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The PLO After Beirut

By Kenneth W. Stein

The Background

Upon the landscape of the Middle East, the long-term implications of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon remain to be tallied. Not since President Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem in November 1977 has one event and its aftermath so dramatically undermined the political status quo. The invasion necessitated the reformulation of political positions, redefined inter-Arab alliances and forced the PLO into unprecedented political discussion about its nature and future direction.

Between 1979 and 1982, little changed in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Each Arab country had its own internal religious and economic troubles. Arab disunity had become an accepted reality. Jordan expressed deep opposition to Israeli initiatives in the West Bank but was powerless to react to the spatial and demographic changes there. The PLO had securely established its autonomous presence in southern Lebanon. Israel employed a policy of defensive preemption in security matters. And in the U.S., foreign policy initiatives were delayed by personnel changes and President Reagan’s priority concern: focus on domestic economic issues.

Yet there were small hints of political change in the Middle East which would ultimately be catalyzed by the Israeli invasion.

Israel had returned all of the Sinai to Egypt, despite fears that the Begin government would not fulfill Israel’s treaty obligations. A pariah state since Sadat had embarked upon his one-man diplomacy, Cairo’s strategic, political, and cultural importance was still seen as necessary by the Arab world in the event of future military conflict with Israel. The Arab world hoped that the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, and the Camp David accords, would wither on a sterile vine, and awaited Egypt’s return to the Arab fold. Normalization of Egyptian-Israeli relations was slow, contractual and not substantial, and little progress was made toward implementing Palestinian autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza. Nevertheless, Egypt maintained her diplomatic relations with Israel while advocating mutual Palestinian (but not PLO-Israeli) recognition at a non-aligned meeting in Kuwait in April 1982. Although Cairo was not conforming to the Arab world’s precondition for rapprochement — that Egypt undo what Sadat had begun — she had begun to lay the groundwork for diplomatic contacts with the estranged Arab capitals.

Meanwhile, Jordan remained in de facto peace with Israel, although the demographic and geographic changes in the West Bank and the steady trickle of Palestinians from the West Bank into Jordan, swelling the Palestinian population already there, troubled Amman. In March, Israel dissolved the municipal council of the West Bank town of al-Birah. Israel continued to establish and develop West Bank settlements and sought to establish a political counterpart to the urban elite’s PLO orientation.

Since 1978 Jordan and the PLO had held meetings about the “occupied territories” in the context of Arab summit resolutions. Each eyed the other carefully to make sure that neither gained too hefty an influence over West Bank Palestinian politics. The PLO was the anointed legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, but the coordinated activities of the Jordanian-Palestinian committee in the spring of 1982

Dr. Stein is Assistant Professor of Near Eastern History and Director of the International Studies Center at Emory University in Atlanta Georgia. His book, The Land Question in Palestine, 1917-1939, will be published by the University of North Carolina Press in the spring of 1984.
suggested some level of pragmatic cooperation. Both Jordan and the PLO recognized that fifteen years after the 1967 war, Israel was still in firm control of the West Bank and Gaza and prolonged civilian mutiny had not, as expected, erupted in the territories.

While the Syrian regime was suppressing rebellion in the Syrian town of Hama, killing thousands of its Muslim citizens, a deterioration in civil order plagued Lebanon as the civil war there raged on. In Sidon, Tripoli and Tyre, frequent clashes occurred between various political, religious and ethnic militias. Assassinations, kidnappings, car bombings and general unrest characterized life in southern Lebanon. Schools and businesses were periodically closed. There were shortages of water and food. The PLO’s control of local municipal governments, the local court systems and the economy gave it an uncontested and powerful infrastructure. With its own refugee camp system, ordinance arsenals, welfare and educational systems and military training facilities, the PLO had created a state within a state.

Even with its strong military and political infrastructure, however, the PLO still lacked independence within the Arab world. Its internal strength was undermined by strains in relations between the Palestinian factions, with the various Lebanese groups, and with the Syrian government. The PLO was also extremely frustrated by an Arab world that refused to champion the Palestinian cause above all other issues. And finally, the U.S. continued to refuse recognition and negotiation with the PLO until the organization accepted Israel’s right to exist.

