constantinople. Notes clamouring against a ‘manifest breach’ of the Capitulations were delivered to the Porte early in 1893. The Porte replied in April, explaining that the latest measure was dictated by political considerations and was not meant to deprive foreigners of their rights. It was designed only ‘to prevent the permanent establishment in Palestine of Jewish immigrants who despite the existing prohibition have succeeded or may succeed in penetrating the country’. The Porte felt that Powers which had accepted its Note in 1888 forbidding the entry of Jews en masse into Palestine could not now object to a measure aimed at strengthening that prohibition. The regulation applied to both Ottoman and foreign Jews, so that the latter could not complain of discrimination! (The real reason was that the Porte wanted to prevent Ottoman Jews from buying land on behalf of foreign Jews). However, to go some way to meet the Powers, the Porte stated that foreign Jews, who were legally resident in Palestine, could buy land—provided that (a) they presented at the Land Registry Office in Jerusalem a certificate, issued by their Consulate and ratified by the Mutasarrif, stating that they were legal residents; and (b) they undertook
not to let 'illegal Jews' live on their land (if urban) or set up a colony on it (if rural).

This last concession on land purchases by foreign Jews was typical of the loopholes which developed in the restrictions. At a time when the Government was prepared to close the whole Empire to Jews in an attempt to stop them settling in Palestine, the right of certain foreign Jews to live in the country and also to acquire land was recognized. Part of the problem lay in the fact that the Government was under pressure from the Powers which were not willing to acquiesce in any measure curtailing their privileges under the Capitulations. But equally, part of the problem lay within the Government itself. No single department of state appears to have been designated to attend to problems arising out of Jewish settlement in Palestine—presumably because in theory there should have been no settlement at all. The local authorities corresponded with at least four departments: the Grand Vezirate, and the Ministries of Internal and Foreign Affairs, and the Cadastre (the department dealing with land questions). Under pressure from their ministers, and indeed from Abdülhamid himself, these departments appear to have fallen into the common Ottoman practice of issuing and re-issuing to the provincial governors existing instructions—in this case those relating to Jewish immigrants. Moreover, coordination between these departments seems to have been weak, so that as they each multiplied the instructions, they frequently modified and often contradicted their previous orders or those of another department. The inconsistencies in the restrictions grew during the 1890s, and the local authorities were regularly confronted with problems they did not know how to solve.

For example, the 1893 land purchase restrictions soon proved unwieldy since various technicalities meant that few sales could be completed locally. The Mutasarrif of Jerusalem tactfully described them as ‘vague’ and by 1898 was pressing the Grand Vezir for more precise instructions. A related question concerned building operations on legally owned land. In 1893 Baron Rothschild had received some building permits after reaching an agreement with the Porte over how many houses could be built on the colonies he supported in Palestine and how many settlers could live in them. Again by 1898, the Administrative Council in Jerusalem was asking the Ministry of Internal Affairs about conditions under which additional buildings could be constructed to accommodate the colonies’ natural increase and the needs of their expanding agriculture.

But by far the most complicated and confused situations arose over the entry restrictions. In 1898, shortly before the second Zionist Congress, the Mutasarrif of Jerusalem was ordered to revert to the unambiguous instructions of 1884 which had been based on a Council of State decision: only bona fide pilgrims could visit Palestine, for up to thirty days. At this, the Administrative Council in Jerusalem asked the Grand Vezir what should be done with those foreign Jews now ‘legally resident’ in Palestine and, for that matter, with the considerable body of Jews illegally resident in the country. The Grand Vezir replied, somewhat unsatisfactorily, that henceforth all Jews, without exception, were to be prevented from settling in Palestine.

The Mutasarrif then informed the Grand Vezirate that various consuls
in Jerusalem disclaimed knowledge of the latest changes.\textsuperscript{107} In September therefore the Foreign Ministry sent \textit{Notes Verbales} to the foreign missions in the capital. These \textit{Notes} referred to the 1884 regulations, but re-extended the time permitted for a Jewish pilgrim’s visit to three months.\textsuperscript{108} This small sop to the Powers did not impress them, and they promptly rejected the \textit{Notes}.\textsuperscript{109}

Meanwhile in Palestine obstacles continued to be put in the way of groups of Jews who came to settle or could not pay a cash deposit to guarantee their departure after their ‘pilgrimage’. This obstruction of foreign nationals led the British Embassy to complain to the Foreign Ministry,\textsuperscript{110} and the American Minister at the Porte to call on the Foreign Minister. Tevfik Paşa told Straus (who was a Jew) that:

