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Author(s): C. Ernest Dawn

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# THE RISE OF ARABISM IN SYRIA

*C. Ernest Dawn*

IN the early years of the twentieth century, two ideologies competed for the loyalties of the Arab inhabitants of the Ottoman territories which lay to the east of Suez. The dominant ideology, Ottomanism, defended the continuation of the Ottoman Empire. The challenging ideology, Arabism, proclaimed that the Arabs were a special people who possessed peculiar virtues and rights. Nevertheless, the central concern of Arabism was identical with that of both the varieties of Ottomanism, conservative and modernist, which were current in political and intellectual circles within the Empire during the half century or so which preceded the outbreak of World War I. Arabism, as propounded by its creators and advocates, was, like Ottomanism, a defense and a vindication of Islām and the East in the face of the dominance of the Christian West. Both ideologies claimed to be the best way of restoring to the Islamic East the greatness which it had lost to the West. Arabism and Ottomanism, in short, were special manifestations of a general reaction against the failure of the Ottoman territories to keep pace with the advancement of Europe.<sup>1</sup>

If the goal of Arabism was the defense of the Islamic East, one might ask, why should the larger bond, Ottomanism, be forsaken for the lesser, Arabism? Perhaps many Arabs went over to Arabism from the feeling that Ottomanism was unable to achieve its goal, i.e., to close the gap between Islām and the West. As the first two and one-half decades of the twentieth century unfolded, objective reality provided less and less sustenance for the hope that Ottomanism could promote the cause of the Empire and of Islām in the race with the West. The conservative Ottomanism of Abdül Hamid II and the modernist Ottomanism of the Young Turks both appeared ineffectual in the face of Europe. The failure of Ottomanism, however, was not obvious to all or even to a majority of Ottoman Arabs. Arabism remained a minority

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1. For full discussion, see my article, "From Ottomanism to Arabism: The Origin of an Ideology," *The Review of Politics*, XXIII (1961), 378-400. The question of Christian Arab participation in the early Arab movement is in need of further investigation; for my own revisionist tendency, see *ibid.*, pp. 386-387, 394-397, and pp. 153-154 below.

◇ C. ERNEST DAWN is professor of history at the University of Illinois.

position among the Arabs of the Empire. The opinion may be ventured, purely tentatively, that the struggle between conservative and modernist Ottomanists was at least as important as that between Ottomanists and Arabists. Yet Arabism did spread and became, especially after 1908, a political movement of increasing importance. Granted that the adherents of Arabism saw in it a way of defending their ethnic identity against the West, the question remains of why some Arabs preferred Arabism to Ottomanism, which claimed to serve the same general goals as Arabism and at the same time enjoyed the support of most Arabs. To suggest an answer to the general question, we must delimit the spread of Arabism, identify those who acted on its behalf, and estimate their influence in its growth.

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The earliest significant manifestation of political Arabism within the Ottoman Empire was the formation in 1908 of the Ottoman Arab Brotherhood in Constantinople. After this society was suppressed, in 1909, its place was taken by the Arab Club of Constantinople. Before long, Arab deputies in the Ottoman Parliament were opposing the Young Turk governments and demanding Arab rights. Simultaneously, newspapers which spoke for the Arab nation appeared in some of the major cities. The public movement for Arab rights soon was coordinated by the formation of the Ottoman Decentralization Society, which had its headquarters in Egypt and branches in Syria. The movement spread with the formation of the Reform Societies of Beirut and of Baṣrah in 1912-1913 and culminated in the convening of the Arab Congress in Paris in June, 1913. None of these groups spoke openly for independence. Their expressed goal was reform which would insure Arab rights within the Ottoman Empire.<sup>2</sup>

Although the public societies and activities of Arab nationalism were directed toward no more than the attainment of Arab rights within the Ottoman Empire, many who participated in the movement had independence in mind and covertly worked for this goal. Some even went so far as to seek the support of European governments for armed rebellion.<sup>3</sup> At the same time, these and other Arabs began to organize secret societies with a revolutionary program. There were several of these, but two came to dominate the movement and to include all but a few members for the secret societies. The two were

2. Amīn Sa'īd, *al-Thawrah al-'arabīyah al-kubrā* [The great Arab revolt], 3 vols. (Cairo: 'Īsa al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī wa Shurakā'uhū [1934]), I, 6-9, 13-31; Muḥammad 'Izzat Darwazah, *Ḥawl al-barakah al-'arabīyah al-ḥadīthah* [Concerning the modern Arab movement], 6 vols. (Sidon and Beirut: al-Maṭba'ah al-'Aṣriyah, 1950- [1951]), I, 22-25, 33-40; Turkey, Fourth Army, *La vérité sur la question syrienne* (Stamboul: Tanine, 1916). Martin Hartmann, *Reisebriefe aus Syrien* (Berlin: Dietrich Reimer, 1913) contains much material on the public advocates of Arabism in 1913.

3. See *La vérité sur la question syrienne, passim*.

the Young Arab Society (commonly known as *al-Fatāṭ*) and the Covenant Society (commonly known as *al-'Abd*).<sup>4</sup>

Despite such progress, the Arab nationalists had won no striking victories when the Ottoman government entered the war in October 1914. With the war crisis, however, some nationalist leaders began to plot armed rebellion against the Turks. In particular, some Arabs began to negotiate with the Amīr of Mecca, al-Ḥusayn ibn-'Alī, with the aim of inducing him to lead the proposed revolution, and with the British to seek their support of the Arab nationalist cause. After protracted negotiations, the Amīr of Mecca reached agreement with the Arab nationalists and the British, revolted in June 1916 and formed an Arab army in Arabia. Then followed the Arab war made famous by T. E. Lawrence and the entry of the Arab army into Damascus as a part of the Allied forces. After the armistice, the Arab army, commanded by the Amīr Ḥusayn's son Fayṣal, was assigned the occupation of Transjordan and the interior of Syria. Meanwhile, a British force had advanced from the Persian Gulf to defeat the Turks in Iraq and occupy that country.

In the area occupied by Fayṣal's Arab army nationalism grew during 1919-1920. Political personalities rushed to join the Arab nationalist societies, especially *al-Fatāṭ*, which enjoyed a great increase in membership, and founded new ones. The Arab movement culminated in the formation of an elected body, the Syrian General Congress, which claimed to be the spokesman for all of "Syria," i.e., Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria. At the same time, a Syrian government was formed. From the start, both bodies accepted the theory of Arab nationalism. Although the Congress claimed to represent only Syria, its pronouncements and resolutions referred to the Syrian people as members of the Arab nation. The sentiment of Arabism filled the declaration of independence which the Congress adopted on March 8, 1920. This declaration went explicitly to full Arab nationalism by declaring that Syria and Iraq "possess linguistic, historical, economic, natural, and racial bonds and ties which make the two regions dependent on each other," and demanded that "there be a political and economic federation between the two brother regions."<sup>5</sup>

Such were the external stages in the growth and fulfillment of Arab nationalism in the Arab lands east of Suez. It remains to define the connections between the stages of the movement and to isolate the influences at work in each. To this end, the identification and comparative study of the personnel of each stage must be undertaken.