Since 1967, the PLO’s operational locations had been systematically reduced until all that remained of these locations were those in southern Lebanon. The Israelis had gained control of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in the war of 1967, and virtually removed all terrorist cells in these occupied territories. In 1970, King Hussein had restricted PLO activity after the PLO’s threat to his kingdom, and after a bloody civil war had expelled most of them from Jordan. After the Syrian-Israeli Disengagement Ac-

The PLO-Syrian relationship was of Syria “Greater Jordania” in avoiding being any Arab power. In October 1968, a military conflict between Israel and Syria began. The involvement of Palestinian fighters in the Lebanese civil war that broke out in 1975 led the Lebanese authorities to attempt to restrict the PLO membership, weapons and activities even further. According to the Shitra Agreement of July 1977, heavy arms were to be surrendered, only Palestinians living in Lebanon prior to the signing of the Cairo Agreement were granted the right of residence in Lebanon, and the external defense of the Palestinian refugee camps was guaranteed by the Arab Deterrent Force which came to be almost completely composed of Syrian forces. (Syria had intervened in Lebanon in 1976 — ostensibly to aid the Palestinians, then curbing their maneuverability and aiding certain Christian groups and remaining in Lebanon since then.)

The Lebanese army was unable to enforce most of these agreements. The PLO essentially retained its operational autonomy in southern Lebanon even after the stationing of U.N. forces there in March 1978, after the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon in the Litani Operation of the same month. The Israelis withdrew by June and the PLO continued to use its last refuge contiguous to Israel. Finally came the Israeli invasion during the summer of 1982. A geographical barrier, which Lebanon, Israel, Syria and Jordan had begun to clamp around the PLO in late 1969, had finally closed.
PLO-Syrian Relations

Syrian-PLO relations remained pragmatic but tense. The PLO was actively aware of Syria’s aspirations to control all of “Greater Syria” at the expense of Lebanese, Jordanian and Palestinian nationalism. The PLO in all its fragmented parts wanted to avoid becoming the political appendage of any Arab state. Yet, in the late 1970s it relied heavily upon Syria for political and logistical support.

In October 1976, Syrian armed intervention in Lebanon had saved the PLO from military collapse. After Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem, the PLO repeatedly aligned itself with the so-called confrontation states (Algeria, Iraq, Libya, Syria and South Yemen) against recognition of Israel, but these states, though initially unified in their vehement opposition to the peace process, gradually disintegrated as a political force because of the pressures of local and regional issues, such as the Iran-Iraq war, discussions on the possible unification of the Yemenis and the Moroccan-Algerian dispute over the mineral rich Western Sahara. Only Syria remained as the PLO’s “reliable” patron.

By the spring of 1982, however, the Syrian-PLO relationship had reached stages of advanced deterioration. The Israeli invasion and aftermath sharpened the acrimony. The Syrian President believed that a close confidant of Arafat had helped fund and organize the Muslim Brotherhood’s rebellion in the Syrian town of Hama. Arafat banned from Palestinian Central Committee meetings a person he felt was leaking information to the Syrians, and became very fearful of Damascus’ intent “to get him.” Syria adamantly opposed any moderation of the PLO’s absolutist position on Israel and suspected that Arafat was being dragged by the United States into an accommodation with Israel.

The level and frequency of animosity expressed by PLO members regarding the Syrian regime’s inaction during and after the Israeli invasion was typified by the comments of Salah Khalaf, a Central Committee member of Arafat’s al-Fatah faction. “President al-Assad would have done better to send 30,000 infantrymen,” Khalaf said. “As for Syria, it has taken fright…”

Parts of the Arab world also roundly condemned Syria for not aiding the Palestinian cause sufficiently. Naturally, Jordan and Iraq, Syria’s Arab competitors, spoke harshly of Syrian inaction. Khalid Sultan, a representative of the Kuwaiti National Assembly, expressed this Arab attitude most succinctly in early June 1982. He commented, “Palestinians are being massacred...we have not witnessed a single Arab move by front line states. Where are the [Steadfastness and Confrontation States] forces today? Where are the [Syrian] rockets, tanks, and planes which crushed the resistance in Hama and killed 15,000 Syrians, leaving more than 30,000 orphans? Why are they sending weapons to Iran when they should have been fighting alongside the Palestinians?”