There is no intent to prevent American citizens, be they Jews or Christians, individually, as distinguished from \textit{en masse}, to visit Syria or Palestine as travelers, or who come as visitors; the only object is to prevent the further colonization of Palestine by Jews, as the settlement there of religious bodies in preponderating numbers may lead to political complications, which it is the purpose of the Ottoman Government to avoid.\textsuperscript{111}

Straus had no doubts about the quarter from which ‘political complications’ were feared—it was, quite plainly, the Zionist Movement.\textsuperscript{112} But in spite of this, the Foreign Minister upheld the distinction, which had been maintained since 1888, between Jews arriving individually and in numbers. As the Porte had already re-extended pilgrims’ visits to three months, the attempt to revert to the 1884 regulations had in effect been frustrated. This may conceivably have given the Powers some satisfaction, but it could not have given the authorities in Palestine any comfort. They were still left with the question of what to do with those foreign Jews who, having arrived singly or in small groups since 1888, had settled legally in Palestine and, it appeared, could continue to settle in the country—despite the Grand Vezir. Similarly, they still had not received any guidance on how to treat Jews illegally resident in Palestine.

In 1897, a special Commission had been set up in Jerusalem to try to enforce entry restrictions. In September 1899 the members of this commission submitted a report to the Administrative Council.\textsuperscript{113} They found that ‘in some way’ the 1891 restrictions had been enforced only as regards Jews from Russia, Rumania, Austro-Hungary, Greece and Persia, and even these Jews had not seriously been barred from entering Palestine; other Jews had been admitted freely. In 1897 the restrictions were applied more strictly by the Commission, but Jews could always enter Palestine as pilgrims, and once in the country it was virtually impossible to make them leave. It was difficult to identify them, since the registers were in such disorder that no Jew’s recent arrival could be proved. Moreover, the consuls resisted the expulsion of their protégés. There were so many points at which Jews could enter Palestine—by sea or overland from the north and south—that officials accepting bribes could not be detected; and there was little point in searching out the offenders if they were not punished as at the present. The Commission offered various suggestions to make the
restrictions more effective: an enlarged police force, full-time immigration commissions in Jaffa and Jerusalem, compulsory registration of all foreigners in the country, and cash rewards for exposing illegally resident Jews and corrupt officials. Above all, the cooperation of the consuls was absolutely essential. Alternatively, Jews wishing to settle should be allowed to do so, provided that they adopted Ottoman nationality on arrival. But at all costs an end had to be put to the chaos in Palestine.

The Porte was slow to face up to all the points being raised by the local authorities, but it could not possibly ignore the constant flow of Jewish immigrants wishing to settle in Palestine and other parts of the Empire—if only because its representatives abroad continued to write about the numbers applying for visas and because many Jewish émigrés from Russia were in evidence in Constantinople. Bad harvests and anti-Semitic outbreaks led to a further increase in Jewish emigration from Rumania in 1899. Thereupon the Council of Ministers cut back to one month the period permitted to Jewish pilgrims reaching Palestine, and also ordered the local authorities to take a record of the details in Jewish pilgrims’ visas on entry. That winter it was rumoured that the Ottoman Government was making land available to Jews in Anatolia. Consequently fifteen hundred Rumanian Jewish families (as well as two hundred Jewish families from Bulgaria) applied to the Porte for concessions of land. This led the Porte, in May 1900, to inform the Mutasarrif of Jerusalem that ‘following inquiries made by Jewish emigrants from Rumania and other countries’, only Muslim immigrants were to be allowed to settle in the Mutasarriflik. A month later, the Porte sent the foreign missions a Note Verbale advising them that Jews would no longer be allowed to disembark at Constantinople and inviting the Powers to request their respective shipping companies not to book passages for Jews intending to settle in the Empire. The Powers (including Russia) rejected this Note in the same way as they had disposed of a similar request a decade earlier.

