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## FOREWORD

This volume is the third in the series of *Proceedings and Papers of the Georgia Association of Historians*. It includes a selection of papers from the 1982 annual meeting as well as several other papers submitted for publication by members of the Association. The five members of the Publications Committee refereed papers for the volume. Editorial responsibility resides with the Editor-in-Chief and two Co-Editors, chosen by the Executive Council of the Association. Opinions expressed in the articles, however, are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily represent the view of the Association.

This year, the use of offset printing, rather than photocopying, has greatly enhanced the appearance of our volume. The generosity of Kennesaw College has made possible this change. GAH President Fred Roach and Kennesaw College Academic Dean Eugene Huck were instrumental in securing funds for this endeavor; members of the Publications Committee wish to extend our appreciation to both for their efforts on behalf of the Association.

The Ninth Annual Meeting of the GAH was held at the Augusta Hilton on April 30-May 1, 1982. For the first time a session was featured on Friday afternoon; it was followed by a reception at the Fuqua Center, housed in the antebellum home of Georgia historian Charles C. Jones Jr. Members of the Music Department of Augusta College presented a program featuring songs and music of the Civil War era.

The Keynote Address, presented at the Good Shepherd Episcopal Church, was given by Kenneth Stein, Assistant Professor of Near Eastern History at Emory University. Dr. Stein received his Ph.D. from the University of Michigan in 1971. In addition to his teaching duties, he heads the Emory Center for International Studies. Dr. Stein spoke on "The Contemporary Middle East in Historical Perspective." After the Keynote Address, outgoing GAH President Joan Huffman presented the Association's Hugh McCall Award to Joseph O. Baylen, Regents' Professor of History at Georgia State University. A dinner reception, hosted by the GAH Local Arrangements Committee (chaired by Helen Callahan) and the Richmond County Historical Society, completed the Friday program.

Included in the Saturday morning sessions were discussions on research in European Archives; papers on teaching in secondary schools, colleges, and universities; and a presentation concerning the Georgia Endowment for the Humanities. A general session featured Dr. Samuel Gammon, executive director of the American Historical Association.

Other papers in the volume address a variety of topics ranging from Frederick Jackson Turner's writing to the abolition of suttee in India. Of special interest is one by Joan Huffman describing the work of the GAH.

The Publications Committee invites any Association member to submit their research for possible inclusion in the 1983 volume. A statement of Editorial Policy is provided elsewhere in this edition.

Ann W. Ellis  
Editor-in-Chief

# THE EMERGENCE OF TERRITORIAL NATIONALISM IN THE CONTEMPORARY ARAB MIDDLE EAST\*

By KENNETH W. STEIN, EMORY UNIVERSITY

The final Israeli withdrawal from Egyptian Sinai on 25 April 1982 was an important historical watershed in contemporary Middle Eastern history. Immediately, it completed one phase of a diplomatic effort. It vindicated former Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's decision to use negotiations rather than war to achieve political ends. It saw the Israelis fulfill a territorial withdrawal commitment based upon the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty signed in March 1979. It initiated a testing period between Egypt and Israel. The bilateral relationship underwent severe strain but did not break during 1982. Egypt severely faulted Israel's invasion of Lebanon and ultimately withdrew her ambassador from Tel Aviv over the massacre of Palestinian refugees in Beirut. Egyptian reaction and the Israeli campaign in Lebanon itself demonstrated that both countries face differing political and strategic pressures from an estranged Arab world. How Egypt and Israel respectively deal with other Arab capitals and the Palestine question on the one hand, while preserving their respective national interests on the other, influences the pace and scope of their bilateral relationship.

But historically, the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai had broader implications. First of all, it enhanced U.S. participation in the diplomatic process which began in earnest in the middle of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Israel and its ideological compatriot Zionism have always sought support and protection from a great power. But Egypt has spent most of her recent political history ridding the area of Ottoman interference, British colonialism, and Russian domination. Now, the United States is not only diplomatic mid-wife but Egypt has accepted the presence of foreigners (not U.N. troops) on her soil in the guise of the 2,600 man Multinational Force Observers in the Sinai. Events in the summer of 1982, which included the negotiating successes of Ambassador Philip Habib, the placement of U.S. marines in Beirut within a multinational force, and the Reagan proposals of September 1982 confirm the central role the U.S. seeks to play and is asked to play in the Arab-Israeli controversy.