The war widened the distance and worsened the relations between Syria and the PLO. Issues of personality, tactics, and substance separated their positions. These issues also threatened the PLO’s organizational unity. Its losses as a result of the Israeli invasion could not be replaced by any Arab country. The organization’s infrastructure in southern Lebanon was destroyed. Military arsenals were confiscated and refugee camps partially or totally obliterated. These camps had been sources of PLO recruitment, nationalist expression and political activity, and essential focal points for the maintenance of Palestinian identity. With many Palestinians dispersed, incarcerated, or killed, recruitment and training of future commandos has been severely curtailed. PLO fighters now in Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, North Yemen, Tunisia, South Yemen, Sudan, and Syria have been considerably demoralized in exile. The freedom of movement enjoyed in Lebanon has gone, as has easy and unrestricted access to the media, publishing houses and newspapers which Beirut provided.

Back to Syria

The PLO leadership and many of its fighters have again been forced to accept
Syria’s tutelage and physical protection. To a certain extent, segments of the PLO have become protégés under Syrian domination, and therefore subject to control by the Syrian army in the northern parts of Lebanon and in the eastern Bekaa valley. In mid-December 1982 in Tripoli, Syrian army personnel reportedly slaughtered several members of Arafat’s PLO faction, al-fatah, ostensibly as a warning to Arafat not to move closer to Jordan’s King Hussein and an American-sponsored settlement.13

The personal chasm between Arafat and Assad has its historical roots. These originate in part from Syrian efforts to control the PLO through Palestinian organizations more dependent on Syria than Arafat’s al-fatah and more aligned with Damascus’ harder anti-peace settlement line. Though Arafat himself used considerable verbal restraint in condemning the lack of sufficient or timely support by the Syrians during the Israeli invasion, his actions have spoken for him. When Arafat left Beirut he went to Athens, not to Damascus. Salah Khalaf explained that Arafat had decided not to go to an Arab capital because “he was so nauseated by the attitude of the Arabs during the siege of Beirut.”14 At the Fez Arab summit in September 1983 Assad was the only head of state not to greet Arafat upon arrival. Both men met briefly after a Palestine Central Council (PCC) meeting in Damascus in late September, but reportedly they did not meet after Brezhnev’s funeral in Moscow, or after another PCC meeting in Damascus in November. So deep were the animosities between Arafat and the Damascus government that at a meeting of PLO leaders in Aden in early December 1982, two Syrian-leaning PLO leaders, Dr. George Habash and Nayeef Hawatme, along with the South Yemeni President, were deputized “to rectify and improve PLO relations with Syria.”15

Syrian-PLO relations have remained very strained. In addition to the personal differences, several substantive issues perturb Assad. They include:

1. Arafat’s increasing coziness with King Hussein;
2. The likely prospect of the creation of a Jordanian-PLO delegation to discuss the future of the occupied territories;
3. The opening of an Egyptian-PLO dialogue;
4. The limited acceptance of U.S.-sponsored negotiations.

All these issues contribute to Syria’s political isolation.

Assad sees a budding PLO-Jordanian alliance as a dual threat: first, it represents the creation of an axis that can further deny Syria its larger interest of controlling the entire region; second, but no less immediate, Assad sees the numerous Arafat-Hussein meetings since the former’s leaving Beirut as a clear indication that the PLO leader is preparing to compromise and accept an American inspired, Egyptian supported and Zionist enforced settlement.16 Thus in October 1982, the Syrian Information Minister questioned Arafat’s right to speak for the PLO without endorsement from the PLO political institutions.17 There is dissenting PLO opinion about Arafat’s leadership and his “Jordanian gambit,” and Assad has found welcome Palestinian allies in at least five Palestinian factions: the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP); the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP); the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine — General Command (PFLP-GC); the Popular Struggle Front (PSF); and al-Sai’qa, Syria’s own PLO faction. These Palestinian factions, like Assad, have opposed in principle the recent meetings of the Palestinian-Jordanian Committee in Amman and view the form and substance of these meetings as an effort aimed at liquidating the Palestinian cause, of accepting President Reagan’s proposals and violating past Palestinian National Council resolutions. At the meeting of the PNC in April 1981, it was affirmed that no country had the right to speak for the Palestinian people or to negotiate a settlement of the Palestinian problem.18 The issue of entering into negotiations, the Reagan proposals, and other issues, were debated at the Sixteenth Session of the Palestine National Council held in Algiers in February 1983.