The membership of the pre-1914 Arab nationalist movement can be identified by comparatively simple procedures. An Arab nationalist was one who

4. Sa'īd, I, 9-11, 46-50; Darwazah, I, 25-33.

5. For the acts of the Syrian General Congress, see Sāṭi' al-Ḥusarī, *Yawm Maysalūn* [The day of Maysalun] (Beirut: al-Makshūf, 1945), pp. 246-273 (the quotation is from p. 265).

worked for Arab nationalist goals. The membership must include, therefore, those Arabs who distinguished themselves as public advocates of Arabism. To these should be added those who were members of the societies which had Arab nationalist aims. Only three societies, the Ottoman Decentralization Society, *al-Fatāṭ*, and *al-'Ahd*, can be so described. The Ottoman Arab Brotherhood aimed at strengthening Ottoman-Arab ties, and several of its founding Arab members were prominent advocates of Arab loyalty to the Ottoman Empire in the period 1908-1914.<sup>6</sup> There were also several Lebanese societies, which worked for Lebanese, not Arab, nationalist goals. The programs of the Beirut and Baṣrah Reform Societies were of general reformist nature, not specifically Arab nationalist, and many members of the Beirut Society are known to have been Lebanese, not Arab, nationalists (the full membership of the Baṣrah society is unknown). On the other hand, the Arab nationalist members of the two Reform Societies were also members of one or more of the purely Arab societies. Thus, a complete list of the pre-1914 members of the Ottoman Decentralization Society, *al-Fatāṭ*, and *al-'Ahd*, is a complete roster of the members of the Arab nationalist societies before 1914.

This investigation of the growth of Arabism has been limited to the territories which were to be included in the Syrian Republic. For this there are two reasons. In the first place, in Syria the various phases of growth of Arabism took forms which permit comparison with each other more readily than do the stages of the movement elsewhere. The earliest phase can be delimited everywhere by public advocacy of Arabism and membership in the nationalist societies. For the latest phase, however, only in Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan and Palestine did Arabism take the form of a formally elected body, the Syrian General Congress, and of a regularly constituted government. The second reason for restricting the study to Syria is that more biographical information is available for the inhabitants of Syria than for those of the other eastern Arab lands.

Furthermore, the pre-war Arab movement in Syria is representative of the entire pre-war Arab movement. Only 126 men are known to have been public advocates of Arab nationalism or members of Arab nationalist societies before October 1914. This number may be too large, since 30 of the men are only doubtfully to be regarded as having been active Arab nationalists before 1914.<sup>7</sup> Of the 126 Arab nationalists, 51 can be identified as Syrian; one was Egyptian,

6. For example, 'Arif al-Māridinī, Shukrī al-Ayyūbī, and Yūsuf Shatwān; see Sa'id, I, 7, 14, 34, 53 and Hartmann, p. 19.

7. The names are given in the principal sources: Sa'id, Darwazah, and Hartmann. Darwazah, who was secretary of *al-Fatāṭ* in 1919, gives a complete list for each of the various societies. The 30 whose Arabism before 1914 is regarded as doubtful are those listed by Darwazah as having joined a society before the end of World War I and about whom no other information is available. While we may regard them as nationalists, we cannot be sure that they joined before October, 1918, and in fact some men whom Darwazah lists as having joined before the end of the war are known to have joined only after the armistice.

21 Lebanese, 18 Iraqi, 22 Palestinian and 13 unidentifiable as to place of origin or residence. Of the 30 who are only doubtfully identified as having been nationalists before October 1914, 11 were Syrians, four Lebanese, five Iraqis and 10 Palestinians. (See Appendix I for the Syrian membership of the pre-1914 Arab movement.) Syrians thus predominated in the leadership of the pre-war Arab movement. Furthermore, the incidence of Arabism was at least as great in Syria as it was elsewhere. Using the only available population estimates for 1915, there were 3.5 Arab nationalist leaders per 100,000 of total population in Syria in comparison to 3.1 in Palestine and 2.4 in Lebanon.<sup>8</sup>

The 126 Arabs who were members of the Arab societies or prominent spokesmen for the Arab cause we may regard as the leadership of Arab nationalism. They also make up a significant percentage of the total number of known active partisans of Arabism before 1914. An indication of the spread of Arabism is provided by the signatures to the telegrams of support which were sent to the Arab Congress in Paris in June 1913. A total of 387 names appear on these telegrams. Of the signers, 79 were Syrians, 101 Lebanese, 37 Iraqis, 139 Palestinians; 16 were resident in Europe, four in Egypt, and 11 are unidentifiable as to residence (telegrams from America are not included in the tabulation).<sup>9</sup> Actually there is an overlap between the two lists. In the case of the Syrians, for example, 12 of the signers of the telegrams were also active in the societies. Thus, in the case of Syria the telegrams add only 67 persons to the 51 who must be considered leaders rather than followers of Arabism. The list of Arab nationalist leaders here considered, then, is a nearly complete list and the names included in it constitute over one-third of the active partisans of Arabism before Turkey entered World War I.

At this point, the difference between the proportion of Syrians in the leadership and the proportion of Syrians in the followers must be discussed.

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8. The population statistics are from A. Ruppin, *Syrien als Wirtschaftsgebiet* (Berlin: Kolonial-Wirtschaftliches Komitee, 1917), pp. 8-9; in addition to the usual reservations which arise from faulty methods of collecting, these statistics are subject to an additional error which arises from the fact that the statistics are given by Ottoman administrative districts which cannot be exactly redistributed among the territories established after 1918. I have redistributed Ruppin's statistics so that the population is as follows: Syria, 1,416,644; Palestine, 689,275; Lebanon, 806,602; Transjordan, 131,788. The post-war statistics are uncertain, but for comparison the rate of incidence of Arabism using the number of Arab nationalists before 1914 and the post-war population statistics is as follows: Syria (1926), 3.8 (1,324,026 population), or 3.3 if the preceding population total does not include an estimated 250,000 Bedouin; Lebanon (1926), 3.5 (597,799 population, not including certain emigrés, who most likely were included in Ruppin's total); Palestine (1922), 2.9 (752,279 population); Iraq (1927), 0.6 (2,970,000 population). For the statistics, see, France, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, *Rapport sur la situation de la Syrie et du Liban*, 1926, pp. 190-193, and 1922-23, p. 8; Great Britain, Colonial Office, *Report by H.B.M.G. on the Administration under Mandate of Palestine and Transjordan*, 1922, p. 58; Doris Goodrich Adams, *Iraq's People and Resources*, University of California Publications in Economics, XVIII (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1958), pp. 34-35.

9. For the telegrams, see *al-Mu'tamar al-'arabi al-awwal* [The first Arab Congress] (Cairo: Higher Committee of the Decentralization Party, A.H. 1331/A.D. 1913), pp. 150-210.

The Syrians, who were more active among the leaders than were the Lebanese and the Palestinians, were noticeably less active among the supporters of the Paris Arab Congress than either of the latter. As most Lebanese anti-Ottomans were Lebanese nationalists, not Arab, it is likely that most of the Lebanese supporters of the Paris Congress were not Arab nationalists. A large percentage of the Palestinian supporters of the Arab Congress are obviously village elders and headmen. The adherence of such persons to the nationalist movement is undoubtedly the result of instigation by the Palestinian notables.

The leaders of the pre-war Arab movement are representative of the movement in Syria, and the Syrians are representative of the movement as a whole. It is now possible to examine the connections of the pre-war nationalists with the later stages of the Arab movement.

The existence of an organized Arab movement and the agreement between some of its members and the Amīr of Mecca was certainly one of the conditions which led the latter to revolt in June 1916. Furthermore, although the Amīr Ḥusayn was a conservative Ottomanist rather than an Arabist, after he revolted he did adopt and pursue the general policy and the territorial ambitions of the Arabists.<sup>10</sup>

The pre-war nationalists of Syria had little influence on the development and outcome of the revolt. Before the revolt was proclaimed, anti-Ottoman activities were engaged in by six of them. Of these, three carried out their activities abroad (two in Egypt, one in Paris and later South America), where they were when the war broke out. The others fled from Syria to Egypt where they continued their activities. After the beginning of the revolt, seven joined Fayṣal's forces. Three of these joined in the early days, the other four not until 1918. In addition, two who were Ottoman officers joined the Arab army after they had been taken prisoners by the British. Thus, of fifty-one pre-war Syrian nationalists, only fifteen, or twenty-nine per cent, are known to have engaged in Arab political or military activity during the war.