Second, Egypt's recognition of Israel as a nation state in the region has deep philosophical and political implications. An Arab state is willing to sign a peace treaty with a Jewish state in the middle of the Muslim heartland. In the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict the concept of mutual exclusivity has

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\*Dr. Stein revised his address in October 1982 to take into account events of the previous summer in the Middle East.

lesser value. Egypt validated the European born export of Jewish nationalism—Zionism. Egypt reaffirmed territorial nationalism and western political norms in inter-state relations. U.N. Resolution 242 of November 1967 and the Camp David Accords are the frameworks for a diplomatic process. The question is no longer whether Israel should be recognized but in what territorial dimensions. Furthermore, by accepting Israeli sovereignty and supporting the establishment of a Palestinian state, Egypt endorsed a western originated principle of self-determination. Indeed, ever since Napoleon landed in Egypt at the end of the 18th century, the Middle Eastern political landscape has been increasingly influenced by western norms of political behavior and political organization.

Thirdly, the very presence and acceptance of Israel confirmed that the Arab Middle East continues to react to the West. Islam and the might of Islamic states have not been strong enough to deny Jewish nation-state existence. Egyptian acceptance of Israel has in fact demoralized many Muslim Arab states, and it comes at a time when those societies are being transformed by western styles, mores, and technology.

Fourthly, Egyptian acceptance of Israel has relevance for inter-Arab political affairs as well. It comes when territorial identity is more salient than trans-national Arabism. It occurs when inter-Arab unity is in an advanced stage of decline. Individual national consciousness is greater than a pan-Arab or pan-Muslim political orientation. In fact, Egypt's acceptance of Israel further divides an already politically splintered Arab world.

But the presence of Arab unity was not a necessary prerequisite for Sadat to travel to Jerusalem in November 1977. Subsequent to his Jerusalem visit, the Arab world was unable to form a continuous, collective and cohesive response to what was termed "Sadat's treasonous act." Parochial state disputes, religious animosities, and intra-regional differences prevented the emergence of such a response. National interests were greater than pan-Arab interests. Even the quintessential pan-Arab cause of Palestine could not evoke a semblance of unity until after the PLO's 1982 military setback in Lebanon. In support of Palestinian interests, the national egos of individual Arab countries were restrained during the twelfth Arab summit conference in Fez in September 1982. But the facade of unity at the summit did not eliminate national disagreements, it merely postponed their discussion.<sup>1</sup>

Sadat made a conscious choice to turn inward and away from the pan-Arabism of his predecessor, Gamal Abdal Nasser. Pressing domestic needs in Egypt required Sadat's attention. But before that turn inward could be effected Sadat needed and wanted the absolute and total return of all Egyptian land. He traded recognition of Israel for the return of Egyptian territory. In the process he understood that western technology, military support, and financial aid would be available from the United States. The priority of uniquely Egyptian interests like the recognition of Israeli sovereignty demonstrated that territorial nationalism as a political structure in the Middle East had taken firm root. Sadat's policies suggested that Egyptian advocacy of pan-Arabism is a necessary but not sufficient criteria for Arab

unity. Sadat demonstrated an acceptance of political reality while eschewing sloganeering. The recognition of Israel revealed that uneasy attitudes toward foreigners and traditional discriminating attitudes towards non-Muslims (Jews) were in the initial stages of transition.

Traditionally, the relationship between the Arab Middle East and the West had been strained at best, and, vehemently antagonistic at worst. But in the 1970s Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy, the Disengagement Accords, the Jerusalem visit, American financial aid, the Camp David Framework, the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, and the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai demonstrated that at least one Arab leader could make peace with and through the West. Since the Sadat response was so unique and perhaps even as some claim an historical aberration, it is worthwhile to trace first, how the Muslim Arab Middle East uniformly reacted to the West, and second, why the uniform manner of that reaction is dwindling.