For all this, growing numbers of Jews continued to reach Palestine, and in April 1900 the Mutasarrif of Jerusalem sent the Grand Vezir a synopsis of the report submitted the previous autumn to the Administrative Council by the local Commission which was supposed to enforce the entry restrictions. Two months later, in June, a committee of enquiry made up of three senior officials from the Ministries of War and Internal Affairs, and from the Cadastre was sent to Palestine. Officially this Commission came to investigate questions concerning land purchases and building on the colony at Zikhron Ya‘aqov but Aaron Aaronsohn, the agronomist, who testified before the commissioners, was alarmed at their inclination to overstep the boundaries of their formal mandate and interest themselves in wider questions of Jewish settlement in Palestine. Then in the autumn of that year the Council of Ministers consolidated the regulations governing Jewish entry and land purchase in Palestine with a view to solving all the problems which had troubled the local authorities in recent years.

As from January 28, 1901, Ottoman and foreign Jews ‘long resident’ in Palestine and those ‘whose residence is not prohibited’ were to enjoy the same rights as other Ottoman subjects. They could buy miri land and build on it in accordance with the Land Code. Thus, by this simple step, the
status of Jews illegally resident for many years in Palestine had been regularised. They were to be treated as Ottoman subjects, and they, like all Ottomans, could buy land and build on it. Similarly the disabilities previously suffered by Ottoman Jews on account of the recent immigrants had been removed. However, it was still forbidden for any property owner to assist recent Jewish immigrants to remain in Palestine.

There were changes in the regulations regarding Jewish pilgrims as well. They were no longer required to pay a cash deposit guaranteeing their departure after one month as previously. Instead, all Jews visiting Palestine as pilgrims (including Ottoman subjects) were to surrender their passports or papers on entry, and in exchange they were to receive a residence permit allowing them to stay in Palestine for three months. This permit, costing one piastre, was to differ in form from other documents given to visitors entering Palestine, and it soon became known as the ‘Red Slip’ because of its colour. It was to be handed back when the pilgrims departed, so that a check could be kept on Jews visiting Palestine. Detailed statistics were to be compiled at the end of each month to enable the authorities to expel pilgrims whose permits had expired. Ottoman officials were warned that failure to enforce these orders would be severely punished.

But, carefully drafted as they were, the consolidated regulations were fatally flawed. Jews could still enter Palestine as pilgrims and certain categories of Jews illegally resident in Palestine had been granted the right to purchase land. And, on top of that, the Powers did not waste time in unceremoniously rejecting the new regulations.

Herein lies a paradox. The Ottoman Government was opposed to modern Jewish settlement in Palestine from the outset. It had good reasons for its opposition and these reasons grew stronger with the passage of time. It knew of Herzl’s ideas well before the Zionist Movement was founded. Abdülhamid too was personally involved and opposed. Ottoman policy was thus clear and constant. It was quickly backed up with restrictions on Jewish entry into Palestine and land purchase there. And, for all that, it failed.

But the paradox, as the phrase has it, was more apparent than real. Important defects in the Government’s policy have been mentioned. But there was another reason for the failure of Ottoman policy towards modern Jewish settlement in Palestine. It lay in the very real difficulties involved in putting the policy into practice in Palestine. This aspect of the question forms the subject of a second article which is to appear in the next number of this journal.

NOTES
This article is largely based on archival material in the Alliance Israélite Universelle in Paris (designated ‘AIU’ in the references); the Central Zionist Archive, Jerusalem (CZA); the Israel State Archive, Jerusalem (ISA (G) & ISA (T) for German and Turkish material respectively); the Jewish Colonization Association, London (JCA); the Public Records Office, London (FO & PRO (G) for British and German material respectively); the Ottoman Foreign Ministry, Instanbul (OFM); and the Quai d’Orsay, Paris (Q d’O).

Other abbreviations used in the references are as follows: Consple. (= Constantinople); Damas. (= Damascus); Dir. Gén. (= Direction Générale); Enc. (= Enclosure); Jerus. (= Jerusalem); Kay. (= Kaymakam); Min. (= Minister); Mutas. (= Mutasarrif);
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Pres. (= President); SP (= Sublime Porte); Tel. (= Telegram); T£ Turkish ([Ottoman] pounds).

1. OFM Carton 208, Dossier 139. Although catalogued, this file cannot be found in the OFM archive.


4. Ibid., no. 652, September 23, 1881.

5. Havazzelet, xii, 41, September 1, 1882; cf. The Levant Herald, iii, 444, November 24, 1881.

6. Ha-Meliz, xviii, 16, May 9, 1882.


9. C. Chissin, Miyyoman had a-biluyim (Tel Aviv, 1925), p. 9, July 24, 1882.


13. Ibid., pp. 518-19, enc. 2 to no. 319, June 13, 1882, Wallace to Said Pasa (SP).


15. A. Druyanow, (ed.) Ketavim letoldot hibbat ziyyon ve-yishshuv erez yisra'el (Odessa and Tel Aviv, 1919, 1925 and 1932), i, 37-8, June 24, 1882, L. Oliphant (Consple.) to D. Gordon [Lyck].