Turkish repressive measures undoubtedly contributed to the limitation of Arab nationalist activity in Syria during the war. The Turkish authorities began making arrests early in 1915. All told, sixteen pre-war nationalists were sentenced, all but one of them before June 1916. Thirteen of them were executed, one was sentenced to death in absentia, and two were imprisoned.

It is impossible to determine how many of the convicted nationalists actually engaged in anti-Ottoman activities during 1914-15. Eleven of them were overt nationalists, and although the Turkish authorities did have specific

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10. I have dealt at length with the origins of the Arab Revolt in "The Amir of Mecca al-Ḥusayn ibn-'Alī and the Origin of the Arab Revolt," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, vol. 104 (Feb. 1960), 11-34.

evidence of treasonable activities on the part of some, these activities antedated the war. The Decentralization Committee, to which most of those executed belonged, certainly was used as an instrument of revolutionary activity by some of its members, including its leaders in Cairo, but whether or not all its members had knowledge of such activity is an unanswerable question.

Assuming that all those who were convicted by the Turks actually did engage in anti-Ottoman activities, the total number of pre-war Syrian Arab nationalist leaders who contributed to the Arab movement during the war is then thirty-one, or sixty-one per cent of the total membership. Two of this group of thirty-one occupy an ambivalent position. The two, 'Abd al-Ḥamīd al-Zahrāwī and 'Abd al-Raḥmān Shahbandar, were among the most prominent of the pre-war nationalists. Both, however, had reconciled their differences with the Turks by the outbreak of war and distinguished themselves as public advocates of Arab-Turkish cooperation during the early months of the conflict. There is nothing to indicate that al-Zahrāwī, who was executed, did plot against the Ottoman government. Shahbandar, who fled to Egypt in early 1916, did participate in some of the early nationalist parleys, but his intentions are obscure. It seems likely that his flight was precipitated by the wholesale arrest of pre-war spokesmen for the Arab cause which the Turkish military was carrying out.

A portion of the nationalists cooperated with the Turks. The most prominent journalist of the Arab movement, Muḥammad Kurd 'Alī, cooperated with the Turks throughout the war. Two served as officers in the Ottoman Army. There is no information on the war-time careers of seventeen. Ten of these are known to have survived the war. In addition, there is some indication that four others were alive in 1919, and it is possible that the remaining three were also. At least ten pre-war nationalists, then, went through the war without engaging in anti-Ottoman activities; this may be true of four others, and could be true of an additional three. Some of these certainly served with the Turks. Four of those who survived the war were army officers, as were three of those whose fate is unknown. The chances are that all these officers who survived the war served with the Ottoman forces.

The pre-war Arab nationalist movement in Syria thus did not make a notable military contribution to the Arab Revolt. The movement affected only a small number of Syrians. Most of its members, moreover, were unable or unwilling to give active support to the revolt. Turkish measures of control were too effective. Much has been made of the blood-thirstiness of Jamāl Pasha, the Turkish commander in Syria. Wholesale arrests were made and many of the nationalists were convicted by evidence which proved crimes other than those with which they were charged. Yet the commonest and most effective security measure seems to have been the careful assignment of Arab personnel to areas out of harm's way. Many Arab notables, who after the war

spoke of their "imprisonment" or "banishment," appear actually to have served as governors or officials in solidly Turkish districts of the Empire. Many Arab officers served at the Straits or in the Caucasus. Others, however, served in Palestine, and even here, recruits for the Arab army appear to have been prisoners of war more often than deserters.

The Arab Revolt, then, made a far greater contribution to the advancement of the Arab movement than the latter did to the Arab Revolt. Most importantly, the Arab Revolt created an Arab army and an alliance with Great Britain, the victor in the war. As a result, Syria was occupied by an Arab army. The Arab military administration soon was converted into a government. Under the aegis of this government a representative body, the Syrian General Congress, was elected. The government and the Congress, together, officially adopted a program of full Arab nationalism. At the same time the membership of the pre-war societies, especially *al-Fatāt*, was swollen, and a new unofficial nationalist body was established to agitate for the Arab cause and to reject any foreign domination. This was the Committee of National Defense in Damascus. (For the membership of the bodies, see Appendix II).<sup>11</sup>

The pre-war nationalists did not play an important part in the three official bodies which established Arabism as the official ideology in Syria. Thirty-nine of the 44 Syrian members of the Syrian General Congress were men who had not previously been associated with the nationalists; the five nationalist members of the body had all been nationalists before 1914, and three of them had participated in anti-Ottoman activities during the war. Of the fourteen members of the Syrian governments, only one had been a nationalist before 1914 and two had joined the nationalists during the war. The pre-war nationalists were a majority in only one body, the army command, three of whose five members had joined *al-'Abd* before the war (none of the three had a record of anti-Ottoman activity during the war), but even in the army command the pre-war nationalists occupied subordinant positions. The non-official body which was most active in organizing popular nationalist demonstrations, the Committee of National Defense, was also dominated by late-comers to Arabism. Only two of its twelve members had been nationalists before 1914. Thus, of the men who took Syria squarely into a policy of Arabism in 1919-1920 (the membership of the preceding four organizations, which, with overlapping eliminated, totals 73) 82 per cent had not been active adherents of Arabism before 1918, 85 per cent before 1914.

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11. For the composition of the Syrian General Congress, see Darwazah, I, 96-98; for the members of the governments, Ḥusarī, pp. 228-242; for the Committee of National Defense, Sa'īd, II, 102-103, 185, 191.

By 1919 Arabism had become the dominant ideology in Syria. Every political personality of any stature espoused it and worked for its realization. Yet the Arab nationalists of 1919 were not a homogeneous group. Two main factions can be distinguished, those who had become nationalists prior to 1914 and those who had not become nationalists until 1919 (those who became nationalists during 1914-1918 are so few in number that for the purposes of this analysis we may ignore them).

The first group was anti-Ottoman before 1919. The second was not anti-Ottoman before 1919. Further, for convenience in terminology, the second group may be regarded as pro-Ottoman until 1919. Under this assumption, the Arab nationalists and the pro-Ottomans were advocates of opposing political philosophies until 1919. If being an Arab nationalist or anti-Ottoman was conditioned by social influences, then a comparison of the social attributes of the two groups, anti-Ottoman (Arab nationalist) and pro-Ottoman, should cast light on the social determinants of the spread of Arabism. To test the assumption and to carry out the comparison, profiles showing the incidence of social attributes within the two groups have been constructed.<sup>12</sup> The pro-Ottoman group consists of the 60 pro-Ottoman members of the four organizations discussed above and all those Syrians, 26 in number, who are known to have joined nationalist societies after the end of the war. Before comparing the Arabists and the Ottomanists, however, something must be said about the geographic and religious traits of the pre-war Arab nationalists.