## II

Historically the West coveted the Middle East. Its geographic position made it a crossroads of trade in ancient and medieval times; more recently, the Suez Canal provided European and Mediterranean littoral states with economic and strategic access to the Red Sea and beyond. Religiously, the area nurtured the evolution of three monotheistic belief systems and hence became an object of veneration and jealousy. The Crusades, Crimean War, and the Arab-Israeli conflict all possess overtones and underpinnings of religious fervor. Economically, the sands of the Arabian peninsula hold the largest known oil reserves in the free world; petro-dollars continue to spawn western pilgrimages to oil rich capitals and influence the foreign policies of oil importing nations. And strategically in the 1970s, the Soviet Union and the United States ringed the oil producing regions with their respective physical presence, bilateral arrangements, and friendship treaties in efforts to control or deny portions of the region to the other.

In addition to the wide variety of external interests which prompted an aggressive West to covet the Middle East, the region itself invited outside penetration. Its internal weaknesses contributed to an inability to hold back the West. The region has been traditionally fragmented by sectarian, tribal, and geographic strife. Such strong allegiances to religious ideology, clan, and local orientations precluded the emergence of strong political structures, the political integration of society, and continuity in government. In fact, continuity in political legitimacy<sup>2</sup> has been traditionally absent.

Instead, loyalty to the patriarch, resulting from a harsh desert influence, promoted authoritarianism and loyalty to kinship. The citizens' fidelity and respect for the local or regional ruler and bureaucracy were slow in evolving. Central governments and bureaucracies were considered alien and oppressive.<sup>3</sup> High rates of taxation and repeated military conscription of the rural peasantry hindered the emergence of confidence in government. Moreover, since the beginning of Islam 1400 years ago, Middle Eastern regimes and dynasties have actively struggled with tensions of allegiance between Islam's

core concept of community on the one hand, and the atavistic identification with smaller family and social units on the other. Lastly, the comparative strength of the West with its resources, technological advancements, and military prowess, placed the peoples of the Middle East in a dependent or vassal relationship with the industrialized West. Thus, the Middle East became susceptible to penetration which included the structure of territorial nationalism, western physical presence, and secularizing norms.

Territorial nationalism emphasized protection of specific boundaries. It challenged the universality of Islam. Allegiance to a state presented a clear alternative to an identity with the pan-territorial Islamic community of believers. Man-made constitutions with an emendation process were offered instead of the prophetically born Koran with its immutable prescriptions. Individual and equal rights were touted in opposition to the importance of ancestral and ascriptive rights. Institutional development of the press, political parties, parliaments, and an independent judiciary challenged the exclusivity of authoritarian political-religious leaders who traditionally manipulated and influenced these constituencies. The advocacy of elections and civil liberties implied self determination and equality before the law, a contrast to an historically limited, or controlled franchise. Most strikingly, territorial nationalism of its secular variety preached at its core a separation of church and state, whereas in Muslim Arab societies Islam remains vibrant both as religion and polity. The role which Islam plays in each country today is different in scope and depth. Yet in all regions of the Middle East over the past several centuries, Islamic values have been eroded to some degree or other.<sup>4</sup> The *Shari'a* or holy doctrine that partially regulated the religious, political, social, domestic, and private life of a Muslim in the medieval Arab Middle East has been steadily modified along European and secular lines.

Coincident with the entry of territorial and secular nationalist identities in the region in the 19th century, the area was under the physical occupation of the British and French. A dual response from the Muslim Arab population was necessary: first to the new ideological norms and political systems, and second to Great Power presence. The French applied their cultural and religious interests in North Africa and the Levant while the British physically occupied Egypt in 1882. A more extensive French and British presence came after World War I. The French were ensconced in Syria and Lebanon and the British in Iraq, Transjordan, Palestine, and in a treaty relationship with Saudi Arabia by the early 1930s.