18. Druyanow, Ketavim, i, 321, November 13, 1884; cf. Y. 'Ari and M. Charizman, Sefer ha-yovel petah tigva (Tel Aviv, 1929), pp. 174, 238 and 240.

19. FO 195/1581, no. 9, March 5, 1887, N. T. Moore (Jerus.) to Sir W. A. White (Consple.).

20. FO 195/1581, no. 9, March 5, 1887.

21. State Dept., Papers, 1888, ii, 1559-60, no. 57, January 28, 1888, O. S. Straus (Consple.) to Secy. of State Baynard; and ISA(T), no. 47, December 15, 1887, Ministry of Internal Affairs to Mutas. (Jerus.).

22. FO 78/3394, no. 1155, December 30, 1882, Wyndham to Granville.


29. Wissotzki, op. cit., p. 55, April 2, 1885 and pp. 74-5, April 4, 1885.


32. Loc. cit.

33. Ibid., p. 30.

34. Jewish Chronicle, no. 652, September 23, 1881.


37. FO 78/4450, no. 34, February 9, 1892, Sir E. Baring (Cairo) to Lord Salisbury (FO).


41. *Loc. cit.*


47. *Ibid.*, ii, 508, January 7, 1897; indeed the *Neue Freie Presse* had published anti-Ottoman articles: *ibid.*, ii, 481, October 13, 1896 and ii, 491, October 22, 1896.


49. PRO (G) K 692/Türkei 195, no. 49, June 19, 1897, von Tischendorf (Jerus.) to Reichskanzler (Berlin).

50. The group did not travel to Palestine as supporters of Herzl—see Herzl *Diaries*. ii, 513, January 29, 1897.

51. PRO (G) K 692/Türkei 195, no. 49, June 19, 1897.

52. JCA 279/no. 26, August 5, 1897, J. Niégo (Miqve Yisra'el) to Pres., JCA (Paris).

53. AIU I.G.I., October 29, 1897, Fernandez to AIU (Paris).

54. E.g. OFM 332/17, no. 9550/63, April 29, 1898, Ali Ferruh Pasa (Washington) to Tevfik Pasa (Conspl.); no. 23598/216, June 8, 1898, Antopolus (London) to Tevfik Pasa; nos. 28858/74 and 28859/96, both July 9, 1898, Tevfik Pasa to Mahmud Nedim Pasa (Vieina and Ahmed Tevfik Pasa (Berlin); nos. 23600/182, July 21, 1898 and 23612/189, July 28, 1898, both Mahmud Nedim Pasa to Tevfik Pasa.

55. E.g. OFM 332/17 telegram no. 58, April 21, 1898, Ali Ferruh Pasa to Tevfik Pasa.

56. JCA 280/ [unnumbered], February 13, 1900, Niégo (Smyrna) to Pres., JCA.


63. Herzl, *Diaries*, iii, 1215-33, February 15-18, 1902; and *ibid.*, iv, 131-342, July 25-August 2, 1902.

64. *Ibid.*, iii, 1222, February 17, 1902.

65. *Ibid.*, iii, 1256, March 14, 1902; iv, 1319, July 27, 1902; iv, 1331, July 31, 1902; and iv, 1341, August 2, 1902.

66. E.g. *ibid.*, iv, 1617-19, March 12-October 4, 1904.

67. JCA 267/no. 129, August 25, 1905, A. Antébi (Jerus.) to Pres., JCA.

68. JCA 261/enc. to no. 338, August 30, 1905, Antébi to Dir. Gén., JCA (Paris).

69. JCA 267/no. 129, August 25, 1905; and CZA Z2/598, September 4, 1905, both D. Levontin (Jaffa) to D. Wolffsohn (Cologne).

70. CZA W 35/4 (Wolffsohn's incomplete diary of his visit to Constantinople, for October 25-November 3, 1907); and CZA W 35/5 (notes by Wolffsohn and his companion, Dr N. Katzenelson).


72. There were no Capitulations with Rumania (independent 1878) or with Bulgaria (still nominally tributary to the Ottoman Empire in 1882).