Before the war, Arabism appealed to Damascene Muslims to a far greater degree than it did to any other regional and religious groupings in Syria. Although the population of the Damascus area comprised only about 27 per cent of the Syrian population in 1915, residents of Damascus made up 80 per cent of the total membership of the Arab movement. Religion also was of importance. Christians comprised about 6 per cent of the total number of nationalists, while in 1926 they made up around 12 or 10 per cent of the total population of Syria. Arabism appealed most of the Sunnite Muslims, for most of the Muslims who comprised 94 per cent of the pre-war Arab

12. The biographical data for this study were taken from Muḥammad Jamil al-Shaṭṭī, *Tarājim a'yan dimashq fi niṣf al-qarn al-rābi'* 'asbr al-bijrī 1301-1350 [Biographies of the notables of Damascus in half of the fourteenth century of the Hegira, 1301-1350] (Damascus: Dār al-Yaqzah al-'Arabīyah, 1948); Kāmil al-Ghāzī, *Nabr al-dhabab fi t-ṭarīkh Ḥalab* [The river of gold in the history of Aleppo], 3 vols. (Aleppo: al-Maṭba'ah al-Mārūniyah, n.d.); Muḥammad Rāghib al-Ṭabbākh, *A'lām al-nubulā bi-t-ṭarīkh Ḥalab al-shabbā'* [The outstanding nobles in the history of Aleppo], 7 vols. (Aleppo: al-Maṭba'ah al-'Ilmiyah, A.H. 1342-45/A.D. 1923-26); Zakī Muḥammad Mujāhid, *al-A'lām al-sharqīyah fi al-mī'ah al-rābi'ah-'asbr al-bijrīyah, 1301-1365/1883-1946* [The leading Eastern personalities in the fourteenth century of the Hegira, 1301-1365/1883-1946], 2 vols. (Cairo: Dār al-Ṭaba'ah al-Miṣrīyah al-Ḥadīthah, A.H. 1368-9/A.D. 1949-50); *Man huwa fi sūriyah, 1951* [Who's Who in Syria, 1951] (Damascus: Maktab al-Dirāsāt al-Sūriyah wa al-'Arabīyah); *Oriente Moderno*, I- XIX (1922-1939); Hartmann, *Reisebriefe aus Syrien*; Muḥammad Kurd 'Alī, *al-Mudhakkarat* [Memoirs], 4 vols. (Damascus: Maṭba'ah al-Taraqqī, 1948-51); Yūsuf As'ad Dāghir (Joseph Assad Dagher), *Maṣādir al-dirāsah al-adabīyah (Elements de Bibliographie de la littérature arabe)*, II (Beirut: Jam'iyah Ahl al-Qalam fi-Lubnān, 1956).

movement were Sunnites, who, in 1926, made up only 67 (or 72) per cent of the Syrian population.<sup>13</sup> Homs provided three (two Christians), Hama three, Aleppo three (one Christian) and Lattakia one. The overt nationalists were distributed more widely than the members of the secret societies. Damascus provided only 12 (70 per cent) of the seventeen overt nationalists, while providing 20 (83 per cent) of the members of *al-Fatāt*, and nine (90 per cent) of the members of *al-'Abd*. Christians were most important among the overt nationalists (two), of less importance among the members of *al-Fatāt* (one), and played no part in *al-'Abd*.

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The Arab nationalists did not differ markedly from the pro-Ottoman Arabs in age. (See Appendix III.) The range of the known years of birth is much the same for both groups. The mean is virtually identical. The chief difference is that the median for the Arab nationalists is three years later than the median for the Ottomanists, perhaps an indication that the Arab nationalists were slightly younger. The pre-war members of *al-Fatāt* were younger than were those of any other group.

The Arab élite with which we are concerned grew to manhood during a period when the process of Westernization had diversified the educational system. The traditional Muslim *madrasah* or college still flourished, as did the traditional shaykh. The Ottoman state schools, however, had long since been offering a more modern curriculum, both in the secondary schools in the provinces and in the advanced schools in Constantinople, where one might study not merely military science and medicine but even Western law and political science. Even more direct contact with Western learning was provided by the missionary colleges in Syria, which also offered advanced training in medicine, and by universities in Europe. To compare the educational background of the Arabists and the Ottomanists, a table of the incidence of varying types of education has been constructed. The influences of interest here are two: (1) the type of education, whether Western, state, or traditional, and (2) the highest stage of education completed. One student might terminate his education with graduation from one of the state or missionary colleges. Another might seek advanced, or perhaps the better term would be professional, training in the state schools, especially in Constantinople, or in Western schools, either the missionary colleges in Syria or universities in Europe. Owing to the professional nature of advanced education, military education, in the

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13. The uncertainty in respect of the Syrian population arises from the uncertainty as to whether the official statistics for 1926 include an estimated 250,000 Bedouin, practically all of whom were nominally Sunnī.

officers' school in Constantinople, has been classed as advanced, although strictly speaking it was perhaps secondary.

Most of the Arab nationalists and the pro-Ottomans were educated in state schools and received an advanced education. (See Appendix IV.) Both traditional and Western education, however, was of significance in both groups. It has sometimes been assumed that the early Arab nationalists were mostly Western educated, and even that Arabism was the product of Western education. Western education was of relatively greater incidence among the Arabists than among the Ottomanists. On the other hand, the Arabists held the same lead in the frequency of traditional education, which was more important than Western education in both groups. If the type of education was influential in forming political and ideological allegiance, and if these samples are representative, then Western and traditional education both tended to produce Arab nationalists, state education pro-Ottomans. Advanced, i.e. professional education, tended to produce Ottomanists.

In a changing situation like that of pre-1914 Syria, an individual's education would vary with the year of birth. Thus the educational attributes of the two groups ought to be compared by age-groups as well as as a whole. A year-by-year table was constructed from all cases (34 in number) in which both date of birth and education were known. The results were then consolidated by arranging the data into three groups depending on date of birth. The first group consists of those born in and before 1876, the latest year in which a person of traditional education is known to have been born. The second group comprises those born between 1877 and 1888, the latest date of birth of persons with only a secondary education. All members of the third group, those born in and after 1889, had received an advanced education. (See Appendix V.)

By this tabulation, education varies with date of birth as well as with political position and the latter variations are more marked the earlier the birth date. Of those known to have been born after 1888, the difference between Arabist and Ottomanist is probably insignificant. All had received an advanced education, there were no persons who had received only a traditional education, and 60 per cent of the Arab nationalists had received a Western education as compared to 50 per cent of the pro-Ottomans. Among those born before 1888, the situation was markedly different, the differences being more striking the earlier the date of birth. The oldest Arab nationalists, those born 1865-1876, were 75 per cent of traditional education, 25 per cent of Western secondary. The Ottomanists of the same age were all recipients of an advanced education in state schools. The differences were slighter, but still marked in the second age group, those born in 1877-1888. Pro-Ottomans were still much more likely to have received a state and an advanced education than were Arab nationalists, but a few Ottomanists had received a Western

education even though such an education was much more common among Arab nationalists.

The data for those born before 1889 are probably askew. Some correction perhaps can be made by the use of thirty cases in which the education is known but in which the year of birth is unknown. It is likely that most of these were persons born before 1889. These cases therefore have been consolidated with those known to have been born before 1889. Most individuals, Arab nationalists and pro-Ottomans, received an advanced and a state education; traditional education was second in importance, and Western a poor third. Still, the trend was for relatively more Arabists than pro-Ottomans to receive a traditional or a Western education. The Ottomanist was more likely to have received a state and an advanced education than was the Arab nationalist.

Class change and class conflict for some time have been one of the most popular of the mechanisms used to explain changes in ideology and politics. Especially popular is the view that European influence has engendered economic change throughout the world, and that such changes, in turn, have created new classes which use newer ideologies, such as nationalism and communism, in order to unseat the old élite which has become vestigial because of the economic changes. The early phase of Arab nationalism, with which we are concerned here, has been generally interpreted as a manifestation of such a new "middle class." More recent Arab developments have been similarly explained, with the modification that the awakening masses are now thought to be adding their weight to that of the middle class.

In Ottoman Syria, family status was perhaps the most important index of class position. Ottoman society was not immobile. New men could rise, while the bearers of proud names might have difficulty in making ends meet. Nevertheless, important positions usually were occupied by men of good family, who possessed immeasurable advantage in the quest for position. At the top were landlords, rural and urban, who sometimes were also large-scale merchants. The landlords (hereafter, "landlord" is used to denote landlords and landlord-merchants) might, at the same time, be from families whose members for several generations had held position in the Ottoman bureaucracy or, less frequently, the army. Of equal, or perhaps even higher, standing, were the landlord-scholars, members of families which had, for generations, produced specialists in the Muslim sciences of theology and law. From these families were drawn the members of the Ottoman "Religious Institution." Such were the high status families of Ottoman Syria. Below them, occupying the middle position, were the ordinary merchants, who had not yet been able to acquire land, the bankers and money-lenders. Lower yet, but still within the middle rank, were the small shopkeepers, the clerks in the government service and the lesser functionaries of the religious organization.