Obviously, the nature of the indigenous population's response to the notions inherent in Rousseau's *Social Contract* and to territorial nationalism was colored by the physical presence of the Great Powers. That presence prevented a thorough, introspective, and patient response to territorial nationalism. Methods or styles of applying nationalism to the traditional and Islamic background did not evolve uniformly or naturally. Arab intellectuals who advocated an Arab response to the norms of nationalism were relatively few in number, divergent in method and approach, ideologically splintered over the role Islam should play in society, and often physically exiled and

distant from the populations they sought to influence. Moreover, the physical oppression of the Ottoman Sultan and Young Turk leadership in the late 19th and early 20th centuries forced Arab leaders interested in nationalism to make an unwelcome alliance with Great Britain and France. The Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire exchanged Turkish control for Great Power presence. The prime focus of the nationalists then concentrated on ridding the area of the colonial powers. In dealing with the Great Powers genuine Arab national aspirations were evoked. But while carrying on the nationalist struggle the Arab political elite carefully preserved its own political superiority, social standing, and economic interests.

In the absence of a geographically distinct Arab nation in the Fertile Crescent during the Ottoman period, political leadership fell to local religious leaders, urban landowners, merchants, and dynasts. This leadership enjoyed virtually unchecked local authority in the latter stages of the Ottoman Empire's decline. The Ottoman central government's power in the Arab provinces had been weak, inefficient and unenforceable. Manipulating positions of local political power and influence, the Arab elite was easily able to protect its prerogatives once the Great Powers arrived. This local Arab elite, which ultimately became the national leadership, carefully and cleverly interposed itself between the ruling Great Power above and the majority illiterate rural population below. Just as local elites had managed and misused the Ottoman bureaucracy, the newly clothed Arab national leadership was able to exploit recently grafted constitutional systems to preserve its own prerogatives. In the post-World War I period, Arab nationalist zeal was publicly advocated. But privately, the Arab nationalist elite was less responsive to the needs of the majority population and more inclined to maintain its own personal status and preserve its well-being.

During the post-war Mandate period, political parties and parliaments became almost the exclusive domain of this self-anointed and usually landed segment in Arab societies. Not surprisingly, the British and French took good advantage of the political fragmentation existent between and among nationalist groups. The British and French increased, maintained, and prolonged their imperial presence by playing off against one another religious leaders, dynasts, landowners, and merchants.

Ultimately, many of these elites were discredited for their associations with the Great Powers and ineffectiveness as national leaders. By the end of World War II, the constitutional experiment in secular nationalism had basically failed. Public confidence in the actors had been destroyed by "rigged elections, musical chair cabinets, suspended constitutions, arbitrary arrests, playboy monarchs, and the absence of reform legislation." A political vacuum was created in Egypt and the Levant as the great powers withdrew and the nationalists were not trusted. Emerging ultimately to fill the political void in the post-colonial period were young military leaders who took the reigns of power and held them. In Egypt at least, the power struggle developed between a resurgent Islamic identity and the chauvinist minded military, with the latter prevailing.

The indigenous response to both secular nationalism and great power presence greatly influenced the subsequent course of contemporary Middle Eastern politics. But the methods of western liberal secular nationalism—free elections, self determination of peoples, and a sharing of power functions—failed to take root. Yet the physical legacy of separate nation states remained as each country found a need and way to rid itself of its colonial tutor.

During World War I, Arab nationalists hoped eagerly for independence. They were encouraged by various British and French promises, statements, and declarations for freedom from Turkish oppression. But by the end of the war that aspiration was frustrated. The mandate borders were artificially imposed upon the region. They almost totally discounted topography, ethnicity, and historical claims of dynasty and rule. The fact that the Mandates were imposed upon the area helped to generate the evolution of separate nation states. Yet, inherent in the mandate concept was trusteeship. A great power tutored those Arab areas formerly oppressed by the Ottoman-Turkish Empire. The slow process of granting full independence to Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Transjordan, and Egypt frustrated Arab nationalists. Indeed, these post-World War I geographic divisions of the Middle East catalyzed late 19th century attempts at philosophical confrontations with the West. But the effort to evoke supra-national, pan-Arab, or pan-Islamic response eventually failed. Instead, parochial national interests and a madcap modernizing environment overwhelmed the Middle East.