73. ISA (G) A III 9, no. 858, July 12, 1882, von Tischendorf (Jerus.) to Reichskanzler (Berlin); cf. *Havazzelet*, xii, 35 July 7, 1882.

74. FO 195/1410, no. 86, October 24, 1882, G. J. Eldridge (Beirut) to Lord Dufferin (Conspl.); and enc. I to no. 97, November 29, 1882, N. Vitale (Latakia) to Eldridge.

75. FO 78/3506, enc. to no. 48, January 22, 1883, Wyndham to Granville: 'Notifica-
tion officielle’ (n.d.).

76. Cf. Havazzelet, xiii, 9, February 16, 1883.
77. FO 195/1447, no. 3, January 16, 1883, Eldridge to Dufferin; and Havazzelet, xiii, 9, February 16, 1883; cf. The Times, no. 30,730, January 30, 1883, letter from L. Oliphant (Haifa), enclosing order, dated December 26, 1882, from Vali (Sam) to Kay. (Haifa).
78. Havazzelet, xiii, 9, February 16, 1883; cf. ibid., 15, April 6, 1883 and ibid., 16, April 15, 1883.
79. ISA (T) no. 89, March 4, 1884: minutes of this meeting (copied to Jerusalem).
80. ISA (T) no. 84, April 8, 1884, Ministry of Internal Affairs (SP) to Mutass (Jerus.).
81. ISA (T) no. 89, March 4, 1884.
82. Havazzelet, xiv, 23, May 2, 1884.
83. E.g. FO 195/1612, no. 15, May 29, 1888, Moore to White.
84. Texts of American, French and British Notes refusing to acquiesce in the Porte’s regulations published in State Dept., Papers, 1888, ii, 1588-91, dated May 17, 23 and 24, 1888, respectively.
85. Ibid., p. 1619, October 4, 1888, translation of Note Verbale (SP) to American Embassy (Consple.); cf. FO 195/1607, October 6, 1888, White to Moore.
86. O. Straus, Under Four Administrations: From Cleveland to Taft (Boston, 1922), p. 80; cf. Wissotski, op. cit., pp. 71-2, April 2, 1885: report of conversation with Haham Basi (Consple.); ibid., p. 62, April 5, 1885, Wissotski to L. Pinsker (Odessa); Druyanow, Ketavim, i, 280, May 26, 1885, A. Veneziani (Consple.) to Pinsker; and OFM A/346, Note Verbale no. 19, January 14, 1887, Russian Embassy (Consple.) to SP.
87. OFM A/346, no. 6682/1022, May 30, 1891, Dikran Efendi (Odessa) to Said Pasa (SP).
89. Loc. cit.
90. OFM A/346, no. 100791/156, July 13, 1891, Said Pasa to Hüsni Pasa (St. Petersburg); and no. 100954/126 A, August 1, 1891, same to same.
91. Havazzelet, xxi, 36, July 3, 1891; and ibid., 37, July 10, 1891. The Grand Vezir was also responding to a telegram from Jerusalem notables protesting against continued Jewish immigration—cf. FO 195/1727, no. 25, July 16, 1891, J. Dickson (Jerus.) to E. Fane (Consple.).
92. OFM A/346, no. 101693/170 A, August 18, 1891, Said Pasa to Hüsni Pasa.
93. OFM A/346, Note Verbale, no. 701718/82, October 19, 1891, SP to Foreign Missions (Consple.); cf. October 26, 1891, Said Pasa to Ottoman representatives (European capitals and Washington).
94. FO 78/5479, enc. to no. 473: Note Verbale, no. 103, November 19, 1891, British Embassy (Consple.) to SP.
95. OFM A/346, many despatches and telegrams between Said Pasa and Ottoman representatives in Russia from end 1891 to end 1893; finally, evasive Note Verbale, no. 836, November 29, 1893, Russian Embassy (Consple.) to SP.
97. FO 195/1765, no. 35, December 30, 1892, Dickson to Sir F. C. Ford (Consple.).
98. FO 195/1765, no. 35, December 30, 1892, enc., December 22, 1892; FO 195/1806, encs. 1 and 2, March 22 and 23, 1893, to no. 19, April 29, 1893, Dickson to Ford; and ISA (G) A III 14, December 16, 1892, I. Frutiger & Co. (Jerus.) to von Tischendorf.
99. CZA (A), January 25, 1893, Note Verbale, Italian Embassy (Consple.) to SP; February 7, 1893, Note Verbale, Austro-Hungarian Embassy (Consple.) to SP.
100. ISA (G) A XXII 18, April 3, 1893, Note Verbale, SP to German Embassy (Consple.); cf. FO 195/1789, enc., April 3, 1893, to no. 278, July 23, 1893: copy of identical Note to Italian Embassy (Consple.).
101. JCA 263/enc. 2 to no. 9, July 14, 1899, Mutass. (Jerus.) to Grand Vezir (SP).
102. This agreement is referred to in JCA 263/enc. to no. 26, November 14, 1899: Resolution of Admin. Council (Jerus.).
103. JCA 263/enc. to no. 26, seeks guidance from Min. of Internal Affairs and refers to two previous inquiries, dated August 15, 1898 and December 17, 1898.
104. ISA (T) no. 86, July 9, 1898, Admin. Council (Jerus.) to Grand Vezir and Min. of Internal Affairs (Consple.), referring to order dated May 17, 1898 from latter to Mutas. (Jerus.).