In order to compare the class composition of the various groups, a table

showing the incidence within each group of individuals of differing family status has been constructed (Appendix VI). Family standing was determined by the relative frequency within a family of various occupations in both the pre- and post-1920 periods. The rating, however, was carried out by impressionistic, not statistical, methods.

The importance of high-status families (landlord and landlord-scholar) among both Arab nationalists and pro-Ottomans is striking. In this connection, however, some attention must be paid to the unknowns, since it might be assumed that families of unknown status were most likely of relatively low status. Consideration of the total, including unknowns, makes it certain that both Arab nationalist and Ottomanist Syrians came from upper class families, for 60.78 per cent of the total membership of the former and 63.94 per cent of the latter came from such families.

Furthermore, two considerations justify the belief that many of the unknowns were of high family status. The first consideration is that most of the unknowns are individuals from areas other than Damascus and the Aleppo region, the only two regions for which relatively full biographical information is available. In the case of *al-Fatāt*, for instance, with twenty-two of twenty-four members of Damascene or Aleppine origin, unknowns comprise only 16.66 per cent of the total membership and high-status individuals 74.99 per cent. Thus, the incidence of families of unknown status is clearly influenced by the quantity of biographical data available and varies directly with it. The second consideration is that inclusion in one of the traditional biographical dictionaries depended to a great extent on membership in a scholarly family, fame for learning or literary activity, and membership in the bureaucracy or one of the municipal or provincial representative-consultive bodies. There are indications that many persons and families of great wealth and influence did not possess any of these qualifications and their names are absent from the older biographical dictionaries.

Even though the Arab nationalists were predominately of upper class origin, so far as information is available, middle class elements (merchant-scholar, merchant, and banker) did participate in the Arab movement to a greater extent than they did in the pro-Ottoman group. There are some indications, however, that middle class individuals are underrepresented in the data for the pro-Ottomans. Except for *al-'Abd*, which calls for special consideration, persons of unknown family status occur most frequently in the Ottomanist sub-groups. Only one Ottomanist sub-group, the Committee of National Defense, has a smaller percentage of individuals of unknown family status than either the overt nationalists or *al-Fatāt*. On the other hand, within this Ottomanist sub-group, middle class elements are more important than they are among either the overt nationalists or *al-Fatāt*.

The explanation of the relatively large number of unknowns within the

membership of *al-'Abd* is obscure. Nine of the ten members were Damascene, and yet the family status of eight of these is unknown. The explanation might lie in the fact that these men were all army officers, and army officers, unless of great distinction and high rank, were not included in biographical dictionaries. Still, the absence of other members of their families from the biographical dictionaries is striking. The question must be left unanswered.

The available evidence justifies the tentative conclusion that the middle class of Ottoman Syria played a relatively greater part in the Arab nationalist movement than it did in the total political process of Syria. There is no ground, however, for the conclusion that this middle class was new or created by European influence. Merchants and bankers had been a part of Near Eastern society for ages. In the past, merchants also had been influential in society and politics. One of the paths upward traditionally was through commerce. The successful merchant acquired land, both agricultural and urban. His landlord descendants then entered the bureaucracy, or the learned institution, and finally became full-fledged aristocrats. Meanwhile, other members of the family continued in commerce, and at times, apparently, some members of well established landowning and scholarly families entered business. Bankers were of a different order, since only non-Muslims could be full time bankers. The individuals in the sample are in keeping with tradition, for one was a Christian, the other a Jew. The presence of army officers in a political opposition group also is no departure from the traditional patterns of Near Eastern society. Connections between the military and government had always been intimate. In general, upper class families were well represented in the officer corps, but at the same time the army was another of the avenues of personal advancement for men of humble origin.

In respect of family status, the most important point of differentiation between the Arab nationalists and the pro-Ottomans is one within the purely upper class elements. Landowners predominate in both groups, but landowner-scholars were of considerably higher incidence among the pro-Ottomans than they were among the Arabists.

Pro-Ottomans and anti-Ottomans alike were mostly from good families. Did the political difference between the two groups correspond to an occupational difference? The incidence of occupations within the two groups is tabulated in Appendix VII. Comparatively few within either group were primarily landlords, though the incidence of landlords was greater among the pro-Ottomans than it was among the Arab nationalists. Landlords and landlord-scholars are undoubtedly underrepresented in both groups because of the procedure used in determining occupation. A person has been classed as a landlord only when he is known to have owned land and to have had no other occupation. Whenever an individual is known to have had some other occupation, as, for instance, lawyer, he has been classed with this occupation

rather than as a landlord, even when he is known to have been a landowner. No one has been classified as a landlord, or as a scholar, on the basis of family name alone. Thus, it is likely that many of those whose occupations are unknown were landlords, and that many who had other occupations derived much or most of their incomes from landed property.

A more distinctive occupational difference between the two groups is the high percentage of the pro-Ottomans who occupied government position (religious dignitary, governor, and official), the largest occupational group among the pro-Ottomans. Government employment was relatively much less frequent among the Arabists and, moreover, occupied only the second rank within the group, or even the third if professionals are grouped together. Furthermore, while the Ottomanist state employees held their positions until the end of the war, the Arab nationalist governors and officials either resigned or were discharged relatively early in their careers. Finally, religious dignitaries (*muftī*, *qādī*, and *khaṭīb*) played some part within the Ottomanist group and none at all within the Arab nationalist.

The commonest occupation of the Arab nationalists was that of army officer. Among the pro-Ottomans, army officers were relatively fewer and, moreover, occupied only the third rank within the group, or the fourth if the professionals are grouped together. On the other hand, army officers are very probably underrepresented among the pro-Ottomans. *Al-'Ahd*, primarily an organization of officers, expanded after 1918, but the new members are unknown while all the original members are known. Nevertheless, army officers played a very important part in the pre-war Arab nationalist movement. It is most likely, in view of what is known about *al-'Ahd* generally, that the Syrian Arabist officers were of company grade. On the other hand, the officers of the pro-Ottoman group appear to have been of field- and general-officer grade.

Among the Arab nationalists, intellectuals were more important than they were among the pro-Ottomans. Journalism and the professions, as a group, was the primary occupation of the greatest number of the Arabists. Journalists do not exist among the pro-Ottomans, a fact which certainly is the result of underrepresentation, for there were pro-Ottoman Arab journals before 1914. Considering professionals only (lawyer, physician, engineer, and educator, or teacher of Western subjects, not traditional Muslim), the difference between the two groups is not very great.

The professionals, as a group, are closely related to government officials. There are indications that most of the professionals in both groups, including physicians and engineers, were employed most of the time by the government. Lawyers, especially, sought government employment, and most of those listed as governors and officials probably were lawyers.

It might be, and commonly is, assumed that persons engaged in journalism and the professions represent the "new Western middle class" in Eastern coun-

tries. The incidence of persons of middle status family origin is slightly higher among the Arab nationalists than among the Ottomanists. Occupation appears to indicate a similar trend. To answer the question whether or not the journalists and professionals were of middle status families, tables showing the incidence of family status were constructed for these two occupational groups and for the governors and officials, owing to the intimate connection of this group with the professionals (see Appendix VIII).

Journalists, professionals, and government officials were not divided into Arabists and Ottomanists by class lines. The Arab nationalist journalists and professionals do exhibit the characteristics of middle class persons seeking advancement to a greater degree than do the Ottomanists. Although one-half the Arabist professionals were from upper status families, the incidence of such persons is noticeably greater among the Ottomanist professionals. Furthermore, the journalists, all Arabists, exhibit a very low incidence of people of upper status origin. With respect to officials, however, the situation is reversed. Most officials, Ottomanist and Arabist, were from upper status families. On the other hand, the incidence of officials of unknown family status is strikingly higher among the Ottomanists. Middle class elements were active among both Arab nationalists and pro-Ottomans. The Ottomanists tended to have government positions, the Arabists did not. In this connection, it is worth noting that government service was the third (along with landowning and military service) of the traditional means of advancement in Ottoman society. A man of modest origin might rise to the position of high official, or even governor. He was then most likely to acquire land and found an aristocratic family.