A sense of unfulfilled promises for the Great Powers emerged. British support for the development of a Jewish National Home compounded Arab national frustrations. During the inter-war period the Palestine question became an important issue in inter-Arab politics. Since the establishment of Israel in 1948, the Arab world has felt unjustly forced to provide the Jews a homeland because of European "guilt" from the holocaust. The Arab world blamed only external factors for the loss of Palestine. It did not look at its own structural weaknesses or associated complicity which contributed to Israel's creation.

What remained, however, was a deep antipathy and distrust for the West. Responsibility for the creation and sustenance of Israel was placed at the feet of the Great Powers. Colonialism and imperialism were culpable. As recently as December 1978, Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia said that "the major powers handed Palestine to a malicious racist Zionist in the ugliest operation in contemporary history."<sup>6</sup> In March 1982, Mohammad Hasanayn Haykal, a close associate of the late President Nasser and former editor of the Egyptian daily *Al-Ahram* noted, "Israel was an alien body implanted in the area by the West."<sup>7</sup>

Meanwhile, the borders drawn and the states created after World War I either separated tribal groups interested in autonomous rule or forced together religious groups that did not like each other's company. The Armenians and Kurds did not obtain independence. Christians in Lebanon and Jews in Palestine were protected by the adoption of governmental systems that supported their precarious demographic presence. By establishing a separate



Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine, Syrian historical claims to these portions of "Greater Syria" were immediately denied. These and other topographic, ethnic, and historic problems remained as potentially divisive but dormant issues until the great powers left the region. But once the external physical presence was gone the small measure of cohesion, unity, and organization that had developed against the British and French also evaporated.

The political legacy that remained was indigenously authoritarian in style. It expressed itself through centrally controlled parties, parliaments, and the press. Regimes defended particularistic national interests after numerous aborted attempts at regional unity failed. Most of the monarchs and landowners were no longer in power. Politically inexperienced officer politicians took over the reigns of government. Ideologies such as Nasserism, Ba'athism, Arab socialism, and non-Alignment consumed the area in the 1950s and 1960s. They all reflected a common desire to be free of foreign or external influence, to promote Arab independence, and to achieve a level of economic progress. These ideologies did not disappear but they lost their fervor and pitch by the 1970s. Devotion to these philosophies was not immediately replaced but became increasingly laced with concerns of regime longevity, consumerism, technology transfer, and Islamic resurgence.

### III

Atomization of Arab unity that would take place in the late 1970s was delayed by the presence of external forces and issues. Still, the Middle East was reacting to stimuli originating in the West. Neither the aborted French, British, and Israeli effort to take the Suez Canal in October-November 1956 nor the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 did much to instill trust for foreign powers. On the other hand the French departure from Algeria in 1963 and the Russian expulsion from Egypt in 1972 significantly diminished the importance which xenophobia played in maintaining Arab unity.

The Palestine question too provided a measure of unity for the Arab world. Israel's establishment continued to engender a collective animosity. Blame continued to be placed upon the West for allowing Israel's creation, recognition, and continued sustenance. But Sadat's trip to Jerusalem diluted the value which the Palestine issue possessed as a cement for Arab unity. Since 1977 the Palestine question or its obverse, negotiation, recognition or peace with Israel, has become an issue of divisiveness and rancor in inter-Arab politics.

In the 1970s other variables emerged which further fragmented Arab unity and stimulated parochial nationalism. These included a renaissance of Islamic identity, the oil and consumer revolution, sophistication and growth of public constituencies, and regional political conflicts.

The revolution in Iran and the reinvigoration of Islamic values were in themselves reactions to the western penetration. Ayatollah Khomeyni like the prophet Muhammad reacted to growing crass individualism, commercialism, and a perceived social malaise. Since 1979 regimes in Saudi Arabia, Syria, Egypt, and the Persian Gulf have been challenged directly by individuals,