Clearly, over these issues and others the
PLO could further fragment, if not formally splinter.\(^9\) Already, Arafat’s \textit{al-fatah} has considerable influence in the three major policy and representative bodies of the PLO: the PLO Executive Committee, the Palestine Central Council, and the Palestine National Council. Nevertheless, despite the deep rift over tactics, all PLO factions realize that division within the organization threatens PLO unity, and the patronage and protection of any Arab state hampers independent action.

**The PLO and the Reagan Proposals**

The Reagan proposals of September 1, 1982 posed deep tactical and ideological problems for the PLO. Not since the 1917 British Balfour Declaration, which called for the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine and for no more than the protection of the civil and religious rights of the non-Jewish populations, has a major document dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict put the Palestinians in such a favorable light. The British had promised no more than protection for the local Arab population. The Reagan proposal declared that “the question now is how to reconcile Israel’s legitimate security concerns with the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.”\(^3\)

Reagan suggested compromise and negotiation. Apparently, the sincerity of his proposals, which were built upon the Camp David process, was sufficient to persuade a characteristically circumspect King Hussein to reassess his involvement in the negotiating process.

The Reagan proposals present various consequences for the PLO. On the positive side, from their viewpoint, these recognize the Palestinians as a people, not a refugee group; oppose annexation or permanent control of the West Bank by Israel, and say that Jerusalem’s future status should be decided through negotiation. On the negative side, the Reagan proposals avoid mention of the PLO, oppose the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, abstain from the issue of repatriation, and call for self-government but not self-determination for the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza in association with Jordan. Neither the PCC in November 1982, nor the PNC in February 1983 roundly rejected the Reagan proposals, but expressed firm opposition to them as insufficient and inadequate.\(^21\) The more uncompromising PLO groups oppose all aspects of the Reagan proposals.\(^22\) Virtually all shades of PLO opinion are wary of U.S. intentions. They regard America as untrustworthy and Israel’s foremost patron. Yet the PLO recognizes that the U.S. is a necessary participant in any future negotiating framework, for only the U.S. is perceived to have any influence over Israel.

There is no doubt that the Israeli invasion forced the PLO to consider new tactical and political options. Clearly, the military option is gone for the moment. Rebuilding an effective military structure will require considerable time, if a contiguous and operational refuge can be found. But the long term strategy of most PLO groups remains unchanged by the summer events. Hani al-Hasan, a political adviser to Arafat and a Central Committee member of \textit{al-fatah}, in a lengthy interview in the Saudi newspaper, \textit{al-Riyadh}, in November 1982 made this point cogently:

> We, the Palestinian resistance, are not against political dialogue or political struggle, but we will never, not even for five minutes, allow ourselves to bargain over the political position in return for small achievements or in return for being allowed to live. We will not let anyone live unless Zionism topples. Our revolution was not born, nor did it proceed in order to recognize Israel. Our goal is as clear as daylight and it is unquestionable. We are here to regain the land, all Palestinian land, all the Palestinian towns, Jerusalem, Nablus, Haifa, Gaza, Safad. These are our towns, dear to us, and of equal rank.\(^3\)

**Conclusions**

In an historical context, the Israeli invasion reaffirmed the presence of general properties characteristic of the Palestinians in the long conflict.\(^24\) After the invasion, the Palestinians saw themselves as distant relatives, alienated and marginal in relation to
the rest of the Arab world. The Palestinians, during and after the Israeli invasion, experienced the same callousness of a disinterested Arab world they had endured after the 1947-1949 war.23 Virtually all shades of PLO opinion expressed disgust and hostility toward the Arab states for their inaction while the PLO was taking a thrashing from the Israelis,24 and attacked those states for their cowardice and complicity. Clearly, the Arabs' national self-interest and fear for their regimes' stability permitted them only rhetorical condemnation of Israel. A PLO member in charge of foreign information charged, "It is an affront to our Arab nation that the first demonstration to support us was held in Israel..."