Perhaps the most significant point of differentiation between the Arabist and Ottomanist professionals and officials is one within the purely upper status sector. The incidence of professionals from landowner-scholar families is much greater among the Arab nationalists than among the Ottomanists. The incidence of officials and governors of the same family status, however, is greater among the pro-Ottomans than among the Arabists. Men from landowner-scholar families with government position were active among the Ottomanists. Similar persons with professional training but without government position were active among the Arab nationalists. A comparable distinction can be discerned in regard to another occupation (see Appendix VII). Scholars, specialists in the traditional religious sciences, were more important among the Arabists than among the pro-Ottomans. On the other hand, religious dignitaries, i.e., scholars who held state positions, were more important among the Ottomanists than among the Arabists.

Like father, like son. Just as the Ottomanist Arabs were more successful in obtaining government position than were their Arabist counterparts, the fathers of the former had been more successful than the fathers of the latter

(see Appendix IX). The commonest occupation of the fathers of the pro-Ottomans was that of religious dignitary. A strikingly lower percentage of the Arab nationalists were sons of religious dignitaries. In contrast, the fathers of 60 per cent of the knowns (17.64 per cent of the total) of the Arab nationalists were landowners, as compared to none of the Ottomanists. Again, landowners are certainly underrepresented. More Arab nationalists were also sons of middle (merchant) or middle-to-high status (scholar) fathers than were pro-Ottomans. Among the latter, only two were sons of men with middle status occupations, banker and physician. Both these cases, however, were non-Muslims, and within the non-Muslim sector such occupations were of high standing.

The assumption that those Syrian Arabs who became active in the Arab nationalist movement only after 1918 were pro-Ottomans before 1918 is probably correct. The high incidence among them of men who occupied positions within the Ottoman administration is clear indication of this. Two of them, moreover, are known to have attacked the Paris Arab Congress in 1913.<sup>14</sup> The comparison of this group with the pre-1914 Arabists is then a valid measure of the social distinctions between Arab nationalists and pro-Ottoman Arabs.

Arab nationalism was not the product of class conflict. The Arab nationalists and the Ottomanists were predominantly from the Syrian upper class. It is true that so far as the available data regarding family status and occupation are representative, known and presumed middle class elements were of slightly greater importance among the Arabists than they were among the pro-Ottomans. On the other hand, similar individuals constituted a significant percentage of the pro-Ottomans. The principal distinction between Arabist and Ottomanist was the holding of office.

The Ottomans did not rule Syria and the other Arab provinces directly by Turkish officials and soldiers. Instead, Syria was governed by a small number of high-ranking Turks and a large number of Arabs who occupied all but the highest positions. The traditional Near Eastern ethic sanctioned the use of public office for the furtherance of personal and family ends. Consequently, the service of the state attracted the *nouveaux* and the well established alike. Competition for state position was endemic within the Arab élite.

Some of the competition for state office was the result of upward social mobility. In Ottoman Syria, new men did get rich through trade or, sometimes, through state service. They, or their sons, sought to increase and secure their wealth by entry into the state hierarchy. The middle class element among both the Arab nationalists and the pro-Ottomans was doubtless of this sort. These middle class individuals, in their quest for position, followed the Near Eastern practice of patronage and clientship, regardless of whether they were Arabists or Ottomanists. This practice extended even to the artisans and

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14. Sa'id, p. 53.

wage earners of the towns, whose guilds and other popular organizations were under the patronage of a town notable, most frequently one of the scholarly class. One of the creators of the theory of Arabism, 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Kawākibī, for instance, in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, was able to use his position as patron of the guilds in Aleppo to great political effect.<sup>15</sup>

Some of the competition for office was the product of downward social mobility. The aristocratic families of Ottoman Syria after the passage of a few generations became quite large. Some of their branches actually suffered a relative decline in wealth and influence and in the ability to obtain public office. It was not uncommon for men of the same large family to be on opposite sides politically. For example, the brothers, Abū al-Naṣr and Abū al-Khayr al-Khaṭīb, of a famous Damascene scholarly family, held the positions *qāḍī* and *khaṭīb* respectively. A third brother, Abū al-Faṭḥ, however, was a teacher and director of a library. 'Abd al-Qādir al-Khaṭīb, the son of the *qāḍī* became a *qāḍī*. Zakī al-Khaṭīb, the son of the *khaṭīb*, became a governor. Both were pro-Ottoman. Their cousin, Muḥibb al-dīn al-Khaṭīb, the son of the librarian, held no position in either the religious hierarchy or the government. He was a pre-1914 Arab nationalist.

The exact extent to which such downward mobility was operative in the rise of Arabism cannot be estimated. Seven families had members in both the Arab nationalist and the Ottomanist camps. Thirteen of the pre-1914 Arabists were members of these families. It is not certain, of course, that each represents a case of rivalry between lesser and dominant branches of the same families, but two cases do beyond doubt, and only two likely do not. It is possible, even likely, of course, that downward social mobility of another type was at work. Under Ottoman conditions, an entire family might suffer a relative decline in fortune. The information used in this study does not permit any estimate of the extent to which such families provided members for the early Arab movement.

Neither downward nor upward mobility was an element in most of the competition. The majority of the pre-war nationalists of high status apparently were as well-off as their Ottomanist counterparts in every respect except the holding of office. If the cases for which family status is known are representative, members of landowning families made up over half of both the Arabist and the Ottomanist groups. Furthermore, men of landlord-scholar families occupied the second rank in both camps, even though such men were consider-

15. Al-Ṭabbākh, VII, 516; for an example at Damascus in 1882, see Elia Qoudsi, "Notice sur les Corporations de Damas" (in Arabic), *Actes du Sixième Congrès Internationale des Orientalistes*, Part II (1885), pp. 10-12; for eleventh century examples, see Jean Sauvaget, *Alep: essai sur le développement d'une grande ville syrienne, des origines au milieu du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle*, Haut Commissariat de l'État Français en Syrie et au Liban, Services des Antiquités, Bibliothèque Archéologique et Historique, vol. XXXVI (Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1941), p. 97.

ably more important among the Ottomanists than among the Arab nationalists. Members of wealthy scholarly families were relatively much more active among the pro-Ottomans than among the Arab nationalists. The converse was true of members of purely landowning families. There is thus some indication that in the Damascus area, especially, there was a conflict between the leading landlord-scholar families and the leading landlord families which took on the nature of a conflict between Ottomanism and Arabism. It might be, of course, that some of these families were relative newcomers, but the information at hand does not permit an evaluation of this possibility. Finally there is no explanation other than personal and family competition for positions in the state hierarchy. Competition of this kind was rife among the Arab nationalists. Conflict between rival personal and family factions was a recurrent activity within the pre-war societies. Similarly, during 1919-1920, *al-Fatāṭ* was beset with frequent changes in leadership which were attended by bitter personal recriminations.<sup>16</sup>

The conflict between Arab nationalist and Ottomanist in pre-1914 Syria was a conflict between rival members of the Arab élite. At the center of each camp were members of the highest stratum of Syrian society, who constituted a majority of the members of each faction. Associated with such upper class elements were men of middle class origin, who were slightly more important among the Arab nationalists than among the pro-Ottomans. The conflict essentially, then, was of the type that was traditional in Near Eastern society. The new element was the ideological definition of the conflict.