groups, and ideologies that do not want pristine Islamic norms subordinated to a particular nationalism or its leader. The Grand Mosque at Mecca was unceremoniously seized in November 1979. The Saudi regime was religiously vilified by Colonel Qaddafi of Libya. In March 1982, Qaddafi rhetorically asked, "Has Islam an enemy worse than Saudi Arabia?"<sup>8</sup> In Syria, the Muslim Brotherhood questioned the legitimacy and threatened the regime of President Hafez al-Asad sufficiently for him to annihilate between 4,000 and 10,000 Muslim Brotherhood members or their supporters in January and February 1982.<sup>9</sup> In Egypt, Sadat's crackdown on religious zealots in September 1981, his assassination by one of them the following month, and President Mubarak's subsequent effort to expunge and reduce Islamic strength in the military, security services, and population at large were indicative of the active confrontation between secularizing values and Islamic norms. And among Arab states along the Persian Gulf, there remains considerable anxiety about the influence that the Islamic Republic of Iran will have upon their citizens' loyalty. Fear exists among these predominantly *sunni* Muslim countries that an Iraqi defeat in the Gulf war will make their *shi'a* populations susceptible to Ayatollah Khomeyni's Islamic militancy. This in combination with Soviet presence in Afghanistan forced the creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council for the purpose of mutual self-defense. Protection of national identity, economic power, and regime survival remain critical priorities.

A second factor enhancing separate national interests in the region is Arab oil production. The oil revolution brought into dramatic focus the disparities of wealth between the population rich-oil poor countries and the oil rich-population poor countries in the Middle East. Jealousies over the control of oil production and pricing as well as over the allocation of excess petro-dollars is evident. But the world wide recession, alternative non-OPEC oil and energy sources, and some conservation have forced production and pricing cutbacks. This caused modification of domestic development programs and petro-dollar supported foreign policies. Furthermore, the world oil glut has had a secondary effect on non-oil producing countries through the great demand for foreign workers in the oil producing areas. Over the last decade these semi-permanent expatriates and their host countries have become extraordinarily dependent upon the billions of dollars sent home in remittances. It is estimated that foreign workers compose 37 percent of the Saudi population, 80 percent in the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, and approximately half the population in Kuwait.<sup>10</sup> Production cutbacks caused a reduction of remittances for oil poor countries. It also forced some expatriates to return to host countries already over-supplied with laboring classes. Lesser funds with more people to service generates attention toward pressing domestic problems and away from distant pan-Arab unity.

Third, the communications revolution, rural-urban migration, consumerism, and greater degrees of literacy have made the modernizing Arab more aware of what he does not have and what his personal aspirations should be. At social gatherings and private parties among the upper-middle and rising middle classes in Arab countries discussions are punctuated if not dominated

by the number and kind of cars, videotape decks, and jewelry owned or what was recently purchased abroad. Greater concern is given to personal materialism. Less attention is focused on the traditional extended family, community interests, spiritual or pan-national issues. As a result, community conformist behavior, a value for which Islam strove, contends actively with individually oriented goals.

In addition, there are now more constituencies which require attention in individual Arab countries. These constituencies are more varied, complex, and numerous than in previous decades. Each constituency covets its own institutional turf and seeks to broaden its influence. Each cautiously monitors the other's prerogatives. The media, intelligensia, military, bureaucracy, technocracy, middle class, religious community, and a massive group of Arab university graduates must relate to one another. Reluctantly, they must share a limited and for some an inadequate economic pie. The respective strengths of these constituencies and their interrelationships demand greater attention by decision-makers.

And last, intra-regional political and religious conflicts have sapped the strength of Arab unity. Three distinct yet overlapping conflict areas are identifiable: first the Persian Gulf region; second the confessional, ideological, national and territorial disputes encompassing Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, the PLO, and Israel; and third, the Arab-Israeli conflict and the nature of Egypt's position within it. Furthermore, there are the fractious bilateral disputes which contribute to Arab political disarray. These include the historically uneasy Jordanian-Syrian animosity which saw the countries almost come to military confrontation at the end of 1980; the Iran-Iraq confrontation which has engendered intense division within the Arab world and cost the respective contenders tens of thousands of lives and billions of dollars; the Libyan-Saudi dispute over religious form and practice; Sudanese-Libyan tensions; the longstanding Iraqi-Syrian conflict that contains leadership, religious, philosophical, and resource components; and the geographically distant Moroccan-Algerian conflict over the future of the mineral rich sub-Saharan region.