105. ISA (T) no. 86.

106. ISA (T) no. 15, August 10, 1898, Grand Vezirate to Mutas. (Jerus.).

107. ISA (T) no. 14, August 20, 1898, Mutas. (Jerus.) to Grand Vezirate.

108. FO 78/5479, enc. 1 to no. 542: Note Verbale, September 19, 1898, SP to British Embassy (Consple.); cf. Note Verbale, September 19, 1898, in ISA (G) A XXII 18, SP to German Embassy (Consple.).

109. Documents Diplomatiques Francais, 2nd Series, i, 187, no. 146, March 19, 1901, T. Delcassé (Paris) to J. Constans (Consple.), refers to Note Verbale, September 24, 1898, French Embassy (Consple.) to SP; ISA (G) A XXII 18, Note Verbale, September 28, 1898, German Embassy (Consple.) to SP; FO 78/5479, enc. 2 to no. 542: Note Verbale, September 30, 1898, British Embassy (Consple.) to SP.

110. FO 78/5479, no. 542, October 13, 1898, Sir N. O’Conor (Consple.) to Salisbury.


112. State Dept., Papers, 1898, p. 1093, no. 25; cf. FO 78/5479, no. 7, February 9, 1899, Dickson to O’Conor; and FO 78/5479, no. 83, February 24, 1899, O’Conor to Salisbury.

113. ISA (T) no. 93, April 28, 1908, Mutas. (Jerus.) to Grand Vezir, enclosing synopsis of this report, dated September 30, 1899.

114. Ikdam, no. 1898, October 16, 1899.

115. JCA 280/ [unnumbered letter], February 13, 1900, Niégo (Smyrna) to Pres., JCA.

116. AIU IV E 11, July 3, 1900, Antébi to Pres., AIU, enclosing copy of 'ordre viziriel', May 18, 1900, to Mutas. (Jerus.).

117. FO 78/5479, enc. to no. 230: Note Verbale, June 27, 1900, SP to British Embassy (Consple.).

118. Powers’ Notes of rejection in OFM A/346.

119. FO 195/2075, enc. to no. 51, July 1, 1900, J. H. Monahan (Haifa) to Sir R. Drummond-Hay (Beirut).

120. Letter, July 2, 1900, A. Aaronsohn (Zikhron Ya’aqov) to Dr H. Joffe, in A. Samsonow, Zikron Ya’aqov: parashat divre yameha (Zikhron Ya’aqov, 1943), pp. 261-3.

121. JCA 264/enc. to no. 76 [n.d.] Min. of Internal Affairs to Provincial Governors (ISA (T) no. 30 gives date as November 29, 1900).

122. ISA (G) A XXII 18: circular, January 9, 1901, Mutas. (Jerus.) to consul (Jerus.); cf. FO 78/5479, enc. to no. 34: Note Verbale, November 21, 1900, SP to Missions (Consple.), giving notice of the new entry regulations, but merely stating that the land purchase remains in force.

123. CZA (A), Note Verbale no. 784/61, December 10, 1900, Italian Embassy (Consple.) to SP; and ISA (G) A XXII 18, Note Verbale, January 16, 1901, German Embassy (Consple.) to SP; cf. State Dept., Papers, 1901, pp. 517-18, no. 354, February 28, 1901 and Documents Diplomatiques Francais, 2nd series, i, 187, no. 146, March 19, 1901, Hay and Delcassé, instructing their respective embassies at Constantinople not to comply with the latest directives.