The war of 1982, unlike the first Arab-Israeli war of 1947-49, was the first Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In 1947-49, the Arab defeat was a pan-Arab humiliation which set off a chain of leadership changes in the Arab capitals. The fate of the Palestinians had been made dependent on the neighboring Arab regimes during Britain's Palestine Mandate and through the Arab League. After the events in Jordan in 1970-71, and Sadat's rapprochement with Israel, the PLO found itself uncomfortably and almost exclusively under Syrian influence. The failure and unwillingness of the Syrian regime to act more vigorously on behalf of Palestinian interests had the obvious lessons for Arafat's faction in the PLO: first, that custodianship by an Arab regime limits Palestinian political maneuverability and, second, Palestinian expectations of genuine support from a politically splintered Arab world are bound to be minimal. The outcome of the first Israeli-Palestinian war was an overwhelming military and strategic defeat for the PLO, but it was not a pan-Arab humiliation. Sadat's trip to Jerusalem was, and that wound is still being cauterized.

The paralysis of the Arab response to the Palestinians in Lebanon was due in part to Arab disunity as well as to the declining priority of the Palestinian question in relation to other pressing national objectives. A world oil glut and recession reduced the importance of Arab oil politics during the summer of 1982. The 1950 Arab League's Collective Defense Agreement was invoked at the Fez summit for the purpose of assisting Iraq in its war with Iran, but it was not applied to the issue of support for the PLO.25 At present, the PLO is finding refuge and representation through a seven-member Arab delegation deriving its authority from the Fez summit conference. But whether this delegation or future ones includes a PLO representative, or is composed of a Jordanian delegation with PLO representatives, or includes a delegation of West Bank mayors with PLO sympathies, is a question which only prolongs Arab political custodianship of the Palestinians.

The PLO is at an important crossroads in its history. Strategically, its Beirut operational center and southern Lebanese infrastructure have been destroyed. Geographically, the Palestinians are more widely dispersed than at any time since the creation of the State of Israel. The PLO leadership is physically distant from the majority of the Palestinians it seeks to represent. Classic armed struggle as a means of achieving aims has not succeeded against Israel. The realization that Israel is willing to pay a high price in human, economic, and image terms must be acknowledged. As uncomfortable as this fact may be, the PLO now finds itself increasingly dependent upon the U.S. and all that this implies. The Reagan administration may be credited with saving the organization from destruction in Beirut by negotiating its withdrawal. The PLO is in the process of redefining the scope of its relations with other Arab countries, recognizing that reliance upon one Arab state will affect its relations with another. Nevertheless, the PLO's dispersal has given it considerably greater maneuverability in terms of its bilateral relations with countries like Jordan, Egypt, and Syria. The Israeli invasion has led the PLO to serious consideration but not as yet to adoption of political alternatives as opposed to military options. The invasion has made Arafat the standard bearer of "centrist" positions and has resuscitated the so-called "Jordanian option."

The PLO is redefining its tactics. But,
political dialogue should not be misconstrued as political concessions. The PLO’s continued refusal to recognize the reality of Israel’s existence merely gives the organization an historical consistency that stretches back to the uncompromising opposition of the Arabs of Palestine to the Balfour Declaration, the British Mandate in Palestine and all the reports, documents and conferences which directly acknowledged Zionism’s and later Israel’s legitimacy. If the PLO is to remain “the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people,” it must alter its absolutist positions and embrace some measure of pragmatic compromise. To survive, it must reject the pan-Arabization of the Palestinian issue and strive for independence within the Arab world.

**FOOTNOTES**


4. For the main provisions of the Shturam Agreement see Ibid., p. 517.

5. Ibid., p. 192.


9. For examples see remarks by Jordanian Prime Minister Badran on 14 June 1982 and those by Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council member Taha Yasin Ramadan on 13 June 1982 as quoted in FBIS-MEA, 15 June 1982, pages P1 and E1 respectively.

10. Arab Times (Kuwait), 9 June 1982.


15. al-Siyasah (Kuwait), 8 January 1983.


20. For example see Nayan Hawatmeh, Secretary General of the Democratic Popular Front from the Liberation of Palestine, interview in Le Figaro, 9 August 1982; Salah Khalaf, Central Committee Member of Yasir Arafat’s al-Fatah Palestinian organization in his interviews in al-Ahali (Cairo), 15 September 1982, and in al-Ra‘y al-Amm (Kuwait), 18 September 1982.