At this point in Middle Eastern history, the Arab world remains dominated by parochial national concerns, rather than primarily pan-Arab interests. President Sadat's emphasis on Egyptianism, his trip to Jerusalem, and establishment of bilateral relations with Israel substantiates this premise. Saudi financial and military coziness with the United States is more dominant than Riyadh's pan-Arab or third world identity. Most recently during the Israeli seige of Beirut, with the exception of Syria, the Arab world shunned its primary pan-Arab issue by giving little but vocal support to the PLO. Jordan's King Husayn was almost silent. The Saudi monarchy did not employ an oil embargo or petrodollar withdrawal from the U.S., but rather engaged in characteristically circumspect backstage diplomacy. Egyptian President Mubarak, though not attending the Arab summit conference at Fez in September 1982, embraced the PLO politically but did not break diplomatic relations with Israel.

National self-interest was greater than full unqualified support of the PLO. In August 1982, Mahmud Abbas, a PLO executive committee member remarked that "Arab solidarity was at its worst."<sup>11</sup> In the same month a political commentary in an Egyptian newspaper said the Arab world was "suffering from fragmentation, division, regional disputes and a widening gap of lack of confidence between the ruler and the ruled. . . ."<sup>12</sup> While the Arab summit conference at Fez resolved to invoke the Arab League's collective defense arrangements in support of Iraq in its war with Iran, those same commitments were neither made for Lebanon nor for the PLO. PLO chairman Yassir Arafat and the Arab League captured the immediate spotlight after Fez and the Beirut massacre. However, that media focus did nothing to remove the other underlying social strains, regional disputes, economic disparities and differing ideological philosophies in the Arab world.

Arab reaction to the West is still a process that causes fermentation and resentment. While the U.S. was blamed as an accessory to the Beirut massacres, U.S. troops were required to monitor an ethnically explosive Lebanon. Meanwhile, if viewed in historical perspective, the Middle East is in a period of profound individualistic and nationalistic definition. A permanent state of tension and transition remains as Middle Eastern peoples and countries seek accommodations to western-bred mores, secularism, and consumerism in a context of traditional and Islamic values.

#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup>See remarks by King Hasan of Morocco to the Arab foreign ministers preliminary conference in Casablanca, 28 August 1982 as quoted in the *Foreign Broadcast Information Served—Middle East* (hereafter *FBIS-ME*), 31 August 1982, p. A2.

<sup>2</sup>Michael Hudson, *Arab Politics*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), pp. 1-30.

<sup>3</sup>Kamal Karpat, "The Transformation of the Ottoman State 1789-1908," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, (1972), p. 249.

<sup>4</sup>Cf. Emanuel Sivan, "How Fares Islam?" *The Jerusalem Quarterly*, Fall 1979, pp. 33-46.

<sup>5</sup>Malcolm Kerr, "Arab Radical Notions of Democracy," *St Anthony's Papers XVI, Middle Eastern Affairs*, 1963, p. 9. See also Nadav Safran, *Egypt in Search of Political Community*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), pp. 181-228; Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid-Marsot, *Egypt's Liberal Experiment: 1922-1936*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).

<sup>6</sup>Riyadh Domestic Service, 21 December 1978, 0600 GMT as quoted in *FBIS-ME*, 21 December 1978.

<sup>7</sup>Interview with Mohammad Hasanayn Haykal by Mona Said, *Monday Morning* (Beirut), 22-28 March 1982, pp. 36-44 as quoted in *FBIS-ME*, 26 March 1982, p. D3.

<sup>8</sup>Colonel Mu'ammarr al-Qaddafi, *Address to the Libyan People's Congress*, 3 March 1982, as quoted in *FBIS-ME*, 5 March 1982, p. Q8.

<sup>9</sup>See *FBIS-ME*, 23 February 1982, p. H3 and *FBIS-ME*, 1 March 1982, p. H6.

<sup>10</sup>*Gulf Daily News*, 18 August 1982, pp. 8 and 9.

<sup>11</sup>Remarks by Mahmud Abbas in *Al-Watan* (Kuwait), 3 August 1982.

<sup>12</sup>See commentary in *Al-Ahali* (Egypt), 4 August 1982.