Before the nineteenth century, such conflicts were either left undefined or defined in terms of rival interpretations of Islām. In the course of the nineteenth century the problem of the West became so important as virtually to monopolize the intellectual activity of the Ottoman Arab political classes. Every ideology offered centered around the problem of defending and justifying the Islamic East in the face of the Christian West. In this, Ottomanism and Arabism were identical. They differed only in the means proposed for the pursuit of the desired goal. The Ottomanists argued that Islām and the East could best be served by the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire, the Arabists, by the restoration of the Arabs to their rightful position of religious and cultural leadership within Islām. In Syria, those members of the Arab élite who had a vested interest in the Ottoman state were Ottomanists. Those who were without such a stake were Arabists. Thus was a traditional intra-élite conflict defined in terms of a new ideology.

Neither the growth of Arabism, the Arab Revolt, nor the Turkish collapse in World War I brought about any far-reaching change in the Arab personnel

16. For pre-1914 examples, see *La vérité sur la question syrienne*, pp. 11-12, 15, 16, 26, 28, 48-49, 77; Sa'id, I, 43-46; Ahmad Djemal (Jemal), *Memories of a Turkish Statesman, 1913-1919* (New York: G.H. Doran Co., 1922), pp. 58-59. For post-war examples, see Sa'id, II, 35-36, 125-126.

who ruled Syria. Nor did the growth of Arabism and the Arab Revolt break the allegiance of the dominant faction of the Arab élite to Ottomanism. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the Turkish defeat, however, was different. Although the political position of the Ottomanist Arabs survived the debacle, their ideology, Ottomanism, could not survive the end of the Ottoman Empire.

Arab nationalism as a political force, then, began as a movement within the dissident faction of the Arab élite of the Ottoman Empire. Arabism won its first success, and a complete success, when the failure of the Ottoman Empire in World War I left the dominant faction of the Arab élite with no alternative to Arabism.

#### APPENDIX I. Syrian Membership of the Pre-1914 Arab Movement

##### *Overt Nationalists*

'Abd al-Ḥamīd al-Zahrāwī  
'Abd al-Raḥmān Shahbandar  
'Abd al-Wahhāb al-Inklizī  
Albayr Ḥimṣī  
'Alī al-Armanāzī  
Fā'iz al-Ghuṣayn  
Ḥaqqī al-'Azm  
Jalāl al-Bukhārī  
Khālīd al-Barāzī  
Muḥammad Kurd 'Alī  
Muḥammad Rashīd al-Rāfī'ī  
Qustanṭīn Yanī  
Rafīq al-'Azm  
Rushdī al-Sham'ah  
Shafīq al-Mu'ayyad  
Shukrī al-'Asalī  
'Umar al-Jazā'irī

##### *al-Fatāt*

'Abd al-Wahhāb Muyassir  
Aḥmad Fawzī al-Bakrī  
Aḥmad al-Ḥusaynī  
Aḥmad Maryūd  
Amīn al-Muyassir  
Aḥmad Qadrī  
'Ārif al-Shihābī  
Bahjah al-Shihābī

Fā'iz al-Shihābī  
Ismā'il al-Shihābī  
Jamil Mardam  
Khālīd al-Ḥakīm  
Muḥammad Fakhri al-Bārūdī  
Muḥammad Kāmil al-Qaṣṣāb  
Muḥammad al-Sharayqī  
Muḥibb al-Dīn al-Khaṭīb  
Nasib al-Bakrī  
Rafīq Rizq Sallūm  
Sa'id al-Bānī  
Sāmī al-Bakrī  
Sayf al-Dīn al-Khaṭīb  
Shukrī al-Shurbjī  
Ṣubḥī al-Ḥusaynī  
Taḥsīn Qadrī

##### *al-'Abd*

'Abd al-Qādir Sirrī  
'Alī Riḍa al-Ghazālī  
Amīn Luṭfi Ḥāfiz  
'Ārif al-Tawwām  
Muḥammad Ismā'il al-Ṭabbākh  
Muḥyi al-Dīn al-Jubbān  
Muṣṭafā al-Waṣfī  
Ṣādiq al-Jundī  
Salīm al-Jazā'irī  
Yaḥya Kāzim Abū al-Sharaf

#### APPENDIX II. Syrian Membership of Arab Nationalist Movement, 1919-1920

##### *The Syrian General Congress*

'Abd al-Ḥamīd al-Bārūdī  
'Abd al-Qādir al-Khaṭīb  
'Abd al-Qādir al-Kilānī  
'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Yūsuf

Aḥmad al-'Ayyāshī  
Aḥmad al-Qaḍamānī  
Dī'ās al-Jirjis  
Fā'iz al-Shihābī\*  
Fakhri al-Bārūdī\*

Fātiḥ al-Mar'ashli  
 Fawzi al-Bakrī\*  
 Fu'ād 'Abd al-Karīm  
 Ḥasan Ramaḍān  
 Hāshim al-Atāsī  
 Ḥikmat al-Ḥarākī  
 Ḥikmat al-Nayālī  
 Ibrāhīm Hanānu  
 Ilyās 'Uwayshiq  
 'Izzat al-Shāwī  
 Jalāl al-Qudsī  
 Khalīl al-Barāzī\*  
 Khalīl Abū-Rish  
 Maḥmūd Abū-Rūmīyah  
 Maḥmūd al-Fā'ūr  
 Maḥmūd Nadīm  
 Mazhar Raslān  
 Muḥammad Fawzi al-'Azm  
 Muḥammad Khayr  
 Muḥammad al-Mujtahid  
 Muḥammad al-Shurayqī\*  
 Munāḥ Hārūn  
 Muslim al-Ḥasanī  
 Nājī 'Alī Abīd  
 Nāṣir al-Muflīḥ  
 Nūrī al-Jisr  
 Sa'dullāh al-Jābirī  
 Sharīf al-Darwish  
 Ṣubḥī al-Ṭawīl  
 Tāj al-Dīn al-Ḥasanī  
 Theodore Anṭākī  
 Waṣfī al-Atāsī  
 Yūsuf al-Kayyālī  
 Yūsuf Liyānādu  
 Zakī Yahya

*The Governments*

'Abd al-Ḥamid al-Qalṭaqchī  
 'Abd al-Raḥmān Shahbandar\*  
 Aḥmad Ḥilmī  
 'Alā' al-Dīn al-Durūbī  
 'Alī Riḍa al-Rikābī\*\*  
 Fāris al-Khūrī  
 Hāshim al-Atāsī†  
 Jalāl al-Dīn al-Zuhdī  
 Jamīl al-Ulshī  
 Muṣṭafā Ni'mah  
 Sātī' al-Ḥusarī  
 Shukrī al-'Ayyūbī\*\*  
 Yūsuf al-'Azmah  
 Yūsuf al-Ḥakīm

*Army Command*

Aḥmad al-Laḥḥām  
 'Arīf al-Tawwām\*  
 Muḥammad Ismā'il al-Ṭabbākh\*  
 Muṣṭafā al-Waṣfī\*  
 Yahya Ḥayātī

*Committee of National Defense*

'Abd al-Qādir al-Khaṭīb†  
 'Abd al-Qādir Sukkar  
 As'ad al-Mālīkī  
 As'ad al-Muḥayinī  
 'Awnī al-Qaḍamānī  
 'Ayad al-Ḥalabī  
 Jamīl Mardam\*  
 Muḥammad Kāmil al-Qaṣṣāb\*  
 Muḥammad al-Naḥḥās  
 Nasīb Ḥamzah  
 Sāmī Mardam  
 Shukrī al-Ṭabbā'

*Nationalist Societies*

'Abd al-Qādir al-'Azm  
 'Ādil al-'Azmah  
 'Arīf al-Khaṭīb  
 As'ad al-Ḥakīm  
 Fawzi al-Ghāzī  
 Ḥasan al-Ḥakīm  
 Ḥusnī al-Barāzī  
 Ibrāhīm al-Mujāhid  
 Iḥsān al-Jābirī  
 Khayr al-Dīn al-Zirkalī  
 Luṭfī al-Rifā'ī  
 Muḥyi al-Dīn Ṣādiq  
 Muslim al-'Atṭār  
 Muṣṭafā Barmada  
 Muṣṭafā al-Shihābī  
 Nabīh al-'Azmah  
 Najīb al-Armanāzī  
 Riḍa al-Rifā'ī  
 Rashid Baqdūnis  
 Sāmī al-Sarrāj  
 Tawfīq al-Ḥayānī  
 Tawfīq al-Shīshaklī  
 'Umar Farḥāt  
 Yūsuf Yāsīn  
 Zakī al-Khaṭīb  
 Zakī al-Qadrī

\* Pre-1914 nationalists

\*\* Joined nationalist movement, 1914-18

† Member of Syrian General Congress

## APPENDIX III. Age (by year of birth)

	<i>Range</i>	<i>Median</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Number Known</i>	<i>Percentage Known</i>	<i>Total</i>
<b>Pre-1914 Nationalist</b>						
Overt .....	1865-1880	1871	1871	5	29.41	17
al-Fatât .....	1885-1898	1891	1891	7	29.16	24
al-'Ahd .....				none	none	10
Total .....	1865-1898	1886.5	1883	12	23.52	51
<b>1919-20 Nationalists</b>						
Syrian Gen. Cong. ....	1869-1892	1878	1880	5	12.82	39
Syrian Govts. ....	1877-1884	1883	1881.2	7	58.33	12
Comm. Nat. Def. ....	1875-1888	1881	1881	2	22.22	9
Others .....	1881-1897	1888	1888	10	38.46	26
Total .....	1869-1897	1883	1884	24	27.90	86

## APPENDIX IV. Education

	<i>Pre-1914 Arab Nationalists</i>			<i>1919-1920 Arab Nationalists</i>		
	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percent- age of knowns</i>	<i>Percent- age of total</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percent- age of knowns</i>	<i>Percent- age of total</i>
Western .....	5	16.66	9.80	4	11.76	4.65
State .....	19	63.33	37.25	25	73.52	29.05
Traditional .....	6	20.00	11.76	5	14.70	5.81
Secondary .....	4	13.33	7.84	4	11.76	4.65
Advanced .....	20	66.66	39.21	25	73.52	29.05
Total known .....	30			34		
Unknown .....	21		41.17	52		60.46
Total .....	51			86		

## APPENDIX V. Age and Education

	<i>Western</i>		<i>State</i>		<i>Traditional</i>		<i>Secondary</i>		<i>Advanced</i>		<i>Tot.</i>
	<i>No.</i>	<i>Pct.</i>	<i>No.</i>	<i>Pct.</i>	<i>No.</i>	<i>Pct.</i>	<i>No.</i>	<i>Pct.</i>	<i>No.</i>	<i>Pct.</i>	
<b>Year of Birth:</b>											
<b>1865-1876</b>											
Pre-1914 Nationalist .....	1	25.00			3	75.00	1	25.00			4
1919-1920 Nationalist .....			2	100.00					2	100.00	2
<b>1877-1888</b>											
Pre-1914 Nationalist .....	1	33.33	2	66.66			2	66.66	1	33.33	3
1919-1920 Nationalist .....	1	7.14	13	92.85			3	21.42	11	78.57	14
<b>1865-1888</b>											
Pre-1914 Nationalist .....	2	28.57	2	28.57	3	42.85	3	42.85	1	14.28	7
1919-1920 Nationalist .....	1	6.25	15	93.75			3	18.75	13	81.25	16
<b>1889-1897</b>											
Pre-1914 Nationalist .....	3	60.00	2	40.00					5	100.00	5
1919-1920 Nationalist .....	3	50.00	3	50.00					6	100.00	6
<b>1865-1888 and Birth-year unknown</b>											
Pre-1914 Nationalist .....	2	8.00	17	68.00	6	24.00	4	16.00	15	60.00	25
1919-1920 Nationalist .....	1	3.57	22	78.57	5	17.85	4	14.28	19	67.85	28

## APPENDIX VI. Family Status

	<i>Pre-1914 Arab Nationalists</i>			<i>1919-1920 Arab Nationalists</i>		
	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percent- age of knowns</i>	<i>Percent- age of total</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percent- age of knowns</i>	<i>Percent- age of total</i>
Landowner .....	22	62.85	43.13	31	53.44	36.04
Landowner-scholar ..	9	25.71	17.65	24	41.37	27.90
Merchant-scholar ...	1	2.85	1.96	1	1.72	1.16
Merchant .....	2	5.71	3.92	1	1.72	1.16
Banker .....	1	2.85	1.96	1	1.72	1.16
Total known .....	35			58		
Unknown .....	16		31.37	28		32.55
Total .....	51			86		

## APPENDIX VII. Occupation

	<i>Pre-1914 Arab Nationalists</i>			<i>1919-1920 Arab Nationalists</i>		
	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percent- age of knowns</i>	<i>Percent- age of total</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percent- age of knowns</i>	<i>Percent- age of total</i>
Landowner .....	5	13.51	9.80	10	21.78	11.62
Landowner-scholar ...				2	4.34	2.32
State dignitaries						
Religious dignitary.				2	4.34	2.32
Governor .....	3	8.10	5.88	5	10.86	5.81
Official .....	3	8.10	5.88	9	19.56	10.46
Total .....	6	16.20	11.76	16	34.76	18.59
Military officer .....	11	29.72	21.56	7	15.21	8.13
Scholar .....	2	5.40	3.92	1	2.17	1.16
Journalist .....	4	10.81	7.84			
Professionals						
Lawyer .....	5	13.51	9.80	3	6.52	3.48
Physician .....	2	5.40	3.92	2	4.34	2.32
Engineer .....	1	2.70	1.96	2	4.34	2.32
Educator .....				2	4.34	2.32
Total .....	8	21.61	15.68	9	19.54	10.44
Banker .....	1	2.70	1.96	1	2.17	1.16
Total known .....	37			46		
Unknown .....	14		27.45	40		46.51
Total .....	51			86		

APPENDIX VIII. Family Status of Journalists, Professionals, and Officials

	<i>Journalists</i>				<i>Professionals</i>				<i>Officials</i>			
	<i>Pre-1914 Arab Nationalists</i>		<i>1919-1920 Arab Nationalists</i>		<i>Pre-1914 Arab Nationalists</i>		<i>1919-1920 Arab Nationalists</i>		<i>Pre-1914 Arab Nationalists</i>		<i>1919-1920 Arab Nationalists</i>	
	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percentages</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percentages</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percentages</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percentages</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percentages</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percentages</i>
Landowner .....			1	12.50	5	55.55	5	83.33	6	42.85		
Landowner-scholar .....	1	25.00	3	37.50	1	11.11			3	21.44		
Merchant .....	1	25.00										
Unknown .....	2	50.00	4	50.00	3	33.33	1	16.66	5	35.71		
Total .....	4		8		9		6		14			

APPENDIX IX. Father's Occupation

	<i>Pre-1914 Arab Nationalists</i>			<i>1919-1920 Arab Nationalists</i>		
	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percentage of known</i>	<i>Percentage of Total</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percentage of known</i>	<i>Percentage of Total</i>
Landowner .....	9	60.00	17.64			
Landowner-Scholar ..				3	16.66	3.48
Religious Dignitary ..	2	13.33	3.92	12	66.66	13.95
Governor .....				1	5.55	1.16
Scholar .....	3	20.00	5.88			
Merchant .....	1	6.66	1.96			
Physician .....				1	5.55	1.16
Banker .....				1	5.55	1.16
Total Known .....	15			18		
Unknown .....	36		70.58	68		79.06
Total .....	51			86		